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Abstract 
Converting potential organ donors into actual donors is a complex process, 
orchestrated by highly specialised physicians. The process is dependent on a 
physician's motivation and confidence, yet theory and current research do not 
effectively explain this. Following a Constructionist Grounded Theory and 
Situational Analysis approach, 15 Intensive Care Unit and Emergency Department 
physicians were interviewed across six major metropolitan hospitals in Victoria 
and New South Wales, Australia. Differences in the interpretation and practice of 
the patient best interests standard were found to affect physicians' motivation and 
confidence to convert potential donors. Measures taken to avoid a conflict of 
interest can be divided according to three secondary categories observed in the 
data: prioritising operational responsibilities; determining ethics; and seeking 
legal clarity and consistency. A physician's role in organ donation requires 
significant personal effort but it was revealed this effort is deemed warranted only 
if organ donation becomes the treating family's priority. Interviewees resisted 
pressure to re-order organ donation amongst their own role priorities as they 
believed it may either challenge their duty-of-care, or potentially expose them to 
misinterpretation by colleagues, patients' families, and the media. There was 
ongoing unease regarding the ethics of Donation after Cardiac Death and 
uncertainty about the operational and legal aspects of Donation after Brain Death. 
Furthermore, Australia's consent registers were not highly regarded by the 
physicians. Overall, interviewees revealed strong support for organ donation but 
would not consider it part of end of life care, representing a major obstacle to the 
support of more potential donor opportunities. It is suggested that inconsistencies 
v 
in opinion, policy, and practice, as well as the perceived deficit of more specific 
public consent information, may negatively impact the motivation, confidence, 
and ultimate behaviours of physicians and the families they are treating. This 
theory-building research indicates that the key to unlocking Australia's potential 
donor pool is to ethically and legally broaden the patient best interests standard by 
making registered consents more meaningful. It offers a unique and raw insight in 
to the "gatekeepers" experience, a perspective not normally available to those 
outside the field, nor in such detail to those within it. 
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Chapter One: Organ Donation in Australia 
1.1. Introduction and Thesis Overview 
1 
On both clinical and economic grounds, organ transplantation has become the 
treatment of choice, if not of last resort, for many very serious medical conditions. 
Transplantable organs include the kidneys, heart, lungs, liver, and pancreas, while 
transplantable tissues include the heart valves, bone tissue, skin tissue, corneas, 
and bone marrow. In addition to overcoming diseases of these organs and tissues, 
transplantation can treat life threatening illnesses such as diabetes, cystic fibrosis, 
blindness, and leukemia. As is the case across the developed world, Australia's 
most concerning transplantation issue is our shortage of donors. 
Empirical research indicates that while Australia's organ donation rate is 
comparable to some countries in the western world, it is significantly lower than 
many others. This is despite various attempts to increase the rate using public 
awareness campaigns, changes to the donor legislation, and to the donor 
recruitment process. This paper will argue that despite these efforts, there remains 
a significant disparity between our potential and actual donation rate. The barriers 
that currently limit organ donation in Australia will be outlined, as well as the 
pathways that may be more effective at increasing rates. It will be argued that the 
most effective pathway is to examine the experience of gatekeepers of the 
donation process, who are the physicians of intensive care units (leU). These 
physicians, who specialise in the care of critically ill patients, are dually referred 
to as intensivists throughout the paper due the common usage of this term in 
Australian healthcare settings. It will be shown that these intensivists have a 
unique capacity to directly impact donation rates. This is because it is their 
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responsibility to determine potential organ donation opportunities, as well as 
when and how to convert these patients in to actual organ donors. 
2 
Through an examination of the empirical literature, the main factors 
influencing health professionals' involvement in organ donation will be discussed 
in Chapter Two. These factors include the attitudes, actions, knowledge, 
communication styles, fears, and experiences of physicians, nurses, and medical 
students worldwide, as well as the limitations and practicalities of the hospital unit 
that must be considered in any evaluation of the donation process. It will be 
argued that both the research and theories proposed to date do not effectively 
explain a physician's behaviour in the organ donor conversion process and the 
need for qualitative, theory-building research is outlined. In response to these 
deficits, an empirical research design is described in Chapter Three that is aimed 
at better comprehending what factors are associated with physician facilitation of 
donor conversion. 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six will present and discuss the analysis of this 
unique Australian research paradigm. It will be collectively demonstrated that 
physicians use the patient best interests standard to guide their ultimate 
conversion behaviour, yet inconsistency and ambiguity in the interpretation, 
policy, and practice of this ethical pedestal are negatively affecting physician 
motivation and confidence levels. To elucidate these differences, the three results 
chapters have been divided according to the three secondary categories that 
broadly figure in a physician's bid to minimise posing a conflict of interest: 
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prioritising operational responsibilities; determining ethics; and seeking legal 
clarity and consistency. 
3 
Chapter Seven, the final chapter, is a synthesis of current findings in relation 
to the previous research and theoretical offerings. It also introduces what has been 
lacking-a substantive model to comprehensively explain intensivists' motivation 
and confidence to convert potential organ donors. As well as providing a platform 
for larger studies, it is hoped this research will facilitate a re-evaluation of current 
donation procedures by offering a conceptual framework upon which national 
policy makers and hospital administrators could structure nationally consistent 
policy development. Furthermore, health professional and public education 
recommendations are provided to assist policy makers more effectively influence 
behavior, and help reap the medical, economic, and social benefits that even the 
smallest increase in our organ donation rate would bestow. 
1.2. The Historical Importance of Organ Donation 
Australia's first successful transplant operation (pancreatic) took place at 
Westmead Hospital in 1911. Corneal transplants were recorded in Australia in 
1941, followed by kidney attempts in 1956 (first successful in 1965), heart and 
liver transplants in 1968, heart/lung combined in 1986 and single lung in 1990 
(Queenslanders Donate, 2007). Approximately 30,000 Australians have received 
life-saving transplants over the past 40 years (LIFEGift, 2007a). Much of this 
figure is only made possible because up to ten people can potentially benefit from 
a sole donor using organs including the kidneys, heart, lungs, liver and pancreas; 
or from tissues including heart valves, bone tissue, skin tissue, corneas and bone 
marrow. In addition to overcoming diseases of these organs and tissues, 
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transplantation has overcome life threatening and debilitating illnesses such as 
diabetes, cystic fibrosis, blindness, leukemia, and many others (Australia and New 
Zealand Organ Donation Registry [ANZOD], 2007). As shown in Table 1, 
Australia is high! y successful in the practice of transplantation. Our one-year 
survival rates for most organ transplants are above 80 per cent (Healey, 2003). 
Table 1.1 
Transplant Success Rates in Australia. 
Type of transplant One year survival rate Five year survival rate 
Pancreatic 94% 87 % 
Heart 90%, 85 % 
Lung 89 % 75 % 
Liver 90% 85 % 
Heart-lung 76% 60% 
Note: Data sourced from Organ transplantation, by J. Healey, 2003, Rozelle, NSW: Spinney 
Press. 
Transplantation is also cost effective: for example, a single kidney transplant 
costs $ 18,000AU in the first year and there is only the cost of medication 
thereafter (LIFEGift, 2007b). Another important consideration is that the recipient 
is typically able to return to the work force. By comparison, kidney dialysis costs 
the community between $30,000 and $50,000 per year, per patient (LIFEGift, 
2007b). Dialysis is very time-consuming as it requires the patient to be treated for 
several hours on several days of each week, which virtually precludes them from 
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full time employment and increases their dependency on welfare payments and 
other tax-payer resources. 
1.3. Rate of Donation in Australia 
5 
Despite such impressive success in the field of transplantation, Australia's 
donation rate is one of the lowest in the developed world at approximately 11 
donors per million population (DPMP) (van Gelder, Manyalich, Costa, & Paez, 
2010). This is higher than our New Zealand neighbours (10 DPMP) but much 
lower than Spain's rate of34 DPMP (van Gelder et al., 2010). Portugal, Austria, 
Estonia, USA, Italy, Norway, and the Czech Republic are the next highest 
donating countries with rates ranging from 31 to 19 D PMP respecti vel y (ANZO D, 
2010; van Gelder et aI., 2010). In fact, most OECD countries have at least a 50 per 
cent higher rate than Australia's, some as much as 100 - 200 per cent higher 
(ANZOD, 2007). 
In August 2010, there were nearly 1,700 Australians on the waiting list for a 
donor organ (ANZOD, 2010). This figure has been reasonably stable since the 
year 2000 but exponentially greater than the number of organs available. For 
instance, in 2009 there were only 247 Australian donors resulting in an overall 
total of 850 transplants (ANZOD, 2010). Last year, donation of more than one 
organ occurred in 80 per cent of donors, where the average number of organs 
transplanted per donor was 3.4 (ANZOD, 2010). This was not a great 
improvement from the respective average of 3.7 of organs donated by Australian 
donors in 2007 (ANZOD, 2007). If enough organs and tissues were available, up 
to 75,000 Australians could benefit from a transplant (Pfizer Australia, 2004) but 
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an average of two Australians will die every week while waiting for a donation 
(Healey, 2003). Given that the average waiting time for a kidney transplant has 
extended to four years in most states (Mathew, Faull, & Snelling, 2005), it would 
not be unexpected to find a further 20 per cent of those waiting will be removed 
from the list because their condition deteriorates and transplantation is no longer a 
viable option (ANZOD, 2007). 
In addition to assisting the recipient, organ donation can be of some assistance 
to grieving families, in that it makes some sense out of an otherwise seemingly 
senseless death (Pelletier-Hibbert, 1998). According to some survey results, as 
many as 94 per cent of the Australian public support donation but only 30 per cent 
of those surveyed had registered their intentions or informed family members 
(Australians Donate, 2006). This was a significant finding because Australia, like 
the United Kingdom, USA, Germany, and New Zealand, currently practices the 
"Opt-In" or "Informed Consent" legislation, which means individuals wishing to 
donate must make their intentions known by actively consenting on national 
registrars, in addition to discussing their wishes with their family. This framework 
ultimately relies on the deceased's family members to make the final decision to 
donate on their behalf regardless of whether the deceased's wishes are known to 
the family. Thus, the family can overrule the deceased's wishes if they choose to 
do so. However, since 2006 there have been no recorded family refusals for 
potential donors who had registered their consent to donate on the Australian 
Organ Donation Registry (AODR) (ANZOD, 2010). Under the Australian Human 
Tissue Act 1982 consent for organ donation can, therefore, occur via the donor, 
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the family, or with permission of the coroner (if required). Payments to the donor 
or donor family are illegal in Australia under the Act. 
7 
Alternatively, the "Opt-Out" or "Presumed Consent" donation system is based 
on the assumption that every person is deemed to give their consent, unless they 
have actively chosen to opt-out by formally recording their unwillingness to 
donate organs. The Opt-Out system and its variants are currently practiced in 
Singapore, Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, and many other European Union (EU) 
countries. Depending on the strictness of the legislation, however, it seems there 
is little difference between the two systems regarding actual donation rates. This 
is presumably because many opt-out systems also mandate family consent 
(LIFEGift,2007c). 
1.4. Australia's Potential Donation Rate 
A potential donor was once defined as a patient with acute irreversible brain 
damage that resulted in brain death (Hibberd et al., 1992). Brain death is the term 
for death determined by the irreversible loss of all function of the brain. It must be 
distinguished from severely brain damaged states such as permanent or persistent 
coma or unconsciousness, post-coma unresponsiveness (vegetative state), or 
minimally conscious state (National Health and Medical Research Committee 
[NHMRC], 2007). When trying to estimate the total number of potential donors 
(via DBD and/or DCD) available to a specific country or region, critics of the 
DPMP method have argued that it fails to account for many influences. These 
include regional variations in health status, number and availability of rcu beds, 
mortality patterns (especially from intracerebral bleeding and road traffic 
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accidents), neurosurgical practice, and demographics (Barber, Falvey, Hamilton, 
Collett, & Rudge, 2006; Sheehy et aI., 2003). 
8 
A country's unrealised or potential donor rate can, therefore, be alternatively 
estimated via "a percentage of a potential" or the "conversion rate", which is 
defined as the number of actual donors divided by the number of potential donors 
(Sheehy et aI., 2003, p. 668). The potential number of donors figure is typically 
found via a national audit of all deaths occurring in intensive care units which met 
the criteria for death with no absolute contraindications to organ donation (no 
cancerous malignancies or HIV, for example) as defined by a standardised list of 
codes from the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-lO) 
(WHO, 1990). Although audit conversion methods include a greater number of 
variables in their calculations, they seem to be more precise in their estimations of 
a country's potential donor rates than the DPMP method alone. The design of both 
research methods limits a study ever going beyond numerically outlining potential 
into actual donor conversion rates. Therefore, neither method can effectively 
explore the reasons why some families consent and why some physicians 
misidentify potential donors, or are unwilling to resuscitate potential donors or to 
approach the next-of-kin for consent. 
Using the audit conversion rate method, Sheehy and colleagues (2003) 
estimated America's potential brain dead donor pool during a three-year period to 
be 18,624, with an overall conversion rate of 42 per cent (that is, 7,790 of 18,524 
became actual donors). In the United J(jngdom (UK), an ongoing national audit 
indicated a conversion rate of just 45 per cent for brain dead donors in a two-year 
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period between 2003 and 2005 (Barber et aI., 2006). This translates the UK's 
maximum donor potential rate to be 23.2 DPMP, which is almost double the 
actual rate of 12.3 DPMP recorded in 2004 but still well below the actual rate 
achieved in Spain for the same year (Barber et al., 2006). A Czech Republic study 
reported a maximum potential brain dead pool of 55.7 DPMP, with a more 
conservative estimate of 37.4 DPMP. Either rate would be a significant 
improvement to the country's actual rate of 18.1 DPMP (pokoma, Vitko, & 
Ekberg, 2003). 
To my knowledge, there is yet to be a national audit conducted in Australia to 
allow such conversion comparisons to take place. A recent approximation from a 
sample of 22 Australian hospitals suggests that on average, there is a 60 per cent 
conversion rate of patients with confirmed brain damage (NHMRC, 2009b). 
However, a state death audit also conducted across all units in 12 Victorian 
hospitals estimated the maximum potential rate of brain dead organ donation to be 
as high as 15-17 DPMP, which was almost double Victoria's then rate of 9 DPMP 
(Opdam & Silvester, 2006). This maximum potential rate is still lower than the 
actual rates achieved in some countries, which Opdam and Silvester believe may 
be explained by our lower road and firearm trauma, and differences in treatment 
of hypertension and severe brain injury. 
Nonetheless, this estimate was a significant increase from a New South Wales 
(NSW) state audit conducted nearly two decades ago which revealed a missed 
brain dead donor rate of approximately 9 DPMP, where the definition of a missed 
or unidentified referral was a medically realistic donor who failed to become an 
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actual donor because of lack of medical intervention (Hibberd et al., 1992). In 
NSW alone, it was found that the actual donation rate could be improved by as 
much as 70-80 per cent. A strength of this study was its accounting not only for 
deaths occurring in the lCU but all hospital deaths, particularly other departments 
where brain death may occur, such as neurology, coronary care, and emergency 
departments (Hibberd et al., 1992). However, this liberal inclusion of all brain 
death patients as well as probable cases makes it difficult to directly compare to 
overseas studies, where audits tend to be restricted to lCU deaths. Nevertheless, 
the Hibberd and colleagues' more extensive outcome measures add significant 
value to Australian organ donor research by isolating the potential donation rate 
and offering a few solutions to increase it. 
The reemergence of Donation after Cardiac Death (DCD) meant there was a 
new potential donor type and that, therefore, the potential donor pool could widen 
significantly. Donation after Cardiac Death offers access to the previously 
inaccessible potential donor who does not meet the definition of brain death but 
whose injuries or prognosis is so dire that death is imminent. Consistent with 
international legislation, to be considered a potential DCD donor in Australia a 
patient must be able to be declared dead by irreversible cessation of circulation of 
blood (Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], 1977), be 
haemodynamically supported in an intensive care unit or emergency department, 
and must meet the general medical criteria for organ and tissue donation in 
Australia (DonateLife, 20lOc). Also consistent with Canada, UK and USA 
protocol is our national use of the Maastricht system to classify potential DCD 
donor types (Kootstra, Daemon, & Oomen, 1995), with Australian guidelines 
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specifying only Maastricht Category Three, or more rarely, Category Four 
patients as realistic potential donors (NHMRC, 2009a). Category Three scenarios 
are controlled and represent patients awaiting cardiac death after planned 
treatment withdrawal, with a known and limited warm ischaemic time. Maastricht 
Category Four is uncontrolled because cardiac arrest has occurred after the 
confirmation of brain death but before planned organ procurement, again with a 
known and limited warm ischaemic time. 
Last year in Australia there were 42 donors after cardiac death, making up 
nearly 2 DPMP of our total of 11 DPMP and a significant increase from the eight 
DCD donors recorded in 2006 (ANZOD 2007,2010). Our current total number of 
DCD donors is similar to those recorded in New Zealand and Spain, the world's 
leading donator (ANZOD, 2010; van Gelder et aI., 2010). International DCD 
statistics indicate just how variable the worldwide uptake of DCD programs 
currently is. Despite being amongst the world's highest deceased donation 
countries, there were no donors after cardiac death recorded in Estonia and the 
Czech RepUblic. Over a five year period, DCD leaders, the Netherlands, recorded 
an overall 129 per cent increase in DCD, compared to 21 per cent decrease in 
DBD for the same period (Cohen et aI., 2005). American audits have revealed the 
number of organs retrieved from DCD donors rose from 64 organs in 1995 to 391 
in 2004 (Marks et aI., 2006) but the number of DCD donors reduced by 46 per 
cent in 2005 compared to 2004 (Mandell et aI., 2006). 
Research on the potential donor pool offered by DCD patients is limited both 
here and overseas, plus the data is difficult to compare due to differences in DCD 
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donor eligibility criteria. Bearing this in mind, however, one retrospective 
Australian audit found that in the state of NSW alone, seven per cent of deceased 
leU patients would have met the DeD criteria (Bhonagiri & Wills, 2005). DeD 
in America has been estimated to increase donors by 1500 per year, which would 
represent a significant increase from the actual donation rate of 793 DeD donors 
recorded in 2007 (De Vita et aI., 2008; De Vita, Vukmir, Snyder & Graziano, 
1995). Other US research suggests DeD has the potential to increase kidney 
organ donations alone by 2.5-4 times (Hoogland, Snoeijs, & van Heurn, 2010). 
One American institution has estimated that at least five per cent of its pediatric 
donors could come via DeD (Durall, Laussen, & Randolph, 2007). Although the 
donor type (DeD or DBD) was not specified, a comprehensive audit of all leUs 
and two neurosurgical leus in four Danish hospitals (which service 30 per cent of 
the Danish population), estimated the potential donor pool could rise from 13.1 
DPMP to a staggering 51 DPMP (Madsen & B0gh, 2005). 
1.5. Summary 
Organ donation is a medical, economic, and socially critical issue. Despite 
this, donation rates continue to plateau at suboptimal levels, well below what they 
could be. Through the research described above, it is evident that the worldwide 
crisis in organ shortage may not be due to a lack of potential donors but rather a 
failure to convert many potential into actual donors (Matesanz, 2004). Better 
strategies are needed to capture more of the potential donor pool and thereby 
increase donation rates. Chapter two will explore the main factors identified by 
the empirical literature that have been found to contribute to the consistent 
disparity between potential and actual donation rates. 
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2.11ntroduction 
Strategies to address the worldwide shortage of organ donors have included 
heavily marketed public education campaigns, introducing donor intent cards and 
driver licenses and mandated choice legislation but most efforts have been unable 
to sustain the initial improvements (Oz et aI., 2003). Australian strategies have 
been similar in their approach to the donor shortage but again with limited impact. 
This can be evidenced by our low donation rate and the fact that fewer than 1.5 
million of our 22 million population have registered their "legally valid consent or 
objection" to organ/tissue donation on the national register (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2010; Australian Government, 201Oa). This is despite opinion polls 
demonstrating that Australians' support for donation is rising and was recently as 
high as 94 per cent (Australians Donate, 2006). So where are these potential 
donors being lost? As identified in chapter one, potential donors appear to get lost 
somewhere within the hospital setting, probably because it is here that the 
sensitive human interplay between the deceased, their family, and the medical 
professional occurs. 
Physicians, in particular, have been identified as the most crucial link in the 
organ donation process because they ultimately determine if organ donation is 
suitable and, if so, when and how they will approach the bereaved relatives about 
donation. Together with the nursing staff, a physician's influence is substantial 
given they are amongst the first individuals to establish rapport and raise the 
prospect of organ donation with the potential donor family (Cohen, Ami, 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Anstralian Physicians 14 
Ashkenazi, & Singer, 2008; Goz, Goz, & Erkan, 2006; Simpkin, Robertson, 
Barber, & Young, 2009; Oliver, Sturtevant, Scheetz, & Fallat, 2001; Williams et 
al., 2003). A vast amount of quantitative, and some qualitative, research has 
therefore surveyed the attitudes, actions and knowledge of physicians, nurses and 
medical students worldwide, with the aim of pin pointing which factors are 
limiting donor conversion. Presented below is a summary of this empirical 
literature, which has been organised according to the main factors found to 
influence health professionals' involvement in the practice of organ donor 
conversion. All results should be interpreted with caution due to the possibility of 
response bias, given most studies report response rates somewhere between 40 
and 65 per cent. 
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2.2 Model of the Organ Donation Process 
Demonstrated in Figure 2.1 is the complexity of the organ donation process, 
the influence of organisational factors and the physician's involvement at almost 
every step. 
Donation & Transplantation Process 
Figure 2.1: The process of organ donation and transplantation 
Org. Proc = organizational process 
Note. From "The Spanish organizational structure for organ donation: Update", by B. 
Miranda, J. Cafi6n, and N. Cuende, 2001, Transplantalion Reviews, 15, p.35. Copyri ght 2001 
by W.B.Saunders Company. 
This macro model illustrates that successful organ donation is clearly a tearn-
dependant process. Each component of this process signifies a fragile junction 
where a potential donor can be lost. Effective and appropriate communication 
between attending medical and nursing staff, their unit and hospi tal 
administrators, and the potential donor family, is vital. So too is the availability of 
clinical resources that are fundamental to carrying out the many components of 
the model reliant on technical input, such as brain death confirmation, donor 
management, and organ/tissue removal. Yet, the most outstanding feature of the 
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model is that the entire organ donation process relies on a single component to 
initiate it all, so unless potential donors are identified, there will only ever be 
limited scope to improve donation rates. This realisation is further discussed in 
section 2.3.2. 
2.3 Factors Influencing Health Professionals' Practice of Organ Donation 
2.3.1 Attitudes Toward Organ Donation and Transplantation 
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According to an Australian survey of reu staff who were mostly nurses, 92 
per cent were supportive of the general practice of organ donation (Australians 
Donate, 2007). Relatively high pro-donation figures have also been reported 
amongst overseas healthcare settings, varying from: 96 per cent of doctors to 84 
per cent of nurses in the UK; 95 per cent of doctors and 81 per cent of nurses in 
Denmark; 96 per cent of doctors and 86 per cent of nurses in Italy; over 90 per 
cent of nurses and neurosurgeons working in the USA; and 74 per cent of doctors 
and nurses in India (B!Zlgh & Madsen, 2005; Ingram, Buckner, & Rayburn, 2002; 
Minz et aI., 1998; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Pugliese et al., 2001; Wakeford & 
Stepney, 1989). Despite being the world leaders in cadaveric donation, generally 
no more than 70 per cent of most Spanish hospital based employee surveys 
(doctors, nurses, healthcare assistants, and ancillary personnel) were supportive of 
the cadaveric donation concept (Rios et aI., 2005). 
Although over 90 per cent of an American sample of nurses and 
neurosurgeons would consider donating their own organs or relatives' organs 
(Prottas & Batten, 1988), this is one of few studies to find consistency between 
health professionals' general attitudes to donation and their personal willingness 
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to donate. Like the public, there is generally a decrease of support amongst health 
professionals when the research question involves donating their own, or loved 
ones organs (B¢gh & Madsen, 2005; Gross et aI., 2000; Pugliese et aI., 2001). 
International surveys conducted in Canada, India and Korea, respectively found 
that only 64,59 and 43 per cent of health professionals were personally willing to 
donate their own or relatives' organs, (Kim, Fisher, & Elliot, 2006; Minz et aI., 
1998; Regehr, Kjerulf, Popov a, & Baker, 2004), which is substantially less 
support than that shown for the general practice of organ donation. If the donor is 
a child, one's willingness to donate is even smaller, as demonstrated in Australia, 
where 80 per cent of a large ICU sample would donate their own or loved ones 
organs but only 32 per cent would donate their child's organs (Australians 
Donate, 2007). 
Of these surveys, the percentage of health professionals who specifically 
refused to donate their own organs was as low as 7 per cent in Switzerland, nearly 
9 per cent in the UK (nurse-only sample), 11 per cent in Northern Denmark, 42 
per cent in Korea (nurse-only sample); and 32 per cent in Spain (B¢gh & Madsen, 
2005; Gross et aI., 2000; Ingram et al., 2002; Kim et aI., 2006; Rios et aI., 2005). 
Again, this last result was a surprising finding from the country with the world's 
largest cadaveric donation rate; nonetheless, it was replicated some time 
afterwards (Rios et aI., 2007). 
The actual reasoning behind these differences in attitude and willingness has 
only been briefly examined by some of the literature, yielding mixed and 
inconsistent support for predictors such as age, sex, marital status, religion, 
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partners opinion towards donations, previous family discussions about donation, 
job category, legislation, transplantation infrastructure (Minz et al., 1998; Pugliese 
et aI., 2001; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Rios et aI., 2005, 2006, 2007; Rithalia, 
McDaid, Suekarran, Myers, & Sowden, 2009; Wakeford & Stepney, 1989). Some 
investigators firmly conclude that organisational and administrative factors equal 
medical ethics as the primary differentiators of a physician's attitude and 
willingness to donate (Wakeford & Stepney, 1989). This is contrary to others who 
insist attitudinal differences are heavily psychosocially dependant, arguing that 
level of education and ethical discomfort are more predictive of health 
professionals' attitudes. Because education level is related to job status, and 
consequently, the amount of direct experience with the donation process, this may 
be one reason to explain the consistent finding that physicians (who are generally 
highly educated) are more favourable towards donation than nurses and 
particularly administration staff. A finding that may also be due to differences in 
the quality of familial interaction given that nurses tend to have a greater bedside 
interaction with the family than physicians typically do. Sex and marital status has 
been a significant predictor in some attitudinal research (Rios et aI., 2006) but not 
in others (Rios et aI., 2005). Thus, there is an undeniable need for more 
conclusive enquiry that not only can explain attitude but can go beyond this to 
explain why often very supportive attitudes towards donation, do not translate to 
personal willingness. 
2.3.1.1 Attitudes of Medical Students 
Based on the assumption that the education of health professionals early in 
their careers may result in better donation rates (Bardell, Hunter, Kent, & Jain, 
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2003; Garcia et aI., 2008), a number of studies have examined medical students' 
attitudes as a way to better understand donation patterns. These samples also tend 
to have better survey response rates compared to practicing professionals. 
Collectively, the attitudes towards donation of overseas medical students are 
as variable as those found in their more experienced, professional counterparts. 
For instance 99 per cent of a sample of American medical students were willing to 
donate their own organs, 96 and 32 per cent were willing to donate a kidney to a 
family member or stranger whilst living (Edwards, Essman, & Thornton, 2007). 
Sixty-five per cent of Turkish students were willing to personally donate but only 
six per cent of those willing carried donor cards, 25.5 per cent were unsure, and a 
further nine per cent specifically stated they would not give consent (Goz et aI., 
2006). Fifty-nine per cent of Japanese medical students were willing to personally 
donate after brain or cardiac death, but much fewer (35%) were willing to donate 
organs from a family member in the same circumstances (Ohwaki et al., 2006). 
The latter study was one of few to also examine whether participants would 
accept organs from a brain-dead donor in the event that they required a transplant 
themselves. Seventy-one per cent of medical students said they would, yet when 
these same students were asked about their willingness to donate their organs, 
only 45 per cent said they were willing to do so (Ohwaki et al., 2006). These 
findings highlight an inconsistency that is also reported in most attitudinal 
research of practicing physicians. 
The most frequently perceived barriers to donation amongst American 
students was mistrust that organs would be allocated fairly (76%), followed by 
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lack of sufficient information regarding donation (45%) and a fear of surgery or 
disfigurement (44%) (Edwards et aI., 2007). In Japan, confidence in brain death 
diagnosis was the important barrier to donation attitudes (Ohwaki et aI., 2006). In 
addition to sex differences found in Turkish medical students, the most common 
reason for an unwillingness to donate was concern over illegal organ trafficking 
behaviour (Goz et aI., 2006), which is not a typical concern amongst Western 
cultures, but has also been reported in some parts of Asia (Kim, Elliott, & Hyde, 
2004). Another point of comparison that seldom appears in the literature, but was 
conducted in the Turkish study, was participants' reasons for their willingness to 
donate, not merely their reasons for not donating. Amongst pro-donation students, 
the most common reason to donate was to save someone's life (Goz et aI., 2006). 
2.3.2 Health Professionals' Practice of the Identification, Request and 
Consent Process 
It has been said that the three most important factors appearing to affect 
donation rates are the rate of hospital identification or referrals, the rate of 
requests made to families, and the rate of consent by families (Opdam & Silvester, 
2006; Sheehy et aI., 2003). The first two factors are squarely the responsibility of 
physicians, but, as demonstrated in the literature, their influence is also both 
consequential to, and dependent on, the third factor - the consent process (Prottas 
& Batten, 1988). Some families report increased stress when health professionals 
fail to identify, approach or discuss the option of organ donation (Pelletier-
Hibbert, 1998) and some even remain resentful they were not given the option to 
donate (Dow, 2006). Worldwide research reveals health professionals' behaviour 
towards the practice of organ donation is highly variable, even within an 
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individual country depending who was surveyed and in which region. The 
following findings are presented from most to least encouraging and where 
available, reasons for the actual donor shortfall are described. 
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One English study found 94 per cent of families of potential donors were 
approached for permission for organ donation (Gore, Cable, & Holland, 1992). 
However, the authors concluded that a 20 per cent increase in kidney donations 
could be achieved if prompter brain death testing occurred in the rcu and if the 
relatives refusal to consent was only 22 instead of 30 per cent (Gore et al., 1992). 
More recent UK research suggested that 85 per cent of families of potential 
donors were asked about donation (Barber et aI., 2006), of which, 41 per cent 
denied consent. Only 32 per cent of families in another UK sample were 
approached about tissue donation and 59 per cent of the families who were not 
approached wished that they had been (Carey & Forbes, 2003). 
In America, the average referral rate was found to be similar at 80 per cent, 
with a request rate of 84 per cent and a mean consent rate of 54 per cent (Sheehy 
et aI., 2003). Although no request rate was specifically reported, the identification 
rate was as high as 78 per cent and the consent rate was 50 per cent in Denmark 
(Madsen & Bogh, 2005). Unfortunately, like the majority of quantitative studies, 
the process involved in approaching (or not) families was not reported, nor were 
the motivators for the families' refusals. As was the case in an Italian audit that 
reported brain death, diagnosis was only conducted on 40.8 per cent of patients 
with severe brain damage (Pugliese et al., 2001). An audit of79 Parisian rcus 
found only 68 of the 120 potential donors were referred to organ procurement 
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organisations, prompting the investigators to conclude that the rate of brain deaths 
differs according to the diagnosis and hospital characteristics (Senouci et al., 
2004). A rare multi-international study that evaluated 11 hospitals in the 
Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and Canada reported just 31 per cent of 
potential donors became actual donors, with the lack of conversion due to 
problems with donor identification and/or management (42%) and family or 
coroner refusals (26%) (Wight, Cohen, Miranda, Fernandez, & Beasley, 1998). 
Finally, only 39 per cent of potential donors were referred to the relevant 
transplant organisation in a Czech Republic sample. Despite not specifically 
investigating the causes, this is one of few studies that posits "the duty of 
intensive care physicians to improve organ donation is not stressed sufficiently by 
hospital authorities" (pokorna et al., 2003, p. 636), which is a theme that warrants 
further investigation and is further discussed in sections 2.3.6 and after. 
Like the 90 per cent request rate reported by a recent study of 28 Australian 
hospitals (NHMRC, 2009b), as many as 93 per cent of brain dead patients' 
families were approached about donation in a NSW study completed nearly two 
decades earlier (Hibberd et al., 1992). Interestingly, potential donors who did not 
present with brain death, but became so during hospitalisation, were more likely 
to be unidentified by physicians. Hibberd and colleagues (1992) thus reported that 
the senior physician was the major barrier to organ retrieval, due to insufficient 
medical intervention (withdrawing resuscitation). The second most common cause 
of failing to convert potential into actual donors was due to the 45 per cent of 
next-of-kin refusing to consent. When compared to actual donors, missed donors 
were older and less likely to die from traumatic brain injury or in the ICU, leading 
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the authors to conclude that the intervention phase of their study might assist in 
raising donation awareness amongst physicians. Of course this course of action 
does not generalise to benefit all Australian physicians. 
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In their Victorian hospital audit of 220 patients, Opdam and Silvester (2006) 
more recently reported 85 per cent of potential donors' next -of-kin were 
approached about donation, a percentage that is encouraging but with significant 
room for improvement, particularly when it is known that just one extra donor can 
improve or save the lives of up to 10 seriously ill people. Another interesting 
result was that lower next-of-kin consent rates were reported when discussions 
were carried out by trainees or registrars (21 % success rate) than when senior 
physicians were present (57% success rate) (Opdam & Silvester, 2006). This is a 
finding that is well replicated in numerous studies around the world and suggests 
that communication skills and appropriate training in approaching relatives can 
have a significant impact on donation rates. 
When a UK survey presented 380 leu staff with a list of nine potential 
barriers to retrieving donations in their own units, the factor identified as of the 
greatest importance was a dislike of adding to relatives' distress (Wakeford & 
Stepney, 1989). A large Swedish sample of neurosurgeons and anesthetists 
similarly found 55 per cent of respondents completely refrained from requesting 
donation in emotionally strained situations (Sanner, Nydahl, Desatnik & Rizell, 
2006). Any unease amongst specialists who are looked upon for guidance will 
certainly be detected by relatives, and consequently will affect consent levels. In 
fact, Spanish research estimates as many as 20-24 per cent of potential donors are 
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lost subsequent to the family interview (Frutos et aI., 2005). It has also been 
shown that physicians who request donation using a neutral rather than a pro-
donation approach are major obstacles for organ donation (Sanner et aI., 2006). 
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According to the majority of the literature, it is fairly well established that 
declaring a patient's brain death to relatives and raising the option of organ 
donation should occur in two separate conversations and in that order (Childress 
& Liverman, 2006). Otherwise known as "decoupling", this course of action has 
been described as important to increasing consent rates (Metzger et aI., 2005) and 
is thought to lessen the conflict of interest perceived by some physicians 
(Childress & Liverman, 2006). Although the decoupling timing was supported by 
only 45 per cent of physicians in the Australian NODC sample, the mixed ICU 
sample also showed great variability as to the most appropriate time for donor 
coordinators to corne to the hospital in response to a potential donor (Australians 
Donate, 2007a). The decoupling process was not a significant factor in a US study 
of donor and non-donor families, as higher consent rates were nevertheless 
obtained when the brain death explanation was provided at some point (Rodrigue, 
Cornell, & Howard, 2006). This study instead found next-of-kin consent rates 
were significantly higher when the donation requester was perceived by relatives 
to be very compassionate (67.4%) as opposed to being somewhat compassionate 
(29.9%), or not at all compassionate (17.5%) (Rodrigue et aI., 2006). 
It is therefore not surprising that a physician's choice of words such as 
"harvesting" and other inappropriate communication has raised anxiety levels 
amongst relatives (Haddow, 2004). Yet direct communication that is free from 
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medical jargon was appreciated by the majority of approached families in the 
same qualitative study of donor and nondonor families (Haddow, 2004). Local 
phenomenological research found that a physician's ability to reason and 
respectfully communicate with the family, was a pivotal theme for 15 physicians 
working in South Australian hospitals (Pearson, Hickson, Greenwood, Robertson-
Malt, & Tucker, 1998). 
2.3.3 Knowledge of Organ Donation and Acceptance of Donation after Brain 
Death 
A comprehensive review of the organ donation and brain death literature 
succinctly summarised that "[ e ]ducation-for both healthcare personnel and the 
general public-is desperately needed" (DuBois & Anderson, 2006, p. 71). The 
overwhelming recommendation from most studies is that health professionals 
need and want more education and training on many aspects of organ donation 
(D'Alessandro, Peltier, & Phelps, 2008; Australian Colloborative, 2007; B0gh & 
Madsen, 2005; Chernenko, Jensen, Newburn-Cook, & Bigam, 2005; NHMRC, 
2009b; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Rodriguez-Villar et aI., 2009; Sadala, Loren<;on, 
Cercal, & Schelp, 2006). Across the world, medical staff feel under-prepared 
when having to approach bereaved families to discuss organ donation, with 
reluctance indicated in 32-91 per cent of samples from the Italy, UK, Canada, and 
USA (Chernenko et aI., 2005; Guadagnoli et aI., 1999; Kent, 2002; Prottas & 
Batten, 1988; Pugliese et aI., 2001). One UK study observed that only 45 per cent 
of their nursing sample attempted to answer questions relating to the exclusion 
criteria for organ and tissue donation and only 5-13 per cent were correct (Kent, 
2002). A limited knowledge regarding transplant survival rates and organ waiting 
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lists has also been reported in both medical and nursing staff (Chernenko et al.. 
2005; Pugliese et aI., 2001). 
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It is promising to see nearly 70 per cent of a sample of Australian physicians 
reported being comfortable introducing and requesting organ donation from next-
of-kin (Australians Donate, 2007). Yet, the knowledge deficit was still present, as 
evidenced by the fact that over 40 per cent of the mixed ICU sample were 
unaware of how many potential donors (approximately) were identified in their 
own unit within the past year and only 50 per cent knew the correct number of 
Australian's waiting for a donor organ (Australians Donate, 2007). 
A significant amount of confusion for organ donation seems to be exemplified 
by the brain death diagnosis. This despite the concept maintaining acceptance by 
the majority vast industrialised world (Bell, 2003). Indications of the controversy 
are most visible when the legal definitions of brain death are compared 
internationally. For instance, Australian law defines brain death as "irreversible 
cessation of all function of the brain" (ALRC, 1977), the USA definition cites the 
plural: "the irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the 
brainstem" (U.S. Government, 1981); and under UK legislation brain death is 
called "brainstem death" (Royal College of Physicians, 1995). This latter, less 
inclusive term reveals inconsistencies amongst the international medical 
community and raises valid research questions. 
The acceptance of brain death being equivalent to human death continues to 
be questioned or misunderstood by some sections of the medical, ethical, and 
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general community (Bell, 2010; Cohen et aI., 2008; Regehr et aI., 2004; 
Shewmon, 1998a; 1998b; 2001; 2004; Sadala et aI., 2006; Siminoff, Burant, & 
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Y oungner, 2004; Tibballs, 2008; Truog & Miller, 2008). Shewmon asserts that 
brain death does not equate to death of the "organism as a whole" (2001, p. 473), 
because the brain itself is not so much the centralised integrator of somatic 
functions but a mediator that augments the "quality and survival potential" of 
living beings (p. 457). To support this assumption, he cites extremely rare cases 
where brain dead individuals have survived, and even sexually matured, more 
than six months post-diagnosis with the permanent assistance of ventilators, 
artificial nutrition and nursing care (Shewmon, 1998a; 1998b; 2001; 2004). 
Shewmon rejects standard thinking that equates brain death to death on essentially 
biological rather than psychological, spiritual, or sociological grounds. Ironically, 
his opposing interpretation of what constitutes human life is also physiologically-
bound and ignores the significance of conscious living. So while his reasoning 
about the inadequacies of the English language to appropriately define death as a 
process, not an event is well accepted, his interpretation of brain death equating to 
some form of human life remains the minority view. 
In fact, when Australian physician, Tibballs, similarly contended that the 
public are misled to believe that organ retrieval occurs from "actually dead" 
donors (2008, p. 354), his comments drew heavy criticism for undermining the 
medical profession, challenging the law and scaring the public without providing 
any helpful solutions (Naffine et aI., 2009). At no stage have brain death 
proponents disregarded such findings that pregnant female brain dead bodies may 
be medically supported until their unborn fetus has a better chance of life. 
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However they argue exactly that point-only bodies can be artificially 
maintained, as medical technology can replace or support any organ except the 
brain (Shemie, 2007). Commentators furthermore dismiss suggestions that the 
brain death concept is not a realistic determination of death by highlighting the 
knowledge that the time to death for each cell and each organ will vary 
significantly and can take up to several hours (Shemie, 2007; Naffine et aI., 2009). 
Therefore, irrespective of organ donation contexts, even if it were feasible to 
measure neurological death processes on a cellular level, it would seem 
unnecessary, even unjustifiable to physicians, policy makers, and the public, to 
have to wait several hours before a deceased patient could be legally declared 
dead. Technological advances may have deepened our understanding of the 
complex spectrum that is life and death, yet this increased know ledge comes with 
the increased potential for uncertainty and the continuous need for societal 
agreement. 
While a more detailed technical and legal review of brain death is outside the 
scope of the current research (for an animated Australian examination, see 
Tibbals, 2009; and Naffine et al., 2009), organ donation research should continue 
to assess whether the brain death controversy is impacting on physician 
conversion behaviour. For instance, according to the 2007 Australian NODC 
survey (Australians Donate, 2007a), less than 50 per cent ofthe mixed ICU 
sample felt confident to specifically explain the brain death concept to families, 
compared to nearly 80 per cent of physicians. An investigation in to the possible 
effects of attitude to brain death on the organ retrieval process revealed that 79 per 
cent of Israeli physicians and nurses accepted brain death as a valid determination 
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of death, which was significantly associated with increasing age and ICU 
experience (Cohen et aI., 2008). Only 54 per cent of physicians and nurses in a 
Danish study acknowledged having enough brain death knowledge to describe it 
to the bereaved family and even fewer (42%) had sufficient knowledge to 
approach the next-of-kin about organ donation (B0gh & Madsen, 2005). The 
perceived lack of understanding of the brain death diagnosis varies between 31 
and 88 per cent of samples from Italy, Korea, Canada, and USA, where nurses 
tend to have lower knowledge of and more discomfort with the concept, than 
physicians (Chernenko et aI., 2005; Kim et aI., 2006; Prottas & Batten, 1988; 
Pugliese et al., 2001). 
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A study conducted in the Czech Republic specifically found that the potential 
donor pool would have improved by 40 per cent if physicians had followed the 
brain death screening protocols instead of ignoring them (pokorna et al., 2003). 
Given Spain's high donation rates, it is somewhat surprising to find only 57 per 
cent of a large Spanish transplant hospital sample understood the brain death 
concept, which was found to be positively correlated with attitudinal support for 
donation (Rios et aI., 2006). A knowledge deficit may explain why between 44 
and 60 per cent of physicians and/or administrators do not like being involved in 
declaring brain death (Chernenko et aI., 2005; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Wight, 
Cohen, Roels, & Miranda, 2000). A phenomenological study of 10 ICU 
physicians working in Brazil reported that some physicians felt under-prepared to 
discuss organ donation with relatives, found the brain death diagnosis difficult to 
explain and had insecurities about the effectiveness of brain death testing (Sadala 
et aI., 2006). 
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Comparable levels of confusion about brain death are seen amongst medical 
students across different cultures. An American sample found only 28 per cent of 
students have accepted brain death as human death (Edwards et aI., 2007), 
compared to 46 per cent of a Japanese sample (Ohwaki et aI., 2006), and 64 per 
cent of a Canadian sample (Bardell et al., 2003). As many as 63 per cent of 
Turkish medical students report having "no idea" about the organ donation 
process but when asked which organs can be transplanted 87 per cent of students 
knew the correct answer (Goz et aI., 2006). Medical students from an American 
university answered less than half the knowledge questions correctly (Edwards et 
aI., 2007). Similar results were reported in a sample of Canadian medical students 
where half of the students assumed that people of certain religious groups should 
not be approached about donation at all (Bardell et aI., 2003) This hesitation to 
approach certain religious groups is well replicated in local (NHMRC, 2009b) and 
international physician literature (Chernenko et aI., 2005; Guadagnoli et al., 1999; 
Regehr et aI., 2004), in addition to lower approach rates reported for minority 
racial groups (Guadagnoli et aI., 1999). This highlights the serious likelihood of 
missed donors, as well as denying the potential donor family an option that may 
assist their grieving. 
According to the investigators of recent medical student research, there is a 
lack of formal education regarding donor identification and the appropriate 
methods for approaching a potential donor's family (Bardell et aI., 2003). This 
potential teaching deficit was cleverly demonstrated in an analysis of critical care 
nursing textbooks, where useful information relating to organ donation was found 
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in only six of 14 textbooks (Kirchhoff, Beckstrand, & Anumandla, 2003). Six of 
the 14 textbooks also had valuable information on brain death, whilst another two 
briefly mentioned the concept (Kirchhoff et aI., 2003). Remarkably, a 
comprehensive review of the end-of-life care curricula (Mularski, Bascom, & 
Osborne, 2001) also failed to include crucial organ maintenance and recovery 
information. Findings such as these may explain why some physicians are deemed 
to be ''uncomfortable at the clinical juncture where end-of-life care and organ 
donation interface" (Mandell et aI., 2006, p.2957). 
Despite Japanese medical students demonstrating increased knowledge of 
organ donation and transplantation compared to other university students, there 
were no significant differences in willingness to donate their own or family 
members' organs (Ohwaki et aI., 2006). This appears to be one of few studies 
un supportive of a relationship between knowledge and attitude to organ donation. 
It is generally found that a higher degree of knowledge about donation and 
transplantation correlates to a more positive attitude toward donation (Ingram et 
al., 2002). This correlation is demonstrated by findings that health professionals' 
communication skills are typically enhanced when they have improved 
knowledge of donation and transplantation. 
2.3.4 Acceptance of Donation after Cardiac Death 
Modest changes in the international organ shortage meant other solutions were 
desperately needed. Still, international and local professional understanding and 
acceptance of DCD is well behind DBD, with "unresolved" ethical problems 
being described as the "major stumbling blocks" to widespread hospital 
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implementation (Keenan et aI., 2002, p. 30). Lack of education and standardised 
protocols, negative attitudes, moral distress, potential for abuse contributing to 
death, lowering standards of patient care, conflict of interest, and procedural 
concerns are just some of the suggested reasons for the lagging uptake of DCD 
programs (D'Alessandro et aI., 2008; Mandell et aI., 2006). The emergence of 
such divisive themes from these international qualitative physician studies are a 
pressing call for replication amongst Australian samples. 
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Some commentators have specifically attributed the noted resistance to DCD 
to questions about organ viability compared to DBD (Bell, 2003; Mandell et aI., 
2006; Reich et aI., 2009; Truog & Miller, 2008), due to the failing blood and 
oxygen supply to organs following treatment withdrawal, known as the "warm 
ischaemic time" (Tibballs, 2008b, p. 334). The liver, in particular, has been 
identified as particularly sensitive to ischaemia (Renz, 2008). These concerns 
endure despite mixed research, which suggests that there may be no significant 
difference in long-term post-transplant outcomes, particularly across the various 
organ types (Boucek et aI., 2008; Devey & Wigmore, 2009; de Vries, Snojeijs, & 
van Heurn, 2010; Snell & Levvey, 2009; Suntharalingam, Sharples, Dudley, 
Bradley, & Watson, 2009). 
ill a bid to lessen warm ischaemic times and therefore improve DCD organ 
vitality, antemortem interventions have been suggested, causing considerable 
controversy amongst the medical, legal, ethical, and general community. Even the 
term antemortem has been debated, as some say premortem is more fitting and 
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better understood by the public. In line with Australian expectations (NHMRC, 
2009a) and presumably a desire to lessen the likelihood of public distrust, this 
paper will use the term antemortem to describe those interventions which are 
given prior to death to assist organ functioning and retrieval. 
Ranging in intrusiveness from giving the patient anti-coagulation Heparin 
medication to inserting a cannula in the groin, critics argue, that at best, 
antemortem interventions raise a conflict of interest and do not conform to 
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informed consent requirements (Bell, 2003; Tibballs, 2008b). At worst, 
antemortems have been accused of blatantly violating the Dead Donor Rule 
(DDR) and even of hastening or causing death (Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010; Rady, 
Verheije, & McGregor, 2008; Tibbals, 2008a, 2008b). However, a growing body 
of medical and ethical experts rejects these claims by arguing that the appropriate 
selection and dosing of antemortem interventions need not cause harm (Reich et 
aI., 2009). It has also been argued they may actually serve the patient's best 
interests if the person concerned had previously expressed consent for donation 
(Naffine et aI., 2009; Richards & Rogers, 2007). 
Australia's first National Draft Protocol for Donation after Cardiac Death 
(NHMRC, 2009a) delineates that antemortem interventions can only occur if the 
patient is competent and consents, or if the senior NOK provides consent. Yet the 
draft guidelines go on to say that "the administration of antemortem interventions 
must comply with jurisdictional legislation or guidelines and institutional 
protocol" (pg. 8). This is where the uncertainty lies, because current Australian 
guardianship legislation is unclear as to whether antemortem interventions can be 
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legally justified under the best-interests standard (Naffine et aI., 2009; Tibballs, 
2008b). Only NSW and QLD state legislation explicitly forbid antemortem 
intervention, which is akin to UK policy, but in the USA, antemortem intervention 
is common practice (Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010; Suntharalingam et aI., 2009). 
Inconsistent guidelines and policies for determining death in the potential 
DCD donor are also passionately debated, both in Australia and overseas 
(D' Alessandro et aI., 2008; Keenan et aI., 2002; Mandell et aI., 2006). While there 
is a significant lack of published studies regarding the prediction of time to death 
or the withdrawal phase of DCD (Suntharalingam et al., 2009), there is a 
burgeoning literature regarding the medical, ethical, legal, and philosophical 
aspects of declaring irreversibility of death in the DCD donor. Australian 
legislation and the recently released National draft DCD guidelines are once again 
undefinitive. The latter suggests that the minimum requirement to establish 
irreversibility should not be less than a two minute observation time of the 
absence of pulse, but not exceed five minutes (NHMRC, 2009a). While the 
Pittsburgh two minute protocol (University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre, 1993) 
gains considerable local (ANZICS, 2008) and worldwide acceptance (Bernat, 
2008; Rogers, 2009; Shemie, 2007), numerous commentators continue to debate 
the length of time needed to ensure death and avoid auto-resuscitation (where 
circulation reestablishes itself spontaneously). Estimates are as low as 75 seconds 
(Boucek et aI., 2008), as high as five or ten minutes (Bell, 2005; Mandell et aI., 
2006; Veatch, 2008) and everywhere in between (e.g. Canadian Council for 
Donation and Transplantation). Others conclude that it is the context of the 
treatment withdrawal rather than the time per se that is most important to establish 
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irreversibility of the circulation (Bernat, 2008; Keenan et aI., 2002; Shemie; Snell, 
& Levvey, 2009). In other words, in circumstances where the decision to 
withdraw treatment and not attempt resuscitation has been made independently of 
organ donation, it is the loss of function that meets one definition of irreversibility 
(Veatch,2008). 
A recent systematic review of auto-resuscitation after cardiac arrest concluded 
that current data are of "insufficient quality to support or refute the recommended 
waiting period to determine death" following cardiac arrest in the context of DCD 
(Hornby, Hornby & Shemie, 2010, p. 1251). The reviewers did however go on to 
clarify that there has been no auto-resuscitation reported in the absence of 
resuscitative treatments (cardiopulmonary resuscitation [CPR]), which is the 
context in which controlled organ donation after cardiac death occurs. 
Nonetheless, in a further bid to ensure the irreversibility criterion has been 
met, some DCD protocols, including NSW state guidelines, demand "stand-
down", "time-out", or "no touch" observation periods after death once the 
cessation of circulation has been declared. Recommendations again vary between 
waiting a further two to ten minutes before any organ retrieval procedures can 
occur (de Vries et aI., 2010; Reich et aI., 2009; Tibballs, 2008b). Once again, our 
national DCD draft guidelines (NHMRC, 2009a) are not definitive in that, 
although they do not oppose the NSW stand-down criteria, they also do not 
specifically endorse their need. 
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2.3.5 Misconception and Fear 
This collective research indicates that some health professionals, even those 
working within transplant hospitals, maintain a level of uncertainty, distrust, or 
fear regarding the organ donation process. In amongst those factors identified thus 
far, other concerns include: fear of public disapproval (Mandell et aI., 2006); 
being perceived as eliminating the family's hope (D' Alessandro et aI., 2008); 
acting unlawfully (Bell, 2003); mutilation/disfigurement of the donor (Chernenko 
et aI., 2005; Ingram et aI., 2002; Kent & Owens, 1995); existence of frequent 
medical errors (Rios et aI., 2005); the notion that one might need their organs or 
tissues in the after-life (Kent, 2002; Kim et aI., 2004); the inappropriate discarding 
of body parts (van Diest, Lopes Cardoso, & Niesing, 2003); and a lack of respect 
for the deceased (Dow, 2006). 
If misconception or fear about the donation process exists amongst some 
health professionals, it will prove extremely difficult for relatives to be consensual 
toward donation, particularly during times of incredible distress. Although data is 
lacking about the fears and misconceptions of Australian health professionals, 
there is an incorrect assumption amongst the general public that a person's 
decision to donate will permit the removal of organs for any other purpose 
(LIFEGift, 2007d). This comes despite the Australian law that demands separate 
and specific consent for science or research donation (Healey, 2003). Overall, 
there is an obvious gap in our knowledge regarding the magnitude and impact of 
health professionals' fears and misconceptions about the donation and 
transplantation processes. This is particularly the case for Australian samples. 
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2.3.6 Professional Responsibility 
When asked why a potential donor was missed in an Australian hospital, the 
attending physician responded that he had not thought of donation at the time 
(Opdam & Silvester, 2006). This particular mind set raises the question to what 
degree do health professionals consider their role in the donation process. It seems 
unlikely that potential donors will be efficiently identified and accessed if those 
who are in a position to do so, do not assume it is their responsibility. 
Depending on the hospital and region, it has been suggested that most hospital 
administrators do not emphasise the physician's responsibility to improve organ 
donation rates (pokoma et aI., 2003). However, the experiences of 15 Australian 
physicians revealed an acute sense of obligation to the organ donation cause, 
which may result in an uncomfortable division between their professional 
responsibility and personal beliefs (Pearson et aI., 1998). Furthermore, these 
physicians stressed the need for considerable waiting and observation of both the 
patient and their family, while still maintaining a forced distance from the family 
due to a busy schedule. This was considered necessary for their ability to perform 
their other professional responsibilities. 
Overseas, it has been suggested that the already burdened rcu staff may resist 
launching into a course of action that will result in extra work, especially work 
that is considered a secondary priority (Pokoma et aI., 2003). Some health 
professionals even appear to resent the time, effort, and expense involved in the 
care of a potential donor (Chemenko et aI., 2005; Cohen et aI., 2008; Meyer & 
Bj0rk, 2007; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Sanner et al., 2006). To counteract such 
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concerns, recommendations have been made to provide increased post-
transplantation outcome information to staff involved in the donor care, retrieval, 
and transplantation process, as well some acknowledgment of the time and effort 
expended (Chernenko et aI., 2005; Regehr et al., 2004). 
Additional research indicates that many health professionals find the organ 
donation process to be an extremely stressful and emotionally draining experience 
(Gross et aI., 2000; Hibbert, 1995; Regehr et al., 2004; Sadala et aI., 2006), which 
must ultimately impact on their subsequent involvement. Some investigators 
believe that these social and interpersonal factors are the main determinants 
influencing a health professional's involvement in donation, rather than medical 
uncertainties (Prottas & Batten, 1988; Rios et aI., 2005). 
2.3.7 Intra-Hospital Practicalities 
Even if health professionals act efficiently and compassionately, there are a 
number of intra-hospital factors that impact the success of any hospital's donation 
rate. Most obviously, the size ofthe hospital (Carter, 2003; Roggenkamp, 
Aldridge, Guy, & Rocheleau, 2007) and its potential for suitable deaths (Hibberd 
et aI., 1992) will dictate the size of the potential donor pool. Generally, high 
potential donor rates are thought to occur in hospitals where more than three out 
of 100 deaths are medically suitable for donation (Matesanz, 2004; Sheehy et aI., 
2003). Hospitals that are fortunate enough to have organ donation coordination 
teams and multiple donation coordinators have also reported higher numbers of 
brain dead patients in some regions (Sheehy et aI., 2003), but not others 
(Wakeford & Stepney, 1989). 
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Other intra-hospital factors that correlate with increased donor pools include 
greater availability of ICU beds and donor management equipment (e.g. 
mechanical ventilation) (Bell, 2003; Sanner et aI., 2006; Sheehy et aI., 2003), the 
presence of an emergency and/or neurosurgical department (Senouci et aI., 2004; 
Roggenkamp et aI., 2007) and the awareness of unit policies on brain stem death 
and other donation related protocols (Chernenko et aI., 2005). For example, one 
Canadian study found that more than half of the nursing staff and hospital 
administrators were unaware of their own hospital's donation protocols, and as 
many as 75 per cent were unsure (Chernenko et aI., 2005). 
Finally, the availability and appropriate allocation of financial resources can 
ultimately impact donation rates; the same Canadian sample reported 80 per cent 
of administrators but only 20 per cent of physicians believed sufficient funding 
had been allocated to maintain ventilator-dependant patients assessed for brain 
death (Chernenko et aI., 2005). Furthermore, 50 per cent of the same sample of 
physicians did not believe they were appropriately compensated for their 
participation in the donation process. 
2.4 Hospital-Based Initiatives to Improve Donation Rate 
Perhaps the strongest evidence for the health professionals' influence on organ 
donation rates comes from hospital-based training initiatives such as the European 
Donor Hospital Education Programme (EDHEP), Donor Action programme (DA), 
the Spanish model and The Collaboratives (USA, Canada, and Australia). 
Collectively, the overarching aim of these initiatives is to provide formal 
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transplantation education within the hospital environment, through the 
implementation of a donor coordination programme that is specific to the 
participating hospital(s). Across a wide variety of countries, it has been shown 
that staff support, knowledge, competence, and subsequent donor identification 
rates will increase as a direct result of the initiatives (Blok et al., 1999,2004; 
Marks et al., 2006; Matesanz, 2004; Mathew & Chapman, 2006; Milanaes et al., 
2003; Miranda, ViI ardell , & Griny6, 2003; NHMRC, 2009b; Pugliese et aI., 2003; 
Singer & Rachmani, 1997; Wight et al., 2000). For example, there was a seven-
fold increase in the number of actual donors just two years after the DA program 
was implemented in the Emilia-Romagna region in Italy (Pugliese et aI., 2003). 
Following the implementation ofEDHEP, samples from the UK and the 
Netherlands also reported sustained improvement in staff rated self-efficacy 
scores, which was significantly correlated with decreases in the perceived 
difficulty of requesting organ donation from next-of-kin (Wight et aI., 2000). 
To my knowledge, final implementation results from the Australian 
Collabaritive (NODC), completed in June 2009, are still pending at the time of 
writing. However, results up to December 2008 suggest that Australia's organ 
donation rate had improved from 10 DPMP to 12 DPMP, with the 28 participating 
NODC hospitals reporting the greatest improvements in donor numbers 
(NHMRC, 2009b). The development and implementation of best practice in 
potential donor identification and the provision of suitable information and 
support to their families, has been directly attributed to this substantial increase. 
Additional factors include advocating organ and tissue donation in hospital 
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mission statements, business plans, policies and procedures; ensuring a 
multidisciplinary team of physicians manages the process for each potential 
donor; practicing early referrals (use of clinical triggers in ED); preparing for 
DCD; and involving senior leaders "to get results" (Australians Donate, 2007a; 
NHMRC, p. 17). 
Australia's most eagerly awaited reform results however, are those due to be 
released following the 2009 establishment of the Australian Organ and Tissue 
Donation and Transplant Authority (The Authority), which was born out of the 
recommendations of the National Clinical Taskforce on Organ and Tissue 
Donation (The Taskforce) (NCTOTD, 2008). Executed by The Authority, this 
four year, 151.1 million dollar Commonwealth reform package is known as A 
World's Best Practice Approach to Organ and Tissue Donationfor 
Transplantation and is designed to coordinate Australia's fragmented donation 
sector, made up by states, territories, clinicians, consumers and the community. 
The 2008-2009 performance results released thus far (Australian Government, 
2009) suggest that The Authority is making some gradual progress towards their 
nine, very broad measures. These measures are: 
1. A new national approach and system-a national authority and 
network of organ and tissue donation agencies. 
2. Specialist hospital staff and systems dedicated to organ donation. 
3. New funding for hospitals. 
4. National professional education and awareness. 
5. Coordinated, ongoing community awareness and education. 
6. Support for donor families. 
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7. Safe, equitable, and transparent national transplantation process. 
8. National eye and tissue donation and transplantation network. 
9. Additional national initiatives, including living donation programs. 
Of these nine broad measures, considerable progress has occurred for the 
measure most pertinent to the current enquiry (Measure Two), where state and 
territory-based Medical directors were appointed by June 2009 and hospital-based 
medical directors and nursing staff were appointed towards the end of 2009. 
Clinical triggers had also been presented to the relevant professional societies for 
endorsement. Still, The Authority's bureaucratic links with the federal health 
department has led to criticism that it cannot be the independent body needed to 
enact the major confrontations that have been missing from sector revamps to date 
(Robotham, 2009). Some say The Authority's tentative approach can already be 
evidenced by their unWillingness to project specific numerical targets, so that they 
cannot be held accountable for disappointing change in statistics (Robotham, 
2009). This has been demonstrated by The Authority'S 2008-2009 annual report 
being devoid of tangible statistics when "performance reporting" on their nine key 
measures (p.17). 
Although it is only 1.5 years into The Authority's 4-year tenure, examination 
of the ANZOD registry reveals that its first year was met with a decrease in total 
Australian donations from 12.1 DPMD in 2008 to 11.3 DPMP in 2009 (ANZOD, 
2008,2009). Furthermore, the number of donations that did not proceed despite 
consent being obtained (13), is currently slightly higher than the number recorded 
(11) at the same point in time last year (ANZOD, 2009, 2010). Conversely, 
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significant improvements have been recorded in the number of DCD donations, 
with an extra 19 cardiac death donors in 2009 compared to 2008 rates (ANZOD, 
2008,2009). 
2.5 Summary 
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Assuming that attending physicians remember to consider the suitability of 
donation within the critical period, the factors outlined above represent barriers to 
organ donation as identified by researchers and health professionals around the 
world. At the very least, research indicates that the attitudes and knowledge levels 
of health professionals can greatly impact organ donation rates (Cohen et aI, 2008; 
Ohwaki et aI., 2006) and in particular, a physician's position on these matters can 
influence other professionals (Prottas & Batten, 1988). Investigations of attitudes 
and knowledge alone do not disclose the complete picture (Kent & Owens, 1995). 
It remains unclear whether communication or resourcing difficulties, or any of the 
other factors identified above, act as significant barriers to higher donation rates in 
Australia's hospitals. Compared to the literature on donor families and nurses, 
there is a significant deficit of qualitative research conducted with physicians, 
particularly in Australia, and particularly since the advent of DCD and The 
Authority's proposed introduction of Specialist hospital staff and systems 
dedicated to organ donation. Furthermore, existing studies seldom extend into 
theory-building. 
In addition, little attention has been directed at the psychological and social 
effects of donation and transplantation on health professionals (Sque & Payne, 
2006), which must influence their subsequent behaviour to some degree. It has 
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been suggested that a one-on-one research approach would permit a deeper 
understanding of their reasons for, or lack of involvement in, the donation process 
(Ingram et al., 2002; Kent & Owens, 1995). For instance, the consistent finding 
that most people (public and hospital staff) are happy to receive an organ, but less 
inclined to personally donate (Ingram et al., 2002). The true relationship between 
attitudes and their ability to explain behaviour remains unclear, despite often 
overwhelmingly positive attitudes toward donation being reported amongst health 
professionals. This failure to act on beliefs is concerning if one considers how 
those who are unwilling to consent to donating their loved ones' organs will be 
effective in approaching donor families to do so (Chernenko et aI., 2005; Kim et 
aI., 2006; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Pugliese et aI., 2001). Taking these knowledge 
gaps into account, the rationale for the current study is discussed in chapter three, 
but not before an examination of the shortcomings of three theoretical models that 
have been proposed to explain and predict health professionals' involvement in 
the organ donation process. 
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Chapter Three: The Research Process 
3.1 Introduction 
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An earlier review of the literature suggested that established theoretical 
models of attitudes and decision-making have not been well utilised in organ 
donation research (Radecki, 1997). This has resulted in a deficit of collective 
knowledge and structure within the field (Shanteau, 1986, as cited in Radecki, 
1997). Furthermore, the existing abundance of survey data has been criticised for 
its limited scope and application (Shanteau as cited in Radecki). This chapter 
therefore describes three of the current theories or models that have attempted to 
explain some aspects of physicians' behaviour in the donation process. Because of 
their influence on other health professionals (Prottas & Batten, 1988), the need for 
greater qualitative, theory-building research regarding physicians in particular is 
argued. To conclude, the merits of an empirical study designed to elucidate the 
current steps taken by a physician to convert potential organ donors, is described. 
3.2 Currently Applied Theories 
Of the few studies that utilise theory to explain findings, classic attitude-
behaviour models are popular, the most common being the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980). In an extension to the Reasoned 
Action Theory (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), the TPB argues that people maintain 
beliefs that underpin attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural 
control, which influences their capacity to carry out future actions (Kent, 2002). 
Subjective norms are defined as the individual's perception that most people 
significant to them believe they should or should not carry out the behaviour in 
question (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980). Thus one's beliefs about resources, 
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opportunities, and past experiences are all factors that will affect a person's 
perceived behavioural control and the level of difficulty they assign to a proposed 
action (Kent, 2002). The interrelationships between the concepts of the theory 
relevant to organ donation are described in Figure 3.1. 
AttItudae towards 
don"'n 
Figure 3.1. Operationalising the theory of planned behaviour in health professionals 
Note. From "Psychosocial factors influencing a nurse's involvement with organ and tissue 
donation", by B. Kent, 2002, Transplantation Reviews, 15, p.35. Copyright 2002 by Elsevier 
Science Ltd. 
The TPB has been used extensively to predict, explain, and influence human 
behaviour (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980) but its use in physician and hospital 
management samples of the organ donation literature is very limited. Presumably 
this is because the TPB does not account for the true complexity of asking about 
organ donation. It ignores a physician's legal and operational confidence, as well 
as subconscious cognitive thought schemata, instincts, and motivators, to name 
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but a few factors that must arise, particularly within highly emotive and time-
pressured environments like the leU. Rather, the TPB assumes "that people are 
usually quite rational and make systematic use of information available to them" 
(Azjen & Fishbein, 1980, p.5). Although this would be a professional aim of most 
physicians and hospital administrators, whether such rationality always 
eventuates, especially in the face of an emotionally complex and humanistic 
process such as organ donation, remains to be effectively determined. 
Additionally, the TPB cannot account for the influence of factors such as a 
physician's knowledge or communication style, or the resources available within 
the hospital unit. 
While still noting the importance of attitude in guiding one's behaviour, 
recently developed models more effectively explain the complexity of the 
donation and transplantation process by acknowledging factors such as the 
physician's workload and qualifications, or the hospital's culture or motivation for 
donation. Figure 3.2 is a representation of this more encompassing model, which 
is still limited in its offering because it only outlines the pathways for detection 
and referral. It neglects other responsibilities of the physician, such as the request 
and donor management processes, which have been found to directly relate to 
actual donation rates. 
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Figure 3.2. Motivational and organizational factor'S influencing detection and 
referral rate of potential organ donors in the hospital setting 
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No/e. From "The organ donation process: causes of the organ shortage and approaches to 
a solution", by from S.M. Gold, K. Schul z & U. Koch, 200 1, Koln, Germany: Federal 
Centre for Health Education, p.59. Copyrighl200l by BZga. 
This model by Gold and colleagues (2001) also ignores staff knowledge 
and confidence levels, donor maintenance procedures, and intra-hospital 
practicalities, as well as many of the oLher variables outlined in the above 
review of the empirical literature. 
Through their rigorous qualitative study of physicians, nurses, 
clergy/social work staff and administrators, 0 ' Alessandro and colleagues 
offered a model for predicting OeD suppon that is depicted in Figure 3.3. 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 49 
Knowledge of DCD 
Process (+) 
Psychological 
Barriers: DCD vs. 
Brain Death (-) Support of DCD by 
Certified Requesters 
State of Death 
Exists (+) 
Support of DCD by 
Killing vs. Saving Health Care Professionals 
Patients (-) 
Trust of Organ Support of DCD by 
Procurement Families 
Organization (+ ) 
Concerns with DCD 
Process (-) 
Care to Organ ~ 
Donation (-) 
Figure 3.3. Hypothesized Donation after Cardiac Death (DCD) Support Model. 
Note: From "Understanding the antecedents of the acceptance of donation after cardiac death 
by healthcare professionals" by A.M. D' Alessandro, lW. Peltier, & lE. Phelps, 2008, 
Critical Care Medicine, 36, p.1079. Copyright 2008 by the Society of Critical Care Medicine 
and Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. 
While still yet to be tested amongst broader samples, this model offers useful 
insight into the possible elements preventing better acceptance of DCD in the 
medical and general community. The authors' specific delineation of four 
negative and three positive factors they believe may contribute to one's support 
for or unease about DCD supports the documented quantitative findings that a 
number of unresolved issues are preventing increased DCD acceptance. The 
benefit of this highly situation-specific model is that it offers tangible starting 
points for researchers, educators, and even DCD organ donation program 
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development. A shortcoming of this specificity is that this model can only explain 
attitudinal findings for DCD and, as observed via attitude-behaviour models like 
the TPB (Azjen & Fishbein, 1980), attitude is not always a reliable predictor of 
one's behaviour, particularly in processes where there is more doubt or 
ambivalence than confidence (Glasman & AlbarracI'n, 2006) - recall Figure 3.3 
lists more negative contributors than positive. 
Overall, it seems that available models explain only some of the variance in 
the practice of converting potential organ donors and there are few, if any, 
relatively analogous processes to identifying, requesting, and managing an organ 
donor in one's capacity as an ICU physician. Processes such as live kidney, blood 
or reproductive tissue donations are less time-sensitive and do not generally 
involve deceased donors; therefore, physicians can directly approach the donor, 
rather than next-of-kin, for consent (unless the donor is deceased or medically 
unfit to consent). Thus, the need remains for a more comprehensive theory as to 
why physicians convert some potential organ donors but not others. Such a model 
may then offer practical utility for policy development. 
3.3 Research Questions 
There has been good progress in health professional organ donation research 
but much remains to be known, particularly about the Australian sector since the 
resurgence of DCD. A new approach is required if researchers and policy makers 
are to fully comprehend factors associated with physician facilitation of organ 
donor conversion. It remains unclear what differentiates a potential donor from 
being considered a real donor opportunity, according to those in charge of the 
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process, the lCU physicians. Furthermore, even if a potential donor has been 
identified, what is preventing physicians from supporting these types of patients 
so that they may become actual donors? A substantive model of the physician's 
role in the conversion process may offer valuable insight and force a re-
examination of attitude, practice, and, ultimately, behaviour. 
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As identified by the empirical literature, the dimensions the present research 
examines therefore includes the attitudes, motivations, confidence, and behaviours 
of senior medical staff; the policies, procedures, and culture of the work unit; and 
the nature and infrastructure of the department. 
3.4 Methodological Approach 
To best address the unanswered questions outlined above, a method was 
needed that described variation, explained relationships, emphasised 
understanding, and provided a rich picture of reality. This called for a more 
flexible orientation than quantitative research could provide but one where a 
number of qualitative inquiry methods could offer at least some of these 
attributes. Hence, the most pivotal research contribution needed to better 
understand and explain physician donor conversion behaviour would come from a 
more comprehensive theory or model of the complex process. As its name 
suggests, Glaser & Strauss's Grounded Theory Method (GTM; 1967) is apt for 
the generation of a theory derived inductively from field data by studying multiple 
individuals who have participated in a process about a central phenomenon 
(Creswell, 1998). It is particularly useful to modify existing theories if they do not 
suit the sample population or the complexity of the process being examined 
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(Creswell), such as the limited TPB and that proposed by Gold and colleagues 
(2001). The application of GTM allows for the development of categories and 
themes inductively rather than imposing pre-determined classifications on the data 
(Glaser, 1978), which in turn leads to a narrative statement, hypotheses, or 
propositions. 
Since its inception in 1967, there have been many revisions and 
epistemological reviews of GTM, leading even its creators to part ways sometime 
prior to 1978. While an assessment of the enduring debate would prove too great a 
diversion from the aims of the current thesis (and has been adequately replayed 
elsewhere, see Bryant & Charmaz, 2007), a summary of the genealogy of GTM is 
nonetheless reproduced in Figure 3.4. 
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Glaser & Strauss 
Discovery (1967) 
I Glaser ~ Glaser (1978) I Theoretical Sensitivity 
Schatzman (1991) I Strauss I Dimensional analysis I 
Strauss (1987) 
Qualitative Analysis 
Stranssian GT 
I 
Strauss & Corbin 
(1990, 1998) Charmaz (2000, 2006) 
Constructivist G T 
I I Corbin & Strauss (2008) Clarke (2003, 2005,2009) 
Situational Analysis 
Figure 3.4. Genealogy of Grounded Theory: Major Milestones. 
Note: Adapted from "Developing Grounded Theory. The Second Generation." by 1M. Morse, 
P.N. Stern, I.M. Corbin, K.C Charmaz, B. Bowers., & A.E. Clarke. Copyright 2009 by Left 
Coast Press. 
As shown in Figure 3.4, a number of researchers have taken up Glaser and 
Strauss's initial invitation to creatively develop their own use of grounded theory 
strategies (Charmaz, 2006) or to respond to its methodological limitations. Unlike 
traditional grounded theory, Bryant (2002), Charmaz (2006), and Clarke (2005) 
approach GTM with a postmodern, Constructivist orientation where no 
assumptions are made about the researcher's neutrality or naive objectivity for the 
subject matter. Instead of "discovering theory as emerging from data separate" 
from the researcher, constructionist GTM's founder assumes that "neither the data 
nor theories are discovered. Rather we are part of the world we study and the data 
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we collect" (Channaz, 2006, p. lO).While I initially was a novice to the field of 
organ donation, as a community-minded member of society (and a registered 
donor), I was aware I had some views or preconceptions about our inadequate 
donation rate. Thus, I felt this more reflexive, interpretative philosophy was more 
fitting and likely to generate more credible analysis. After all, reflexivity has been 
shown to minimise prior knowledge distorting the researcher's perceptions of the 
data (McGhee, Marland, & Atkinson, 2007). 
Instead of following traditional grounded theory rules that discount variation 
by seeking simplification and conclusiveness (e.g. the derivation of one core 
category), constructionist GTM offers flexible guidelines that are designed to 
elucidate the variability inherent in complex processes. Also dissimilar to 
"positivist" grounded theory where the goal is often to delineate a basic social 
process and fonnal theory, the goal of postmodern grounded theorising is to 
construct process and theorise working understandings in a grounded fashion 
(Clarke, 2005a). Any assumptions regarding causality are made conditionally and 
are left open to further adaption (Parker, 2004). As opposed to fonnal theory used 
to develop a broader conceptual area of inquiry, substantive theory is developed 
for an empirical area of inquiry (Minichiello, Sullivan, Greenwood, & Axford, 
2004). In other words, substantive theories relate to the particular social 
phenomenon being examined and not to a broader range of phenomena that 
formal theory might be expected to (Bryman, 2004). Inline with Constructivist 
GTM, I do not suppose my substantive interpretation of the Australian physician 
donor conversion process will have any broader applicability than its original 
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purpose, but this is not say it will not offer insight into other donation processes, 
systems, or contexts. 
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Akin to traditional GTM, open and selective coding processes, theoretical 
saturation, and constant comparative methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) are 
fundamental to Constructionist GTM. Constant comparative methods are used in 
data collection and analysis to propose and test links between categories, assisting 
the analyst to move from the level of description to one of abstraction (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). This is done by comparing data with data, data with category, 
category with category, and category with concept, to find similarities and 
differences, but not necessarily in such a linear fashion (Charmaz, 2006). The 
researcher's written memos or the "running logs of analytic thinking" are used to 
raise codes to tentative categories, to summarise and integrate categories, and, 
indicative of reflexivity, to allow inspection of one's basic assumptions, biases, 
and perspectives (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, p. 108), amongst many other benefits. 
As indicated in Figure 4.3, a further appealing aspect of Constructivist GTM is 
its logical collaboration and extension into Situational Analysis (Clarke, 2003, 
2005a). Dissatisfied with only a conditional consideration of context in Strauss's 
Conditional/Consequential Matrix and with action being at the core of the Matrix, 
Situational Analysis creator Clarke makes "the situation itself ... the key unit of 
analysis per se" (Clarke, 2003, p. 559). This meso-level theory broadens 
institutional studies beyond their conventional boundaries (Carder, 2008) and 
hence its relevance to the examination of institutionally-bound employers and 
processes in the current study. By replacing the basic social process concept 
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underpinning traditional GTM with Strauss's social worlds/arenas/negotiations 
framework, Clarke introduces three situational analysis techniques: 
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1. Situational Maps portray the major human, nonhuman, discursive and 
other elements in the research situation of concern and encourage analyses 
of relations among them; 
2. Social Worlds/Arenas Maps depict the collective actors, key non-human 
elements and arenas of commitment within which they are engaged in 
ongoing negotiations or meso-level interpretations of the situation; and 
3. Positional Maps expose the major positions taken, and not taken, in the 
data in relation to specific discursive axes of variation, difference, and 
controversy complicating issues in the situation (Clarke, 2003, 2005a). 
Intended to supplement, not replace, grounded theory coding and memo-
writing paradigms, these analytic maps focus on provoking intricacies: "the key 
elements and conditions that characterize the situation of concern in the research 
project broadly conceived" (Clarke, 2003, p. 554). By "deeply" situating the 
research individually, collectively, temporally, culturally, social-organisationally, 
and institutionally, Clarke convincingly argues that more "thick descriptions" 
should result than those presented by grounded theory studies that fail to fully 
evaluate the situation and current research context (2003, p. 554; 2005b). Clarke 
points out the analytic omission of time or the "unconditional present" that is 
acceptable to many researchers is not only wrought with "unacknowledged 
imperialism" (2005a, p.299), but is likely to generate highly misrepresentative or 
rapidly out-dated findings. This would certainly have been the case if the current 
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research had not fully taken into account the major organisational and procedural 
developments that occurred within the Australian organ donation sector before, 
during, and after the actual data collection period. 
Situational Analysis furthermore answers GTM criticism that minority views 
or groups can be easily ignored, particularly when following traditional grounded 
theory research designs (Clarke, 2005a). By assuming a postmodern stance to 
depict the true "messy" complexity and difference fOUfld in most human situations 
(rather than seeking standard simplifications), it is argued that silences can be 
made to speak (Clarke, 2003, p. 559, 2005a, 2005b). This is done by exposing the 
positions taken and not taken in the data, therefore, creating positional maps that 
may allow for a better representation of the several positions and inconsistencies 
inherent within individuals, groups, and organisations. 
3.4.1 Procedure and Participants 
This interview-based research project received Human Ethics approval from 
Deakin University, but multi-centre and specific site assessment approval was 
sought where required, see Appendix C. The plain language statement and 
consent form is included in Appendix D. All interviewees received an electronic 
copy of the statement and form prior to the interview date and a hard copy 
immediately before commencing the interview. Although an extensive literature 
search assisted the development of the initial semi-structured question list 
(representing another departure from traditional grounded theory), the questions 
were continually revised according to the thematic analysis of previous interview 
data. This was in addition to adaptation according to the current interviewee's 
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responses and the current context of the donation sector; for example, questions 
about the Taskforce and their recommendations. This meant no two interviews 
followed the same course. Appendix E displays the initial set of interview 
questions. 
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In total, thirteen male and two female physicians participated in this research. 
At the time of interview, they were aged between 39 and 61 years and had 
averaged 20 years experience working as a physician (individual physician 
experience ranged between seven and 35 years). Throughout the paper, 
participants who are qualified ICU physicians are referred to as intensivists and 
participants who are qualified emergency department physicians are referred to as 
ED physicians. For intensivists, approximately 14 years of their physician 
experience had been accrued specifically in the ICU (individual specialty 
experience ranged between three and 27 years), while the ED physicians averaged 
at least 10 years experience in their respective specialty. Three of the 15 
informants were principally employed at pediatric hospitals. Apart from working 
in Australia, interviewees had a wealth of international work or training 
experience, in countries such as Canada, UK, USA, Europe, India, Sri Lanka, and 
Ireland. No interviewees requested their participation be removed from the study. 
The face-to-face interviews took approximately one hour per participant and 
were carried out on-site across six different public hospitals in New South Wales 
(NSW) and Victoria (VIC) (three hospitals per state). Five of the six hospitals had 
specific transplant units in operation at the time of data collection. In the year 
proceeding data collection (2006), the total donation rates of these two states were 
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amongst the nation's lowest (7 DPMP and 9 DPMP respectively; ANZOD, 2007). 
However in the same year, these two states were also amongst the first to start 
recording DCD, where from a national total of eight DCD donors, four respective 
donors came from NSW and one came from Victoria (ANZOD, 2007). This 
meant that these two states were ideal to source a sample of physicians who were 
part of less-successful organ donation programs that appeared committed to 
extending donor opportunities through the incorporation of emergent DCD 
protocols. It is interesting to note that over the course of the project, both states 
recorded steady improvements to their respective total donation rates (10 DPMP 
in NSW and 12 DPMP in Victoria in 2009) and forged ahead as our national 
leaders of DCD (15 DCD donors from NSW and 17 from Victoria in 2009; 
ANZOD 2010). 
Interviewees from major metropolitan hospitals were also approached due to 
the finding that the highest proportion of potential organ donors are found in large 
institutions (Sheehy, et aI., 2003). Theory conceptualisation continued until 
categories and relationships were saturated, that is, additional data did not add to 
the developing theory (Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Spencer, Ritchie 
& O'Connor, 2003). This was achieved after 15 formal interviews. 
In-depth, one-on-one interviews were chosen because they are ideal for 
understanding complex processes, issues, and motivations in non-threatening 
environments, whilst also inhibiting potential power or status issues that can be 
problematic to focus groups (Lewis, 2003). Given their time-pressured schedules, 
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the interview method for data collection has been specific all y useful among health 
professionals (Younger, Landefield, Coulton, Juknialis, & Leary, 1989). 
Access to interviewees was negotiated through contact made with the manager 
of each state's governing body for organ donation (DonateLife VIC and NSW, 
previously known as LifeGIFT VIC and NSW). The two state managers then 
wrote and distributed a study information letter to several ICU hospital unit 
managers on my behalf. This letter invited physicians that were interested in 
participating in the study to contact me via email or telephone to gain further 
information about the proposed research. Additional participant access was later 
gained using "snowballing" purposive sampling techniques, once initial 
interviewing had commenced. 
As indicated in Table 3.1, sampling was carried out over a number of phases 
according to the true grounded theory principle of theoretical sampling, where the 
aim was to develop the properties of the emerging categories (not to select 
representative sample distributions or to stop when no new data had emerged), 
(Charmaz, 2006). Constant comparative analysis revealed that later sampling 
needed to include ED physicians and those with DCD experience in order to 
accommodate the developing theoretical categories of DCD and end of life care 
(EoLC) practices. At the time of data collection, only NSW interviewees had 
active DCD protocols operating within their hospital units, with some units 
conducting DCD for more than 10 years. The number of beds per hospital unit 
ranged from 25 to 48 in emergency departments and between 16 and 42 beds in 
the ICU, with an average 25 beds per ICU. 
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Table 3.1 
Data Collection and Analysis Timeline 
Stage Date State Interviewees Hospital and Unit Type 
One Mar - Aug 2008 VIC 7xICU Interviewees 1-2: Adult hospital 1 
Physicians Interviewees 3-5: Pediatric hospital 1 
(Intensivists) Interviewees 6-7: Adult hospital 2 
These hospitals all had specific 
transplant units 
Two Nov - Dec 2008 NSW 5 xICU Interviewees 8-9: Adult hospital 3 
Physicians Interviewee lO: Adult hospital 4 
(Intensivists) Interviewees 11-12: Adult hospital 5 
These hospitals all had with active 
DCD protocols and except for adult 
hospital 3, they also had specific 
transplant units 
Three Oct 2008 VIC 1 xED Interviewee 13: Adult hospital 2 
Physician (specific transplant unit) 
Four Dec 2008 NSW 2xED Interviewees 14-15: Adult hospital 5 
Physicians (DCD protocols and a specific 
transplant unit) 
3.4.2 Rigourous Analysis 
Interviews were recorded via voice recording and note-taking. Given the strict 
time-limitations and availability of this particular participant group, prompt 
transcription was paramount to allow sufficient constaIit comparative analysis to 
take place in between each interview, as per the GTM. For this reason, interviews 
were professionally transcribed verbatim by outsourced medico-science 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 
transcribers but all transcripts were double-checked with original audio upon 
receipt, offering the additional benefit of multiple verification. 
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Following the constructionist grounded theory methods laid out by Charmaz, 
(2006), the data was inductively coded according to initial (word-by-word and 
line-by-line), focused, axial and theoretical principles. Memos, taken via written 
and voice-recorded mediums, occurred during and after every analysis and 
mapping session and assisted my awareness of potential personal effects on the 
data (McGhee et aI., 2007). Constant comparative methods were pivotal to 
developing the analytic categories grounded in the data, while also advancing my 
initial, descriptive memos to become more abstract. The various positions that 
interviewees held on emerging issues were further analysed using Situational 
Analysis. This allowed fresh insight and different visual perspectives to emerge, 
broadening the analysis beyond what was initially obtained through coding alone. 
While all of Clarke's cartographic methods were used to open up the data to 
further the analysis (see Appendix F and G for a sample of such maps), as is 
suggested by Clarke (2005a, 2005b), only certain maps are included in the final 
document. Consistent with grounded theory guidelines, the analysis phase of this 
project commenced at the outset of interviewing early in 2008 and continued well 
into the draft writing stage which was completed mid to late 2010. 
NVIVO 7 (QSR International, 2006) was the qualitative software program 
chosen to manage the data. Use of computer-assisted software is thought to 
increase data organisation and therefore the analyst's efficiency, adding to the 
rigour of the analysis (de Wet & Erasmus, 2005). 
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Overall, a number of reliability and validity strategies were incorporated in to 
the study design to increase the rigour of the resulting research. From the 
commencement of the project, I received class-based, and then ongoing individual 
qualitative research methods training from published qualitative researchers as 
part of the psychology doctorate degree. This supervision and methodological 
training was supplemented by my participation in, and direct project feedback 
received from Situational Analysis creator, Clarke, during a two-day Situational 
Analysis workshop and intimate master class held in Sydney, Australia, 2009. 
Based informally upon the validity principle of data triangulation (defined by 
Denzin, 1978, as the use of a variety of data sources in a study), three informal 
meetings were conducted between 2007 and 2008 with the state manger of 
Victoria's governing body for organ and tissue donation. Multiple, biannual 
meetings were also conducted with the state manager and the medical consultant 
from the equivalent NSW body from 2008 to 2010. These meetings greatly 
assisted my understanding of the changing organisational and political situation 
that was Australia's organ donation sector over the entire course of the research 
project. 
Before the formal physician interviews commenced in 2008, insight into the 
specifics of the solid organ donation process was carefully gleaned from informal 
interviews with a highly experienced organ donation co-ordinator, and also a state 
coordinator of the organ donation bereavement program. This meant that the 
physicians did not have to assume that I interviewed with little or no knowledge 
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of the process in question, which was likely to attain richer and more valuable 
interview data than that otherwise obtained. Informal but in-depth interviews with 
two rcu Nursing Unit Mangers in 2008 also facilitated broader insight into the 
institutionally-bound conversion process. Also, my attendance at the one-day 
medical workshop (module two) of the Australasian Donor Awareness 
Programme (ADAPT) in mid 2009, which prior to the Authority was the 
compulsory organ donation training program for rcu registrars. Aimed at 
providing a "consistent and uniform approach to educating health professionals 
involved in the care and management of dying patients and their families, 
including those patients who may become potential organ and tissue donors" 
(ADAPT, 2009, p. 7), this workshop also encouraged active discussion of current 
controversies which was useful in validating numerous components of my 
developing theory. Finally, r also sought an informal but in-depth interview with 
an Australian bio-ethical expert in 2009 to confirm that my initial conclusions that 
the ethical and legal components of organ donation were based on accurate 
interpretations of the law. 
In sum, it will be shown that this research provides a number of methods for 
enhancing the standard of rigour by: ensuring participants lead the inquiry 
process; using the participants' actual words in the proposed substantive theory; 
specifying the scope of the research in terms of the selection of the sample, 
setting, and level of theory produced; detailing how the literature relates to each 
category in the resultant theory; and successively memo-writing my personal 
research views along the way (Chiovitti & Piran, 2003). 
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3.5 Summary 
In the absence of a robust model to allow a better understanding of physician 
practice of organ donor conversion, the need for qualitative, theory-building 
research is evident. The investigation proposed herein offers a unique opportunity 
to understand influencing factors identified in the literature and extensive 
interviews with leu and ED physicians. As well as providing a platform for 
further enquiries, this research may facilitate the re-evaluation of organ donation 
procedures within hospitals and offer a conceptual framework upon which unit 
managers and administrators could structure organ retrievals within relevant units, 
thereby reaping the medical, economic, and social benefits that even the smallest 
increase to our organ donation rate would bestow. 
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Chapter Four: Operational Responsibilities in the Organ Donation 
Conversion Process 
4.1 Introduction 
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Organ donation is far from a straight-forward occurrence, as will be 
demonstrated by the complexity of the proposed model in this first analysis 
chapter. Issues surface at most junctions of the two pathways to donation, DBD 
and DCD. Some issues are inherent to both pathways, whilst others are unique to 
or more prominent for one particular donation pathway. These emergent issues are 
presented in the following chapters according to their prominence in three key 
categories: prioritising operational responsibilities (current chapter); determining 
ethics (chapter five); and seeking legal clarity and consistency (chapter six). Amid 
some overlap, it will be shown that these three categories broadly figure in an 
intensivist's considerations and handling of potential donors. 
The first section of this chapter provides detailed mapping of the process in 
question. While there are other organ donor process models available (e.g. 
NHMRC, 2007), few offer enough detail to simultaneously account for the 
decisions pertinent to both DBD and DCD. With the aim of depicting the true 
complexity of decision making required by the intensivist, the utility of a 
combined DBD and DCD process model is contrasted with one recommended by 
The Taskforce in 2008 (NCTOTD). 
The second part of this chapter opens the discussion regarding intensivists' 
operational responsibilities to convert potential organ donors. It will be shown that 
although the benefits of organ donation were undisputed by all interviewees, a 
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few disclosed how much organisational, psychological, emotional, and physical 
work is really involved. Typically withheld from the public, this effort must be 
considered when examining any organisational procedure asked of employees. If 
intensivists really are the "gatekeepers" in organ donation, how they perceive their 
operational responsibilities will undoubtedly have a significant bearing on how 
they subsequently behave. 
4.2 Pathways to Conversion 
When The Taskforce released their final report in 2008, they recommended 
the donation sector adopt an "ideal care path for critically ill patients who might 
be potential organ donors" (NCTOTD, 2008, p. 162). The suggested template was 
recommended for use by the ICU consultant/medical officer or Organ Donor 
Coordinator (ODC), to be used in conjunction with local procedures when 
deciding a patient's medical suitability for donation, the timing of the NOK 
consent discussion, and referral to the AODR. Figure 4.1 displays the suggested 
pathway (page 162 of original document). 
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Inlubated patient in ED with low GCS 
and irreversible brain injury. Therapy 
withdrawal being considered 
'" 
ED call for intensive care unit review of 
end-of-life care including potential for 
organ donation prior to eKlubation 
... 
ICU review and acceptance of patient for 
f--+ 
ICU initiates family discussion 
end of life care about prognosis and transfer for 
end of life care 
* ICU review of cHnical indicators of 
imminent brain death and DCD including ICU Medical Officer and/or Organ 
absence of brain-stem reflexes ........ Donor Coordinator inmates family 
discussion about organ donation 
* ICU contacl5 State-8ased Organ Donation 
Agency for AODR information and review of Family consent and 
medical suitability 
------
support processes 
/ '\,. .. --
If not proceeding to If organ donation 
organ donation, proceeding, therapy is 
limitation of therapy mnintained pending 
when indicated transter to theatre 
Notes: ED=emergency department; DCD=donation after cardiac death; GCS=Glasgow Coma 
Scale; ICU=intensive care unit 
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Figure 4.1. National Taskforce's Indicative Patient Flow from Emergency Departments 
and Intensive Care Units. 
Presumably the template was intended to reduce confusion about the 
recommended order of procedures, however at certain junctures the diagram 
contradicts recommendations made in the supporting text. For instance, one of 
The Taskforce's overall recommendations was that the AODR be accessed prior 
to approaching the family about the prospect of organ donation, yet the diagram 
implies the opposite order should occur. While its simplicity is appealing, the 
current findings reveal Figure 4.1 is too rudimentary to offer any practical utility 
in what are effectively two different and complex processes. While there is 
significant overlap, such as the decision to withdraw therapy being independent of 
organ donation, organ donation that occurs via DBD follows a very different path 
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than that necessary to facililale DCD. Yet this sununary diagram merges DBD 
and DCD and through omiss ion, it erroneously implies that the order of 
proceedings and patient management is similar in both pathways. This is not 
reflected in practice. Hence, using findings from the current study, an alternate 
and more encompassing patien t fl ow template is proposed in Figure 4.2 below. 
Intubated paIiert with low GCS am irreversi~e OOin irjury. Therapy 
withdrawal Mr.J consiflered 
ICU aQnission d ED _ Noo-emergerx:y departrnen 
fa me RX admissioo to ICU lor active RX 
I \. / 
ED callfa ICU review prior to extubatoo 
I ICU patiert I'Iith poor ootcane 
ICU ~ ard ao:ejXance d ED _ fa EolC / 'i 
ICU iMiales IM'liy dscussiCW1 about progrosis ard trerofer to Ed..C. 
ICU review d dirtcal indcators d mminert brain death: Maastridt 
CalegJry 3 (a rarely 4). Wilhdraw d carde-respiratory ~ has 
been decided. 
I 
leu comac!s gate-based OIDA lor AGDR irlormaloo and review d 
medea su~aljily 
I 
lCU MO ard'or OOC iritiates famiy dscus900 abooI 00 
I 
/\ 
~ no! proceecif'9 to organ H DO is ~rg, thefaJly is 
00'laIi00, imitation d willldrawn perdf'9 death in f5G. 
theraJlY'MIen indcated !KI mils. T ran!iler to/neat theatre 
I 
Death does rd oxur ;n ICU OOdaratioo d death VI8 
specilied line fra'l1e. circ:Ualory criteria. Patien! returns to ward 
I 
DCD 
I 
ICU review d dirical indcators d mrinert brain reath. Wihjraw 
d carde-respiratory soppo~ has beoo decided 
j 
KlJ dIdIaIiuI" _ .. blalldIIIII" 
I 
ICU ro1ac\s state-based OIDA lor AODR irlormaliooaro review 
d meciea su~abiity 
I 
ICU '"'0 andIa OOC inti ates fiJltily dsrussioo aOOut 00 
I 100._"""" 
·-omv _.-
I 
IIIID 
\ 
H rd proceedf'910 organ 
dcrraIioo, Imtatioo rJ 
therapyv.tlen irdcaled 
Figure 4.2. DUD and DCD Pathways to Conversion 
I 
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Unlike Figure 4.1, by distinguishing both DBD and DCD, Figure 4.2 allows 
closer inspection of the significant differences between the two possible pathways 
to donation. The most notable difference between the two pathways is that 
compared to DCD, death (brain death) in DBD is determined quite early in 
proceedings. After brain death has been determined, a patient's family is invited 
to consider organ donation and, if they consent, patient treatment continues to be 
maintained up until the organ retrieval operation. In DCD, however, treatment is 
maintained until the decision to donate has been made, after which treatment is 
withdrawn and then death is determined. Therefore, physicians need to discuss 
organ donation with the NOK prior to death determination via cardiac criteria. 
The difference in practice means that intensivists have to make two sets of process 
decisions depending on the selected donation pathway. Thus, it is imperative that 
the sector receive more specific "templates" than that shown in Figure 4.1, 
otherwise the way in which an intensivist converts one particular donor will seem 
incongruent to his or her practice in converting another type of donor. 
4.3 The Organ Donation Conversion Process: An Optional Extra 
Figure 4.2 also informs how organ donation is not a straight-forward 
occurrence but "a logistic ordeal that takes many, many hours". It requires a 
significant amount of strategic, organisational, physical, and emotional motivation 
and effort from everyone involved, more than is required for patients not 
identified as potential organ donors. Intensivists specifically, "need a fair bit of 
time to spend with the family in explaining and talking and helping but that's a 
good thing". Having pride in their ability to help others get through their darkest 
hour was one element of the donation process celebrated by all interviewees. 
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However, with this emotionally-laden work comes with inevitable strain. 
Thus, despite unanimous opinion that organ donation is "the only good that 
comers] with very tragic situations" with "huge community benefit", it is not 
always an easy task for the facilitating intensivist. One interviewee even likened it 
to a "double edged sword. It's a pain, definitely a big pain in the arse". They were 
not alone in their complaint about the two-sided nature of the donation process. 
Organ donation was sometimes thought of as a burdensome "extra", meaning it 
can represent an additional responsibility in what is already a fairly demanding 
job description: 
[I]t's an extra ... it's exhausting emotionally for us talking about death all 
the time ... if you're sort of facilitating something and making it better for 
families, [it's] quite rewarding but it's exhausting emotionally. You add an 
extra layer of fucking exhaustion when you're talking about donation and 
getting it to that process and then going, going, going. So it is a pain in the 
arse III one sense. 
These words denote that supporting families through the emotionally 
charged death process can be taxing enough without having to uphold this support 
throughout the sometimes drawn-out donation process. Hence, reinforcing that 
there are two sides in the facilitation of organ donation: the rewarding, fulfilling, 
positive-out-of-tragedy component and the strenuous, emotionally draining, 
enduring component. Furthermore, unlike the frequency of death in ICU, organ 
donation occurs much less frequently and even then, it is not a certainty. Thus, 
although a physician cannot avoid the emotionally draining discussions of death 
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with the NOK, they could theoretically choose to avoid the equally draining organ 
donation discussions. 
Aside from the emotional strain to the individual physician, there are also 
practical challenges to consider such as the increased resource pressure, which 
can: "devastate the hospital, in my unit for 48 hours". There is no disputing the 
fact leu staff must juggle their responsibility to the potential donor and their 
grieving family with the urgent needs of critically-ill patients and their families 
and these repercussions affect multiple shifts. This situation leads the same 
intensivist to bravely acknowledge that when initiating the conversation about the 
opportunity for donation with the NOK, occasionally: 
You take a deep breath and [think] "oh god I hope they say no." So that's 
one of the things that's not talked about because it sounds as if I'm just 
complaining about a bit of extra work, but it's not, it is a hell of a lot of 
work. 
From the moment a potential donor is recognised, this intensivist cannot 
ignore the unappealingly large workload that will inevitably follow. NOK consent 
to organ donation signals additional personal and unit-wide labor that could be 
avoided if consent is not granted. Apparently, others share this view but do not 
speak about it at the risk of being labeled complainers. This is a plausible 
suggestion, when one considers how many doctors would feel confident to 
grumble about their personal workload when facilitating society's most altruistic 
"gift" . 
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Interestingly, other interviewees wholly refuted the suggestion that organ 
donation can be a resource burden. One intensivist called for colleagues to 
consider the bigger picture, in addition to pointing out the cost-effectiveness of 
donation: 
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They say "oh well what about the resources, we haven't got the 
resources." ... if one in ten of them become a donor, one in ten, then the 
resources that they will save in terms of getting people off dialysis and out 
of hospitals and sick beds with hearts and goodness knows what, the 
resources they save are enormous. 
By contrasting the short-term impact of a donor in one hospital unit to the 
much larger resource problem caused by society's low donation rate, this 
intensivist was one of very few to reveal the hidden cost of not recognising the 
potential donors. The argument is compelling. Although few would disagree with 
the logic, it still does not account for the fact that dialysis patients are often some 
other unit's or hospital's problem. According to one intensivist, the unspoken but 
strenuous additional workload meant that some physicians, "well, they're 
probably not going to do it on their lazy shifts". So taxing is an intensivist's role 
in organ donation, this interviewee suggested that during certain periods in the 
lCU, less motivated colleagues may conveniently neglect to identify potential 
donors or find reasons not to facilitate the possible conversion. This serious claim 
is, however, consistent with The Taskforce and The Authority'S proposition that 
the Australian hospital setting has the potential to improve deceased donor rates. 
This proposition is further supported by another interviewee, who remarked, 
"I think that's a little naIve" when informed that some interviewees had denied 
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their hospital could miss potential donors. Nonetheless, a clarification was quickly 
offered: 
I think there are lots of potential donors missed. Very few real donors 
missed. Certainly from what I've seen in there. Although I'd like to say 
no, we never miss one, I think we do, usually because of people not 
recognising the opportunity ... [or] because of a misperception, often on 
the part of the medical staff. 
Despite preferring it was not their experience, this intensivist conceded 
numerous potential donors are being missed. Still, it was apparently unrealistic to 
assume that many of these potential donors might have eventuated as actual 
donors. Therefore, current conversion behaviour was justified, which raises more 
questions than it answers: such as why the need for justification? What 
differentiates a potential donor from a "real" donor and how can one know which 
patients would have become actual donors if their potential to do so was not 
supported? Why are donor opportunities not being recognised and what 
misperceptions are causing medical staff to miss these opportunities? The next 
two chapters are dedicated to answering these questions by exploring the 
misperceptions and inconsistencies preventing more donors being realised in two 
of Australia's largest potential donor pools, the capital cities Melbourne (VIC) 
and Sydney, (NSW). 
4.4 Summary 
At the beginning of this introductory analysis chapter, a detailed organ 
donation conversion model was proposed (Figure 4.2). It was argued that this 
level of description was vital paramount to enable the current study to give much 
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needed insight not only into how potential donors are recognised but also the 
reasons why intensivists behave as they do once their patient is identified as a 
potential donor. This more accurate depiction of the conversion process may serve 
as the reference model the donation sector is currently lacking. 
Despite universal agreement about the value of organ donation, this chapter 
also revealed that organ donation requires a significant amount of strategic, 
organisational, physical, and emotional effort from the family, ICU, and ED staff 
alike. Compared to patients not suitable for organ donation, potential donors 
create a considerable amount of extra work, in particular for the treating 
intensivist. Furthermore, while physicians cannot avoid managing death in their 
everyday practice, it is possible to avoid the "extra" work involved in organ 
donation by not raising the prospect or supporting the patient's potential. 
What makes organ donation particularly emotionally, psychologically, and 
physically taxing for physicians and the degree to which this effort could be 
minimised is revealed in the subsequent analyses chapters. Here it will be shown 
there is currently too much disagreement, misconception, and inconsistency 
amongst physicians about certain organ donation practices. While questioning and 
challenge are a natural and important part of any human quest and particularly of 
medicine, it will be argued that some of these uncertainties and inconsistencies in 
opinion, policy, and practice are significantly impacting the motivation, 
confidence, and ultimately, the behaviours of health professionals and 
subsequently, the families they are treating. This provides a better understanding 
as to why some interviewees felt the identification of a potential donor could be 
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met with a sigh or even as something to be discouraged, depending upon one's 
current level of motivation and workplace demands. 
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Chapter Five: Determining Ethics 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was established that organ donation requires 
strategic, physical, emotional, and psychological effort from the treating 
intensivists. Some interviewees admitted that this can make their role in organ 
donation quite taxing at times. In this chapter, it will be argued that a substantial 
part of this effort stems from the intensivist's determination of the ethics involved 
in every potential donor situation. 
The first section of this chapter will show that, consistent with the literature, 
physicians define the suitability of their behaviour according to the therapeutic 
intent of their actions (or others' potential perceptions about the intention of 
medical treatment). Interviewees expressed clear ethical comfort when the 
treatment provided is solely intended for the benefit of their patient and the 
patient's family. However, it "muddies the waters" substantially when it becomes 
unclear if anyone other than the patient and their family will benefit from the 
intensivist's actions. It will become apparent why "upholding patient's best 
interests" constituted the core theme in the analysis. 
Intensivists' acceptance of their dual capacity as the treating intensivist and 
the person to discuss organ donation to the patient's NOK will also be discussed. 
Many interviewees denied that this posed a conflict of interest in this context, 
given that they consistently determine the suitability of their actions according to 
the best interests of the patient and family. Discussed are inconsistencies about 
intensivists' role in organ donation, both in theory and practice, including 
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interviewees' paradoxical shunning of the recent initiative designed to relieve 
them of some responsibilities and bypass the conflict of interest issue. The first 
section concludes by summarising the possible implications this new initiative 
may have for intensivists' conversion of potential organ donors, if indeed it is 
welcomed by the sector. 
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The ethical investigation continues in the two remaining chapter sections that 
explore the circumstances in which interviewees did recognise the potential to be 
caught in a conflict of interest. Two major ethical subthemes are presented: 
supporting potential donors, and navigating the "Grey Zone". These complex 
subthemes are crucial in understanding intensivists' conversion behaviour given 
each theme revealed many caveats in the donation procedure and the DCD 
process in particular. Interviewees cried foul if patients with futile outcomes were 
admitted to ICU to support their potential to become organ donors. Yet most 
interviewees were comfortable with admitting exactly the same patients to better 
manage their EoLC. Consequently, there were significant differences of opinion 
amongst interviewees as to whether organ donation should be considered part of 
an individual's EoLC. 
In the third and final section of this chapter, the ethical acceptability of DCD 
is discussed. While the reintroduction of DCD in Australia may relieve public 
frustrations through offering a broader donor pool, there are "major sticking 
points" preventing some hospitals' uptake of DCD programs. These uncertainties, 
or areas of "grey", concern the cardiac death donor criteria, the antemortem 
intervention "slippery slope" and the irreversibility of death in a potential DCD 
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donor. It will be argued that most current DeD protocols successfully mitigate 
these uncertainties but absolute certainty in medicine is impossible. Hence, 
despite the unavoidable need in DeD to broach organ donation before death has 
been determined, current protocols ensure the practice remains ethical and in the 
patient and family'S best interests. 
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The overarching aim of this chapter is to show that decoding the 
intensivist's therapeutic intent behind organ donation procedures is paramount to 
understanding their motivation and confidence in actualising potential organ 
donors. Differences of opinion and practice inconsistencies emerged when the 
intensivists disagreed on what is in the best interests of the patient and particularly 
when the therapeutic intent guiding their actions was no longer for the sole benefit 
of the patient or their family. It will be argued that some interviewees' 
interpretation of the patient's best interest is unnecessarily narrow. 
5.2 Upholding The "Best Interests" Standard: Physician Duty-OJ-Care 
As identified in the previous chapter, facilitating organ donation opportunities 
falls under the busy intensivist's list of responsibilities. Thus, understanding 
intensivist's motivation and confidence to actualise organ donors must begin with 
an examination of how they manage and prioritise this responsibility amongst 
their other job tasks. 
Due to their position in the supply chain, intensivists did not deny their 
pivotal role in the delivery of organs to a society in need: "from a practical point 
of view, it's something, as an leu specialist ... we're meant to be aware of'. But 
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it is this intensivist's word choice that provides some clues as to how, in practice, 
interviewees view organ donation. Organ donation represents an extra or option 
that intensivists are "meant to" or should consider - emphasising an element of 
obligation is involved. Another intensivist extends this sentiment: 
There are lots of people who need organs and we are the major persons as 
a group in the hospital network whose responsibility is to see that 
whenever it's appropriate, that organs are donated to the needy persons. 
As I said it's a matter of routine questioning, however irksome it might be 
and however distressing for the parents, one really is obliged to ask the 
question. 
While not all interviewees would agree with the perception that it can be 
distressing for the NOK to be asked about organ donation, many would agree 
there is inherent awkwardness in such an emotional situation. Nevertheless, this 
should and does not prevent an intensivist fulfilling their responsibility to raise the 
prospect of organ donation with a NOK. However, broaching the prospect of 
organ donation and prioritising organ donation amongst role responsibilities are 
completely different tasks. Although a few interviewees reported some problems 
with the former task, all showed great disdain for the latter. Thus, despite 
acknowledgement of their pivotal role in our organ donation system and no matter 
how pragmatic their general donation opinions, interviewees firmly opposed 
ranking organ donation amongst their top job priorities. 
First and foremost, intensivists are highly skilled medical doctors, not organ 
donation advocates. They have studied and practiced the science and art of 
medicine, choosing to specialise in the critical care of gravely ill people. Their 
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code of ethics principle standard is to "consider first the well-being of your 
patient" (AMA, 2004 s l.l.a, p.l). Hence, interviewees stressed that their primary 
focus of care is looking after the patient's best interests, whilst supporting the 
patient's family. Their judgement is fitting considering successful solid organ 
donations generally transpire as a result of someone's death (apart from some live 
transplants). Nonetheless, interviewees were acutely aware that their primary 
patient directive must be carefully managed with their capacity to support 
potential organ donors. Although their job descriptions say they can attend to both 
tasks, intensivists don't believe it is appropriate to give both tasks equal attention: 
The primary aim of therapy is to treat the child and their parents. Donation 
is a secondary aim. It so happens that the three things coincide but one 
can't consider organ donation alone as the primary aim. We are not a 
donor factory. 
Unlike an industrial production-line, where the priority is to turn out profit-
making products, the ICU's priority is not to produce donors (no matter how 
"profitable" that may be). Consequently, the current findings undeniably show 
that, day-to-day, organ donation only becomes an intensivist's priority when the 
NOK decide they wish to pursue it. To order organ donation any other way was 
seen to jeopardise the duty-of-care to their patients and NOK. 
Accordingly, some interviewees were angered by perceived pressure from 
others in the donation sector to re-examine their strongly-held "neutral stance" to 
organ donation. Despite the NODe's apparent success and continued government 
funding, at least three interviewees expressed uncertainty about its overall 
intentions, as summarised by the following intensivist: 
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Best interest of family, patient and family. They're the things we look 
after; and by the way, if they become organ donors, great, but that's 
always got to be second, and I'm not sure in some cases it's second. 
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As the profession advises, this intensivist uses the patient and family "best 
interest" compass to determine the ethical appropriateness of organ donation and 
their own subsequent behaviour. However, they believe others in the donation 
sector are not behaving as they should by insinuating that the conversion of organ 
donors should rank higher than it currently does on an intensivist's to-do-list. 
In no uncertain terms, an intensivist's utmost duty is to their patient, not 
society's problems or another specialist's patient. Hence, the moment a 
physician's actions benefit, or could be seen to benefit, anyone other than the 
patient and their family, the physician is on ethically shaky ground. To be 
anything but neutral when initiating the prospect of organ donation was therefore 
seen to be inconsistent with the essential "best interests of patient and family" 
standard. 
5.2.1 Offer, Receive, but Never Request 
Contrary to the literature, public perception, and published "request" rates, the 
need for neutrality explains why, in practice, intensivists do not request organ 
donation of the NOK. Rather, "we float the idea". This is because the very act of 
"requesting" would imply a physician had a preference about that potential 
donation or indeed, organ donation in general. Yet at no time was it okay for 
physicians to let their personal donation opinions be known to the NOK. 
According to interviewees, such unprofessional behaviour was not tolerated in 
their ICUs. Consequently, intensivists report that they offer the NOK the 
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opportunity to donate, in a delicate discussion that cannot be overly prescriptive: 
"It is not a cooking recipe. It's a dish you make up according to the 
circumstances; it's nonetheless a very fine tuned concoction." Indeed, as long as 
the NOK were left with a neutral aftertaste, interviewees remained confident in 
raising the opportunity of organ donation by tailoring the discussion to every 
circumstance. 
While this well-supported neutral donation stance is taken to the extreme in 
the following excerpt, it clearly illustrates the intensivist's duty-of-care priorities 
to immediate patients and their families: 
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[T]he end gain quite frankly for me is not the donation rates or the consent 
rates, as long as it's something that the [patient's] family feels comfortable 
with, and that is well and truly their decision on behalf of the [deceased] 
person, then that's fine. Ifbecause of something the consent rate goes to 
zero ... I don't have a problem. If that's what the community wants, 
that's what the family wants. 
The final sentence of the passage allows understanding of how the intensivist 
justifies their neutral donation behaviour. Like many health professionals, they see 
their role as being to serve the community and to enact agreed standards, not to 
challenge these standards or promote one's own. To guide practice, they draw 
upon the treating families as if they are representatives of the community-agreed 
standards. Therefore, confidently stating they would be comfortable with a low 
consent rate, if this was a true indication of what their community wants. This 
poses a question: In spite of first-hand experience of treating patients with end-
stage organ failure, does maintaining this impartial, community-derived attitude 
lead intensivists to relinquish some of the responsibility to convert potential 
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donors into actual donors? Possibly, but still it is simplistic to assume that 
intensivists' neutral donation stance is a potential barrier to increasing conversion 
rates. After all, families expect their doctor to look after their own needs and 
would perceive any "pushing" for donation as unprofessional and unethical while 
also threatening public donation support rates. 
One way a physician can avoid the potential perception of pushing for organ 
donation and remain dedicated to their patient's best interests, is for the NOK to 
initiate the prospect of organ donation when the situation arises. According to 
ANZOD statistics (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010), organ donation was volunteered by 
the family in 36 per cent of successful donor cases in 2009, which was up from 
the 32 and 22 per cent volunteer rates in 2008 and 2006 respectively, but similar 
to the 37 per cent rate recorded in 2007. This is inline with interviewees' claim 
that families are more frequently initiating the possibility of organ donation, 
sometimes prematurely or in unsuitable contexts, "[b Jut when it is appropriate 
then it makes life incredibly easy for us". 
There is also the added benefit when a NOK initiates the discussion of organ 
donation, a physician's therapeutic intent is less likely to be questioned. 
Effectively, "that would take a lot of heat off a lot of people" as physicians are no 
longer the trusted professional to suggest the NOK might want to consider helping 
others in their darkest hour. In other words, there is the potential of being 
perceived as acting out-of-line with their patient and family's best interests 
because a third party's interests are suddenly being considered. Not to mention 
how taxing it must be to be constantly mindful of one's behaviour and the 
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potential for liability. Therefore, it is little wonder it "changes the ball game if the 
family brings it up, and changes the ethics and the morals of the situation quite 
substantially." The moment the NOK initiates interest in organ donation, organ 
donation can be considered compatible with the patient and family's best interests 
and physicians are less likely of being accused of having a conflict of interest. 
5.2.2 A voiding The Conflict of Interest - Perceived or Real? 
If on-duty intensivists do not promote or advocate organ donation, they 
believe they can avoid posing a potential conflict of interest. According to 
interviewees' logic, their patient's and NOK's best interests are their only 
imperative, hence maintaining a "neutral" donation stance assists them to 
facilitate the conversion of potential organ donors without creating a conflict of 
interest. The following extract is representative of the interviewed sample: 
I think that because of the way we operate ... I think everything we do is 
really designed to sideline that conflict of interest as much as we can. You 
know we don't confront one issue until we've cleared the other. And so I 
don't think the conflict issue is a big thing for us. 
Like others, this intensivist employs preventive practices that are designed to 
minimise the potential for a conflict of interest. Recall, for instance, the well-
documented demarcation procedure that suggests physicians should not inform 
NOK of their loved one's brain death in the same discussion as broaching organ 
donation, otherwise "if you bring it in earlier than that it's very confusing for 
families, they wonder who you're treating". Thus, although the same cannot be 
said for DCD (a point that will be returned to in the upcoming sections), 
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interviewees protested it is not intensivists who perceive a conflict of interest but 
rather others in the donation sector: 
[T]hey reckon ... that the public sees a conflict of interest ... we don't 
see a conflict of interest but the businessmen do. I can't see what the 
bloody conflict of interest is ... I think that totally misconstrues the whole 
thing. 
According to this interviewee, the very suggestion of a conflict of interest 
misinterprets the overarching cause of organ donation. That is, organ 
transplantation is seen as a secondary benefit to the donation process. The first 
and most important reason for organ donation is to offer bereaved families some 
positive out of their tragedy. Therefore, it is believed that organ donation can be in 
a family'S best interests ifit is one of their wishes and may even aid their 
emotional and psychological adjustment to their loved one's death. While these 
arguments have great merit and the literature to support them, this intensivist fails 
to recognise that regardless of their ability to separate physician tasks from the 
one to broach organ donation, if members of the public (including the 
businessmen who make up pro-donation organisations) perceive a conflict of 
interest, then it does matter to them. Hence, it may be having an effect on 
Australia's consent rates, given that the public is where donations come from. 
Furthermore, if intensivists' desire to avoid a conflict of interest is so strong, it 
must impact their capacity to support the organ donation cause and, therefore, 
their day-to-day conversion behaviour. 
Given our understanding of human motivation and accomplishment, it appears 
organ donation advocates and government bodies have recognised there is a 
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problem if our "gatekeepers" to donation are unable or unwilling to raise it on 
their list of priorities. Cue The Authority's introduction of another hospital-based 
professional, whose role is to offer and manage the donation process, thereby 
side-stepping the potential conflict of interest issue being perceived by 
intensivists. Such an initiative means that the treating intensivist would manage 
the active care of the patient until such time as the patient becomes a potential 
donor. At that point, a different specialist would assume management. 
These recent changes to the Australian donation sector can be evidenced in the 
pink text in Figure 5.1, which is a social worlds/arenas map. According to 
Situational Analysis, a social worlds/arenas map allows a meso-level 
interpretation of the situation through the visual delineation of the collective 
actors (e.g. organised social action groups such as ICU physicians, transplant 
recipients), key non-human elements (e.g. the AODR, ICD-lO guidelines) and the 
arenas of commitment within which they are engaged in ongoing negotiations 
(represented by the dotted lines) (Clarke, 2003; 2005). Each social world is 
represented by its circular but porous boundaries and some overlap, demonstrating 
that certain people (e.g. ICU physicians) and their collective groups (e.g. 
professional societies such as ANZICS) are participating in more than one social 
world. This is also the case for social worlds, groups or non-human elements (e.g. 
the ICD-l 0) that participate in more arenas than just the Australian solid organ 
donation arena (Clarke, 2005a). 
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Note: Pink text depicts the recent sector additions. 
Although interviewees categorically preferred it when the NOK initiates the 
possibility of organ donation, they did not support thi s allernative of introducing 
specific organ donation hospital medical directors. Dissenters reasoned that 
removing the broaching and management of organ donation from their current job 
responsibili ties would equate to abandoning a family when they are most in need, 
by severing the rapport, communication, and trust that had been built up over a 
number of hours or days. This was perceived to be aSki ng the physic ian to forsake 
thei r cont inu ity of care and, more importan tl y, abandoning their patient/family's 
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best interests standard. Hence, it was not surprising that some intensivists 
interviewed want to extend this level of care beyond the patient's death, as 
expressed by the following interviewee: 
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I'd feel terrible if [I wasn't the one to broach the donation discussion], I 
don't see it makes any sense ... Because we have an engagement 
philosophy, because we do believe very strongly in the communication 
with families and we carry it through ... it's not just talking, this isn't just 
baby talk. I think we really do it. That other way of managing it doesn't 
make any sense and the conflict of interest stuff is just bullshit in that sort 
of a context. 
This intensivist clearly resents the notion that treating a patient and offering 
their NOK the option to donate is a conflict of interest. Furthermore, they are 
actually offended by the mere suggestion, perceiving their professionalism to be 
unduly questioned. 
This was consistent with the finding that interviewees showed great pride in 
their planning and ability to communicate complex concepts and emotionally 
sensitive information to vulnerable NOK. No matter how "irksome" raising organ 
donation with a grieving family may be, interviewees reasoned that it was their 
responsibility and part of their duty-of-care. Therefore, instead of posing a 
conflict of interest that could damage donation consent levels, some intensivists 
perceived handling the "offering" process was their responsibility and may 
actually increase consents levels: 
It is my impression and belief that you're going to be much more 
successful in negotiations with family when you have been taking a lead 
role in walking them through each stage of their loved one's illness. So 
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explaining what you're doing and what you hope to achieve and what 
you're worried might happen and planting those seeds. If you've got time, 
and sometimes you don't have time, to walk people through a stepwise 
process over a couple of days, it is very useful. If the one person can speak 
to the family, it's very helpful. 
This extract also introduces an additional important point in the debate-the 
notion of time. Intensivists are busy, highly-specialised, and therefore, highly 
sought-after in the leu. They have numerous responsibilities to manage, with 
facilitating potential organ donation opportunities being just one of them. While 
the organ retrieval process may indeed be rapid, interviewees emphasised the 
importance of fostering a much slower-pace when grief-stricken families are 
asked to decide the fate of their loved one's organs. Hence, in addition to the 
reduction of labour it may provide, there was some interviewee in support of the 
proposed initiative: 
I'm sure the processes will become better. I know if I have somebody who 
is dying and an organ donor at the moment, and I'm on the floor, it takes 
me, as the specialist, away from the floor from looking after the other 
patients for at least six hours or eight hours, which is almost the entire day, 
'cause it is very time consuming. So if there's a person who's dedicated to 
that and who takes over that role, then it's probably going to be easier to 
look after the other patients firstly, and secondly might even make the 
family feel better. I think this concept of conflict, which the families seem 
to perceive may be real, and it might well be that if somebody else comes 
they may view it differently. 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 91 
At the time of writing, dedicated hospital specialists destined to manage 
potential organ donors had commenced their new positions in some regions across 
Australia. Until the performance data is available, it is difficult to comment on the 
likelihood it will reduce the conflict of interest perceived by some parts of the 
community. The separation of roles may offer specific benefits to the DCD 
program, given that the prospect of organ donation must be raised before cardiac 
death can be declared. Thus, compared to families of brain dead donors, families 
of cardiac death donors may be more likely to be unsure of where the treating 
physician's motivation lies. 
Given that physicians claim the initiative may cause a departure from their 
patient/family best interest standard by abandoning the family when they are most 
in need of a trusted face, The Authority'S initiative's timely introduction with the 
re-birth of DCD in Australia suggests more than just the public will be protected. 
Reducing the potential for conflicts of interest in medical practice will also protect 
physicians, hospitals, and governments from bad press and litigation, and the 
likely damage to public support rates and Australia's organ donation program that 
might otherwise occur. 
It will also be interesting to see how the initiative is received by those 
intensivists who would rather not hand over their responsibility to another 
professional. After all, whoever deals with the NOK presumably will also be 
expected to consider the patient and family's best interests to prevent unethical 
practice. This initiative may effectively be repositioning a set of issues from one 
professional to another. 
Finally, there is the possibility that the dedicated specialist may be introduced 
too late in the process to really capitalise on the potential donor pool. As is 
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revealed in the next section, where some interviewees deemed it unethical to 
transfer terminal patients to the reu in order to support their potential to become 
organ donors. 
5.3 Supporting the Potential: Is Organ Donation part of End of Life Care? 
As detailed in Figure 4.2, it is common practice in major Australian hospitals 
for ED patients to be transferred to the reu to better manage their EoLe, yet 
international research hints of growing concerns about reus are being used 
inappropriately as hospices (Sharma, Freeman, Zhang & Goodwin, 2008). While 
this debate is out of the current dissertation's scope, it should be briefly 
acknowledged. Opponents say it is a waste of resources to admit terminal patients 
for palliative care. Yet the current findings reveal the majority of reu and ED 
interviewees were comfortable with admitting patients to the reu for the main 
purpose of providing EoLe. Their claim being that the reu is a better 
environment than the ED for time-consuming medical and nursing interventions 
designed to make the dying patient more comfortable. Many also highlighted the 
importance of providing the family with an environment that is equally 
appropriate for their comfort in such a distressing situation, which allows time and 
privacy to adjust to the dire prognosis. Such requirements may not always be met 
in the ED or on the ward. 
Transferring mechanically-ventilated patients from ED to the reu means the 
staff are not just standing by doing nothing, which must be a difficult task for a 
physician when faced with distraught family members. The simple act of 
transferring patients provides staff with a further opportunity to enact their best 
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interest duty-of-care to the shocked family; "it's a smoother process for everyone 
then when you do withdraw life support, rather than letting someone die on the 
ward". While the interviewee acknowledged advantages for "everyone" involved, 
they go on to point out that it may not be strictly advantageous for the patient, 
who may in fact be having their life prolonged: 
[W]e do take patients to the intensive care unit knowing that they're not 
going to survive and it's not, if you like, necessarily in the patient's best 
interest to have done it, but it helps smooth the process over, so I guess 
you could apply the same thinking when you're in the end oflife and 
you're considering organ donation. But that's really the only tricky, ethical 
issue as to whether you should admit [the patient in to the ICU] and 
continue giving intensive care support, when you realise that the outcome 
is going to be death; right from the beginning. 
Although most interviewees often pointed out keeping a dying patient alive 
may not be regarded as being in the patient's "best interest", they also recognised 
that it may be within a patient's interests to have their family'S needs attended to. 
After all, admitting a patient with futile outcomes to the ICU affords the NOK the 
preferred environment to learn of, and adjust to, their loved one's imminent death. 
Hence, interviewees now have an ethically justifiable reason for extending the 
treatment of patients with no chance of recovery. The family'S emotional and 
psychological best interests are prioritised above what might be a patient's 
medical best interests. 
Conversely, interviewees did not believe it was in the patient and NOK's best 
interests to admit the same terminal patients to the ICU for the sole purpose of 
organ donation. Nor did many believe that the prospect of organ donation should 
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be considered as part of EoLe. Some claimed that as organ donation does not 
occur during the patient's life, it is a contradiction in terms to regard it as part of 
EoLe and admit potential donors into the leu under that proviso. Although a few 
interviewees acknowledged the continuance of therapy may well be considered in 
the best interests of those patients with pre-registered consents, this consent was 
not considered enough to mitigate the subsequent ethical issues. Indeed, the 
following extract represents the majority of interviewees who draw a definite 
distinction between leU admissions for EoLe and leu admissions for certain 
death and organ donation: 
We orchestrate death in the leu . We allow time for people to get used to 
it, for family members to get - we do orchestrate it. And one might say 
that's not strictly in the patient's interest once you've decided to withdraw 
care ... But we do it because, I guess, at the very least, there's a 
perception if the patient was alive, if it was felt that it would help the 
grieving process of the family, they would be quite happy to be kept alive 
just a bit longer so that everyone could get there. So you could justify it. I 
still think that's different from orchestrating things for someone else who's 
totally unrelated to the patient. 
In other words, continuation of therapy (or non-therapeutic ventilation) is only 
ethically justifiable if the patient or family may stand to benefit from it 
(emotionally or psychologically), but the same patient management is not 
considered ethically justifiable if a third party may prosper from it through organ 
transplantation. Another interviewee related the process to "hunting with the 
hounds and the horses if you like ... you can't go on two horses at the same 
time". In fact, the current findings clearly indicated that the admission of terminal 
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patients (i.e. potential donors) to the ICU for the sole purpose of becoming organ 
donors was deemed unethical: 
I don't actually agree with that concept [of maintaining therapy] and I 
don't think any of my other colleagues do either, we think that's [a] 
disingenuous mode of action to do something in a two faced way, with or 
without the parents knowledge ... [the] guiding principle in this 
circumstance is that if a child was obviously dead the right thing to do is to 
stop the treatment. If at that point the parents agree for organ donation, so 
be it, but if the child is in the process of dying it's immoral and unethical 
to maintain life-support treatment with the mere prospect of obtaining 
organs. 
Notwithstanding a patient's registration of consent or full disclosure to the 
NOK, interviewees insisted that the therapeutic intent behind the continuance of 
the patient's "life support" is to provide the family with the most appropriate 
environment for death, not to permit organ donation. Interviewees were therefore 
comfortable making an assumption that the NOK's emotional needs were in-line 
with a patient's best interests, but not that organ donation was. 
5.3.1 The Rejection of Non-therapeutic Ventilation 
Regardless of supposedly legally valid donation consent, non-therapeutic 
ventilation in the dying potential organ donor was considered ethically 
unjustifiable to oneself, one's colleagues, and the community. This was why most 
interviewees were definite that potential donor transfers to the ICU were only 
acceptable after the patient had been declared brain dead: 
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We certainly don't object to that as long as we feel, A, we've already got 
agreement to donate and, B, if someone is already brain dead then that's 
fine because we know it will happen soon. So in principal we have no 
issue with that unless of course we're full or it's our last leu bed, and then 
it becomes an issue. 
When transferring patients to the leu for the purpose of organ donation, this 
intensivist outlined two theoretical conditions followed by a practical one. Firstly, 
donation consent must have been obtained; secondly, the patient is already brain 
dead, and finally, there must be sufficient leu bed resources. For this intensivist, 
gaining the NOK's consent for donation prior to the leu transfer is crucial. It 
means that the family are well informed that the patient is being transferred for no 
other reason than the possibility of donation. They are not given false hope. Thus, 
the potential for conflict of interest is lessened because the physician is acting in 
line with the family's wishes; there is no hidden agenda. Therefore, it seems 
informed consent can powerfully mitigate a physician's strict organ donation 
protocols, which are designed to avoid a conflict of interest. The influence of 
informed consent is a theme that will be returned to throughout the remainder of 
the dissertation. 
Returning to the above extract, condition "B" relates to the transference of 
brain dead patients only. This condition is imperative to interviewees for a 
number of ethics-based reasons. Apart from one interviewee, all stated that 
meeting this condition ensures the transfer and continuance of care remains 
ethically appropriate. Given the patient has already been declared dead, the 
potential for conflict of interest is diminished because the intensivist cannot be 
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accused of manipulating a patient's death in order to convert the potential donor 
into an actual one. The physician's therapeutic intent remains transparent. 
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Additionally, if death has been declared, then the organ retrieval operation 
should be imminent. All interviewees expressed great unease about maintaining 
futile treatment for lengthy or indefinite periods of time, as they felt this robs 
patients of a dignified death. Dying can be an inexact process, particularly when 
brain death is the cause of death. Interviewees acknowledged this uncertainty and 
used it to justify the ethical extension of treatment for certain NOK to make it to 
the patient's bedside, compared to what was perceived as the unethical treatment 
extension for organ donation. 
In other words, interviewees believed it was justifiable to maintain mechanical 
ventilation for interstate relatives but not to allow brain death and subsequent 
organ donation to occur. Their reasoning relates directly back to their ethical 
compass; i.e., it would be in the best interests of the patient and their family if that 
special interstate relative had the opportunity to say goodbye. In contrast, many 
interviews assert it would not be in the patient's best interests to prolong their life 
for those unknown transplant recipients, even with known patient or NOK 
donation consent. Bearing in mind humans are better at predicting plane arrivals 
than brain death, the logic seems plausible but it is still based on assumption. 
Hence why one intensivist rejected this reasoning, declaring it may be more 
unethical to deny a dying patient's known wish to donate by not admitting them to 
the ICU, as demonstrated by the satirical response when asked if their reasoning 
still applies when there was only one ICU bed left: 
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Yeah, yeah, yeah, I know, there's always only one bed left. [P]eople say .. 
. I can't bring people up here just for that purpose, that's unethical. And I 
say, well hang on a tick, if they wanted to be a donor and you're stopping 
them being a donor ... if you don't bring them up [to the ICU] aren't you 
denying them their wishes? So how do you see that as being anything but 
unethical? 
By pointing out the established value of managing patients' EoLC in ICU, this 
intensivist rejects the notion that the ICU bed clause should be a factor in 
supporting potential organ donors. Moreover, they were the only interviewee to 
point out that looking after a patient's best interests should extend further than just 
considering their physiological wellbeing. 
In this context, interviewees' narrow interpretation of the patient/family best 
interests' ethical standard is unfortunate. While physicians are comfortable 
attending to their patient's physical best interests, they are less so with their 
patient's emotional, psychological, and spiritual best interests, except when these 
are consistent with the NOK's. Thus, in a further bid to avoid, or at least 
minimise, the potential conflicts of interest intensivists may pose families in their 
dual capacity as the treating doctor and facilitator of organ donation, organ 
donation is not considered part of EoLC. However, the physicians with narrow 
EoLC interpretations are resisting the inevitable. The manner in which DCD 
occurs forces organ donation to be considered as part of one's EoLC because of 
the time frame in which treatment is withdrawn and death is declared. Patients' 
NOK consent to DCD prior to death declaration, not afterwards, as is possible in 
DBD. 
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Finally, despite a number of valid consent registers being available to relieve 
patients' families and physicians from the pressure of guessing an individual's 
best interests, their practical utility remains low. This finding will be explored in 
chapter six, as it is now appropriate to explore what has been done to address 
some physicians' stem reluctance to consider organ donation as part of EoLC 
practices. 
5.3.2 The Call for Clinical Triggers in ED 
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In the previous section, it was shown that the admission of dying patients to 
the ICU for the sole purpose of organ donation was considered unethical. This 
finding is further evidenced by those interviewees who specifically rejected the 
notion that Category C patients are indeed realistic donors (Opdam and Silvester 
(2006) defined Category C patients as those with the potential to progress to brain 
death within 24 hours if supportive treatment were continued). Some interviewees 
suggested that unconverted potential donors may predominantly be Category C 
patients: 
I don't believe that we miss any appropriate donors who are in the 
intensive care unit, and again, the figures that Helen Opdam produces 
would suggest that you might increase your [donor] pool if you took 
severely brain injured people up from the emergency department with a 
poor prognosis, but I don't really think they're true misses, that requires a 
societal shift in thinking. 
Given these findings support the notion that severely damaged neurological 
patients may have their active care withdrawn before brain death would have 
occurred, a shift in societal thinking may well increase conversion rates. In fact, 
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the advent of clinical triggers in the ED appears to be one of the ways The 
Authority intends to spearhead such a shift. Aimed at improving the recognition 
and flow of potential donors and dying patients from ED to ICU, programs 
utilising the acronym such as GIVE had been, or were due to be implemented 
during this study's data collection (acronym stands for: G = low and descending 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), I = intubated, V = ventilated, E = extubation). 
While clinical triggers undoubtedly offer promising outcomes for recognising 
potential donors, these findings suggest it may be some time before ED physicians 
and intensivists feel ethically comfortable, and legally secure, about maintaining 
the potential donor under these circumstances. The hesitation for clinical triggers 
supports some findings previously released by NODC (NHMRC, 2009b), and is 
perhaps best summarised by the intensivist who said: "let's just keep him going in 
case he could be a donor tomorrow. Nobody says that but that's the truth of what 
probably happens and you know, I wouldn't subscribe to that at all." This 
intensivist believed that the mere prospect of non-therapeutic ventilation in not-
yet-brain-dead patients makes physicians so ethically uncomfortable that they 
could not be honest about the practice. But is there more to this popular objection 
than an ethical discomfort about interfering with a patient's right to a "dignified" 
death? When explicitly broached, what was identified was another possible 
deterrent to maintaining non-therapeutic ventilation; the danger that brain death 
may not ever occur: 
The other ... possibility is that if you allow these people to have non 
therapeutic ventilation, is that they may not die, and they end up being in a 
vegetative state. Now, is that harming a patient? Now, they may be, by 
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definition, being in a vegetative state, they're not suffering because there 
is no awareness. But most people, including myself ... would worry ... 
that could happen to me ... end up in a vegetative state, 1'd rather be dead. 
So that's a harm, a potential harm, to me, you know. So it depends on how 
you define harm. 
It seems the possibilities of negative consequences in non-therapeutic 
ventilation are multifold. Should brain death fail to eventuate, the patient may be 
stuck in a vegetative state, which is an existence this intensivist described as a 
state worse than death. Moreover, the treating intensivists could feel they caused, 
or at least contributed, to this event-a forbidding prospect for any individual's 
conscience, not withstanding those whose ethical code specifies: "where death is 
imminent and curative or life-prolong treatment appears to be futile, try to ensure 
that death occurs with dignity and comfort" (AMA, 2004). 
Herein lays another potential conversion barrier if intensivists feel at all 
uneasy about some aspects of the management required to facilitate more 
donations via brain death. Thus, an alternative to waiting for brain death to 
possibly occur was identified. This precipitated the recent re-introduction of DeD 
in some major Australian hospitals. Unlike DBD, where passive therapy is 
maintained to ensure brain death has or will occur (see Figure 4.2), therapy is 
withdrawn in DeD. Thus, the period of non-therapeutic ventilation in DeD 
should theoretically be less than that necessary in DBD. Yet only one interviewee 
acknowledged this potential merit. Instead, most interviewees expressed a greater 
unease with the unavoidable situation where organ donation must be raised with 
the NOK prior to cardiac death being determined. In turn, this meant that the 
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therapeutic intent behind subsequent DCD practices have an increased potential 
for a conflict of interest, compared to DBD. The next section is dedicated to 
exploring these issues as well as the potential benefits offerings of DCD. 
5.4 Donation after Cardiac Death: Navigating the "Grey Zone" 
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It was not surprising that the advent of DCD was defined by many 
interviewees as a necessity, given their strong opposition to non-therapeutic 
ventilation in dying neurological patients intended for donation. The topic of DCD 
consumed a major proportion of all discussions with intensivists and ED 
physicians alike. Reasons for this are offered in the following extract from an 
intensivist whose hospital had implemented DCD: 
It's a hot topic because we feel the need and there's pressure on us to 
increase the number of donations or the number of donated organs. And 
DCD is, apart from making sure you never miss a brain dead donor and 
you don't stuffup the organs so they're actually in good condition, the 
only other thing we can do is to increase DCDs. 
Unlike most interviewees, this intensivist acknowledges a pressure to increase 
donations and the possibility of missing potential, brain dead donors. However, 
like others, it is contended that there is little intensivists can do to increase the 
donation rate-other than to pursue DCD. But DCD offers more than just 
improved access to a previously inaccessible organ pool. It offers families another 
opportunity to fulfil their own, or their loved one's, wishes to donate, where brain 
death is not a likely outcome (at least not in the short-term). In fact, a number of 
intensivists claim it was families and the community who initiated DCD's rebirth 
in Australia due to dissatisfaction with unreasonable suitability criteria: 
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Some families are very frustrated by the fact that they can't donate organs, 
to the point where a particularly articulate family recently said "are you 
telling me that because he's not brain dead, but he's dying and he's going 
to die, that he can't donate organs, but yet ifthere was no blood flowing 
through his brain he could?" The answer to that at that stage is "yes". So 
he says "that's ridiculous. That's just stupid". 
This pediatric intensivist illustrates how DCD now provides a mechanism to 
avoid potentially frustrating situations, where families wish to donate their loved 
one's organs but they are told it cannot lawfully be done because the patient is not 
brain dead. By assuming the family's perspective in this situation, this intensivist 
was one of few to explicitly highlight the potential benefits DCD may afford 
frustrated families. 
Nevertheless, there was a varying but definite degree of reluctance and ethical 
discomfort perceived by all physicians about DCD. This was evidenced by a 
paediatric intensivist whose hospital was yet to implement DCD: 
I mean everyone you speak to will have a standard answer for [DBD], like 
I probably have. Whereas if you're asking about non-beating heart, non-
brain death donation, then that's really quite complex. How we feel about 
that and how we think it's going to be worked through and how it's going 
to work out. That is quite hard. 
As documented in American qualitative physician research (Mandell et aI., 
2006), many interviewees made reference to complex, "grey areas" they believe 
are more inherent to DCD than its counterpart. An attempt to represent these 
varying degrees of acceptance can be found in Figure 5.2, which is a positional 
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map (Clarke, 2005a). Represented on the X axis are the positions interviewees 
broadly assumed regarding the theoretical acceptance of DCD and represented on 
the Y axis are their positions regarding their comfort for operational aspects of 
DCD. A novel offering of Clarke's methodology is that these positions are not 
necessarily static and may change for both between· and within each interviewee, 
depending on the context and on the patient. 
Operational 
Acceptance of 
DCD 
• = Positions not 
articulated in the data 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Position B: 
Moderate theoretical and 
operational acceptance 
DCD. Some concerns 
remain 
Position C: 
Moderate ethical 
acceptance of the theory 
of DCD but some 
significant concerns about 
DCD in practice 
Theoretical Acceptance of DCD 
Position A: 
High theoretical 
acceptance and 
moderate acceptance 
of DCD in practice, 
Some operational 
concerns remain 
+++ 
Figure 5.2: Theoretical versus Operational Acceptance of DCD Positional Map 
As evidenced in this positional map, there were three general positions held by 
interviewees at the time of interview. The most commonly assumed positions 
were the high (position A) to moderate acceptance (position B) of DCD in theory. 
That said, both positions still represent definite concerns about its practical 
application. Interviewees whose hospital was yet to implement DCD were more 
likely to maintain position C at the time of interview. 
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Following Clarke's (2005a) reasoning, this positional map also permits the 
silences to "speak". For example, it is clear that no interviewees highly supported 
both DCD in theory and in practice simultaneously, nor did they strongly reject 
DCD in theory and practice. The silences also indicate that at the time of 
interview, no one reported a high acceptance for the operational aspects of the 
DeD process. Even those who had no qualms with the theory underpinning DeD 
reported some procedural concerns across a variety of situations. 
Figure 5.3 outlines the specific difficulties interviewees identified in a DeD 
program. The DeD procedure is depicted on the left side. The right side 
demonstrates the major issues in order of their emergence in the DeD process. 
The issues are also colour classified into two types: whether they are issues 
specific to DeD (yellow) or they pertain to both DBD and DeD (blue). 
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Two of the issues that are specific to DCD (yellow-coloured): "heart 
transplantation" and "indignity of the withdrawal and retrieval process" will not 
be discussed in this paper given they were not strongly evidenced in the current 
dataset. This is not to say they are not worthy of further inquiry. However, only 
those most salient to interviewees are addressed in the subsequent sections, 
beginning with some discussion regarding the recently introduced donor pool. 
5.4.1 The Maastricht Categories: Introducing a New Potential Donor 
The current findings revealed consistency with the international acceptance of 
the DCD Maastricht Categories and, specifically, with Australia's adherence to 
Category three & four in local DCD protocols. As one intensivist explained, "the 
cleanest, easiest way to do" DCD is only to allow patients who have a "profound 
brain injury that's not brain dead" to be recognised as potential donors. Hence, by 
only considering patients who meet Category three or four, more stringent ethical 
boundaries keep physicians from straying too far into the "grey zone" of DCD and 
public distrust. This sentiment is well captured by an intensivist with DCD 
expenence: 
[Y]ou have to have that demarcation where ... either somebody's brain 
dead or they're not brain dead and either they're not survivable or they are 
survivable ... So you're either treating or you're not treating invasively 
and when you cross the bench where you say look this is not survivable, 
we're going to remove invasive support but they're not brain dead, you 
then say well, would they be suitable for DCD? And it's that stepping over 
those boundaries if you like makes it doable. Once you dissolve the 
boundaries it gets less and less doable in my opinion. 
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Each step described above represents an ethical boundary the physician uses 
to guide their own practice of organ donation and specifically DCD. The fewer 
boundaries in place, the more ethically difficult they find DCD and the more at 
risk of creating a conflict of interest. 
Other interviewees were willing to consider loosening current DCD 
boundaries so to include other withdrawal-controlled patients (Category three) 
such as those with high spinal cord injuries, who could only survive in a 
vegetative state or be very profoundly neurologically impaired. This was 
providing, of course, that the decision to withdraw treatment on the basis of 
futility had already been made, independent to organ donation. Through treatment 
withdrawal and subsequent DCD, these physicians believe they will be acting in 
line with the patient's medical, emotional, psychological, and spiritual well-being. 
One intensivist was willing to push the potential DCD donor boundaries further 
still: 
[A] patient who was quadriplegic, ventilated and dependent quadriplegic, 
but otherwise completely awake, alert and rational. And the patient said I 
do not want to live with this disability, I want you to turn my ventilator off 
and let me die and I want to be an organ donor. You know, I want to 
donate my organs. Now there's no way you can do that except through the 
DCD thing. But how could you look that guy in the face and say no, piss 
off, I've got a conflict of interest, I've got an ethical problem with this. 
How can you look him in the face and say no you can't do it because of 
something in me? 
By arguing that the ethical boundaries of organ donation should involve 
further flexibility, this intensivist inadvertently raises the controversial Euthanasia 
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debate. He also emphasised the difficulty in refusing a fully-conscious, yet 
dependent quadriplegic's consent to death and subsequent organ donation, based 
on a doctor's personal ethics. So while DCD opens the door to new potential 
donor possibilities, just how wide that door may open made most interviewees 
very wary. Likewise, any discussion about extending the current DCD boundaries 
beyond Categories three & four raised immediate ethical concerns for the public 
perception of DCD. 
Interviewees felt that pushing the ethical boundaries of DCD too far and fast 
may paradoxically damage community support levels and the new potential donor 
pool. Given the opportunity for misconceptions amongst the public described in 
chapter two, these concerns seem realistic. Many interviewees illustrated this 
point by comparing the medical sector's awareness ofDCD procedures to that of 
the general public's, claiming there is too great an education gap between 
physicians and the public: 
[T]here has to be much more ... public education ... I mean you come in 
with chest pain and you have a cardiac arrest, you die, the next thing 
you're being organ donated. I don't know ... if the community is even 
aware that that process could unfold. 
At the time of interview, this ED physician was employed in a hospital that 
had implemented DCD about 18 months previously and was unaware of 
acceptable Maastricht donor types. That withstanding, like most interviewees, the 
ED doctor did not believe the public was ready for patients without serious 
neurological damage to be considered potential DCD donors. Of concern is that 
this observation appears to be in direct conflict with the earlier observation that it 
is the public who are driving the expansion of the potential organ donor criteria to 
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include DCD. It was furthermore ironic that some physicians thought DCD may 
be better understood and supported by the general public given that the definition 
of cardiac death is more synonymous with all previous cultural notions of dying 
than brain death is. 
Such anomalies appear to reveal the core reason for physicians' wariness of 
DCD and their faithful adherence to Maastricht Categories three and four. One of 
the concerns about DCD is not simply that its procedures are inherently unethical, 
but rather that performing these procedures on an ill-informed public is unethical. 
After all, physicians rely on community standards to determine and guide the 
ethics of their professional behaviour. Thus, it seems that until the community is 
better educated about DCD and the advancements it may offer, interviewees are 
more ethically comfortable if the new potential donor pool remains restricted to 
Maastricht Categories three and four. This would appear to be a wise course of 
action until public discourse about DCD is increased. In the next section, 
interviewees' perception of the deficit in the community's donation awareness is 
further examined in relation to a particularly controversial, "grey area" ofDCD: 
antemortem interventions. 
5.4.2 The Slippery Slope: Antemortem Interventions 
While interviewees readily acknowledged the potential increased organ access 
via DCD, some were wary about the transplantable quality of the organs retrieved. 
This was well captured by an intensivist whose hospital had implemented DCD 
over 12 months ago: "DCD for me is ... the sort of poor second cousin to brain 
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death". His reasoning that DCD is somehow inferior to DBD, like others, is 
directed at the manner in which DCD occurs. 
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Through the withdrawal of therapy, DCD may effectively side-step the 
unpopUlar, unethical, non-therapeutic ventilation issue hindering more brain dead 
donations, but consistent to the literature, some interviewees believe this comes at 
a significant cost to organ vitality and function (Bell, 2003; Mandell et aI., 2006; 
Reich et aI., 2009; Truog & Miller, 2008). Thus, to counteract potential ischemic 
damage to organs, a case for antemortem interventions has been argued (Rogers & 
Richards, 2008). However, apart from specific scenarios detailed below, this 
particular sample opposed most forms of antemortem intervention in DCD. 
Unlike blood collection, which must be taken from the patient prior to death in 
order to cross match potential recipients, most intensivists convincingly argued 
that DCD can occur without the need for antemortem interventions. Moreover, 
many interviewees argued that these procedures cross an ethical boundary they, as 
the treating physician, were simply not comfortable with. This is because 
antemortem interventions push physicians into that non-therapeutic-intent 
minefield that they wish to avoid at all costs. Thus, in line with the physician's 
"best interests of the patient and family" standard, the transplantable vitality of the 
organs is deemed insignificant compared to their obligation to provide patient care 
that is intended for the wellbeing of the patient and no one else. 
Extending this reasoning, some interviewees dismissed the suggestion that 
antemortem interventions could be considered as within the definition of a 
patient's best interest if the patient had a predetermined consent to donation. This 
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dismissal was based on at least two reasons. Firstly, a Victorian intensivist argued 
that he cannot lawfully provide antemortem interventions: 
[I]n the Guardianship Law, the doctors are required to do everything to 
preserve the health of the person, so they [other doctors] give the facile 
explanation that because a person wanted that to be done, it's in their best 
interests, sorry, that doesn't make legal sense. So they've got a problem. 
When there is an overarching law to abide by, predetermined patient donation 
consent is futile. This is despite the intensivist's admitting: "[ m]y heart may say it 
would be a good thing, and ethically one could argue about it but the law doesn't 
agree". In fact, recall the legislation and guidelines are inconsistent. As Australian 
pioneers of DCD, NSW currently bans antemortem interventions, yet in Victoria 
the Guardianship legislation is sufficiently vague about the matter. Much to their 
unease, another Victorian intensivist admitted knowledge of antemortem 
interventions occurring at their hospital: 
It does, yeah, it happens here. I have arguments with my colleagues ... 
and they would say ... there's a worse possible situation, but this may be 
the best possible outcome ... and it's true ... I can see why you might 
argue [that], and I can see you might go down there and you talk to the 
family and they're distressed and saying ... is there any possibility ... 
[the patient] could become an organ donor? 
Because antemortem interventions may facilitate the organ retrieval process, 
this intensivist begrudgingly acknowledges the direct benefit for families who are 
keen to donate their loved one's organs. But they continue on to say they would 
require "very very clear" evidence of the patient's previous donation consent 
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before personally considering the use of an antemortem intervention to facilitate a 
DCD. 
Another interviewee dismissed the suggestion that antemortem interventions 
could be considered to be in a patient's best interest because they had serious 
reservations about the specificity of information currently available in 'informed 
consent' processes. There was also uncertainty that current community education 
standards regarding the DCD procedure is specific enough to ease ethical concern 
about "treating them as a dead person by doing those things", thereby indicating 
that a considerable amount of uneasiness about antemortem interventions is 
generated by the fact that they actively challenge current ethical boundaries that 
have long been known about and agreed to by our medical and general 
communities. In essence, the ethical boundaries that typically prevent certain 
procedures from occurring before death are now being reviewed, even relaxed, yet 
a large proportion of the public are not aware of it. 
A further concern about antemortem interventions amongst this sample was 
the potential for movable boundaries. As illustrated by the pediatric intensivist 
who said: "I think if you cross the line with something so called as simple as 
Heparin, you're on a slippery slope". This slippery slope comparison was made by 
many interviewees who claimed that permitting one antemortem intervention, 
however small, may indeed open the door for other, more intrusive and potentially 
risky interventions to creep in, the danger of this being that the mechanisms by 
which these antemortem procedures work may hasten or even cause a patient's 
death. For example, when asked the likelihood that Heparin given antemortem 
could contribute to a patient's death, one NSW intensivist conceded: "It's very 
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unlikely but it only takes one to clear the pitch quite badly. So in general, we tend 
not to do that." 
This statement provides a number of insights: firstly, although he admits the 
potential for patient harm is small, it is still enough to avoid the antemortem 
administration of Heparin, but not specifically because of the risk of patient harm. 
Rather, the intensivist metaphorically emphasises that should such harm ever 
eventuate even to one patient, it would be enough to damage the greater donation 
cause. It seems there are greater risks at play than antemortem interventions that 
threaten patient care. 
Of additional interest is the "in general" proviso and "we tend not", word 
choices, which imply that there may be exclusions to the rule. Is this evidence of 
the slippery slope phenomenon well and truly existent in practice? Possibly, but it 
is certainly present in the following hypothetical example given by another 
interviewee who defines the ethical acceptability of antemortem interventions as 
dose-dependent: 
[W]hen it becomes more widely known that these are the sorts of things 
that go on, then I could conceive of giving a smallish dose of Heparin but 
never a largish dose of Heparin. Not the 20,000 sort of dose of Heparin 
that you'd use for someone going onto a heart lung machine. Because the 
risk of that contributing to their death would worry me a bit. 
Like a number of others, this intensivist also recognised the potential 
moderating effect of increasing the community's education level about DCD 
procedures. So although he does not feel the community's current knowledge 
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equates to informed consent, he may consider administering small doses of 
Heparin in future, should the public education level about DeD increase. This was 
a significant finding and one that the literature is lacking. 
As discussed, this stance again reinforces that a physician's fundamental role is 
to serve their patients and families. Therefore, to guide their own practice, 
physicians draw upon the treating families as if they are representatives of the 
community-agreed standards of ethical practice. Thus, the majority of 
interviewees did not believe they could perform antemortem interventions whilst 
consistently serving the best interests of an uninformed community. After all, the 
ethics of antemortem interventions are yet to be agreed upon in the medical sector. 
For instance, in this sample alone, only one NSW intensivist endorsed changing 
the state's current antemortem ban: 
Look I'm pretty practical about these things. I think it would be a good 
thing if they were changed. I mean, if you come to terms with the fact that 
there's an inevitability of dying, then I can't see anything wrong with 
optimising organ function in the last day or so of life ... 
Although having a pragmatic perspective about death was not unusual, this 
intensivist was the only one to explicitly support the use of antemortem 
interventions for the optimisation of organ function, not just to increase the 
likelihood that a deceased patient's donation wishes could be met. 
Apart from optimising organ function and therefore, serving a consenting 
patient's best interests, this raises a question of whether there are any other 
justifications for the use antemortem interventions. According to one intensivist, 
antemortem cannulation, in particular, may offer one appealing benefit to staff: 
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The cannulation I think is unnecessary. It should be unnecessary to do that 
premortem. So I think we should have better systems, you know putting 
great big cannulas in somebody is very intrusive. Putting in very small 
wires premortem in the artery and the vein so that the veins are then easy 
to cannulate post mortem is a very small intrusion. And so the issue of 
cannulation shouldn't come up I don't think ... that's just laziness. That's 
just not great medicine. 
This extract provides further evidence of the slippery slope phenomenon, 
given that the intensivist believes the ethical acceptability of antemortem 
interventions is dependent upon the level of intrusiveness caused to the patient. 
Overall, any apprehension about antemortem interventions and their slippery 
boundaries is real. For the credible reasons elucidated above, most of the 
interviewees deemed antemortem interventions to be currently unethical. 
However, if the community was fully informed about the new procedures, and 
remaining concerns were addressed, many interviewees may at least consider 
performing minor antemortem interventions in the near future. It is also worth 
noting there were interviewees who believed that the threat to patient care only 
becomes a possibility if the antemortem intervention is dispensed incorrectly. Yet 
none pointed out that the same potential threats are present in all medical 
procedures provided to patients in contexts not related to organ donation. This 
finding indicates that physicians operate .under somewhat different codes of 
practice with patients identified as potential organ donors compared to non-
donation patients. Further evidence of practice inconsistencies will be highlighted 
in chapter six and also in the next section, where the death declaration process of a 
potential cardiac death donor is contrasted with that of a non-donor's death. 
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5.4.3 Irreversibility and the Dead Donor Rule 
Intensivists are required to predict the time to death from cardiac arrest after 
the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment if a patient is intended for DCD. 
Depending on local state and hospital protocols, in order for the donation to go 
ahead, patients must be declared dead within 60 - 90 minutes following treatment 
withdrawal. While this calculation may seem incredibly complex, it was seldom 
raised by interviewees, regardless of whether DCD had been implemented in their 
hospital. 
In fact, very few interviewees reported any major difficulties with the 
declaration of death by irreversible cessation of circulation of blood, the 
Australian law that underpins DCD. Despite the term irreversibility inciting 
almost as much ethical and legal literature debate as antemortem interventions, 
few interviewees had serious issues with it. These dissatisfactions were related to 
the "default definition" that implies that circulatory death can only be declared 
"when there's no hope of so called auto-resuscitation". That is, when circulation 
reestablishes itself spontaneously, without assistance or intervention. This 
intensivist is effectively suggesting that at present, other physicians may be acting 
unlawfully and therefore unethically, by overlooking the term "irreversibility" and 
allowing inappropriate patients to become DCD donors. It is an objection that 
raises some serious questions and even the potential for another slippery slope 
dilemma: 
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[W]hat do we mean by irreversible cessation of circulation? ... We get 
patients who come into the emergency department who have arrested out 
on the street. They might have had no circulation for 30 or 40 minutes, 
but we continue to try to resuscitate them when they come in. We might be 
successful, we may not be ... We ... only think about giving up after 20 
or 30 minutes ... Here's people we're saying, well, after two minutes, it's 
irreversible. 
This intensivist passionately points out apparent inconsistencies in the practice 
of declaring death on the basis of irreversible cessation of circulation. However, 
the therapeutic intent in the two situations he has described is fundamentally 
different, thus the irreversibility component is not equivalent. The difference 
between Patient A who arrests in the street and Patient B who arrests some time 
after receiving medical care, is that Patient B has further progressed along the 
continuum of care. Every attempt has already been made to resuscitate Patient B 
with no success. The decision has been made to withdraw treatment on the 
grounds of futility. This is quite distinct to Patient A who has just been admitted 
to hospital and whose prognosis is yet to be determined. 
A further argument is that long before the reintroduction of DCD, death has 
been a process determined according to pragmatic guidelines congruent with the 
law. Like most medical procedures, these guidelines are set and approved by the 
medical community and indeed general society. Thus, the common and ethically 
acceptable interpretation of the circulatory law is that death is called when a 
patient's circulation stops (ANZICS, 2008). It does not mean that all bodily 
functions and cellular activity have permanently ceased. It does not mean that the 
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heart could not be restarted. One common situation where the irreversibility 
definition of death cannot be irrefutably met is described below: 
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[H]e's dead when his circulation stops. When he looks dead and 
everything about him says he's dead. That's how we normally say people 
are dead ... tell the family he's gone and time of death is 10:22, we know 
that if we tried we could restart that heart. We know that if we restarted the 
heart that there may be some, there's very likely to be some preserved 
brain function because that's the basis of all resuscitation anyway. So we 
know that to be the case. But we still say they're dead at 10:22. 
Thus, by acknowledging the infinite possibility of resuscitation following 
CPR, this intensivist dismisses the relevance of irreversibility in this ethically 
acceptable context. He demonstrates that calling the time of death is a judgment 
made skillfully by the treating physician; a necessary practice, widely deemed to 
be ethical and reasonable on pragmatic grounds. His views were not uncommon 
amongst the sample: 
The DCD stuff, there is a slight issue in terms of the timing and 
irreversibility of death. There's a pragmatic consensus on exactly what we 
do and how we do it which I think is reasonable. Very few things are 
absolute, even when it comes to death, because you can restart a heart a 
long way down the track if you try hard enough and that means nothing in 
real terms. 
By also pointing out the infinite possibility of resuscitation through the use of 
a lot of medical intervention, this intensivist contends that restarting a deceased 
patient's heart does not equate to much. In the following extract, one interviewee 
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supplements this argument by candidly describing how an unintentional but 
improper resuscitation occurred early into the hospital's DCD program: 
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[Y]ou extubate somebody, tum off whatever they're on, they pass away 
and you wait the five minute downtime. You take them to the operating 
theatre and they're appropriate for lung donation so an anaesthetist comes 
along, puts a tube down, gives a few puffs on the bag, inflates the lung 
vigorously, squeezes the heart and that heart can actually restart. That can 
happen up to half an hour down the track. That has happened once. That's 
essentially auto-resuscitation. What we do about that is if they are going to 
be reintubated, we don't [do it] vigorously because that's basically cardiac 
compression and that's resuscitation. So it's important to inflate the lungs 
gently to keep them open and healthy, but not vigorous ventilation 
movements. That's something that we've learnt relatively recently from 
this happening. 
Although the resuscitation of a deceased patient's heart (30 minutes after 
death was officially declared) had no significant patient outcomes, as a result of 
this unintentional event, the implicated hospital's DCD procedures were 
apparently tightened to ensure it did not happen again. 
Most interviewees argued that the irreversibility term is in fact being met 
through verdict. In other words, when the decision to withdraw a patient's 
treatment on the grounds of futility is made, although resuscitation may always be 
possible, doing so presents a complete paradox: 
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I don't see why we need a different definition of death for organ donation. 
The Act doesn't say that. The Act says they're dead when they've got 
irreversible cessation of function of the brain or irreversible cessation of 
circulation in the blood, in the body or whatever it's worded. But no one 
really thinks that means that you've got to resuscitate them to see if it's 
irreversible. No one thinks that. 
His claim of inconsistencies in the death declaration process raises interesting 
questions regarding why some physicians believe that in contexts involving organ 
donation, the irreversible cessation of circulation must be irrefutably demonstrated 
despite the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment being previously decided upon. 
Why is irrefutably ruling out the possibility of resuscitation considered to be in 
the potential donor's best interests but not in the average deceased patient's? It is 
because the current practice of organ donation has been declared lawful and 
ethical only so long as the organ retrieval is independent to the donor's death: 
The Dead Donor Rule (DDR) says two things: you can only take-harvest, 
terrible word-vital organs-that is, organs if you take them away you'll 
die, such as a lungs and hearts-from dead people. The corollary to that is, 
you can't cause the death of a person by doing that. So someone can't rock 
up and say, listen, I'm going to donate my heart to my son. I know it will 
kill me. You can't do that under the DDR because you will kill that 
person. So that's the two aspects to it. So if that is a rule that we stick to, 
there's two things-they're very clear. 
In no uncertain terms, vital organ donation can only legally occur in deceased 
patients. Some interviewees utilise this point to argue that unless the irreversible 
cessation of circulation has been indisputably determined, the DDR is not being 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 122 
lawfully enacted. In other words, these few interviewees assert that patients and 
physicians may find themselves vulnerable to the highly unethical practice of 
removing vital organs from living or nearly dead donors unless irreversibility of 
circulation is staunchly determined, for example, by way of ruling out auto-
resuscitation. One of these interviewees further called for the review of the legal 
definitions of death, if colleagues' continue to resist determining irreversibility in 
the death of potential DCD donors. 
However most interviewees opposed such an "extreme" interpretation of the 
death determination laws and did not support the need for amendments. These 
intensivists are right to be ethically confident and comfortable with their 
"pragmatic" and "reasonable" interpretation and practice of the circulatory death 
procedures and the DDR. Recall that there have been no recorded reports of 
spontaneous, unassisted auto-resuscitation following cardiac arrest (Hornby, 
Hornby & Shemie, 2010). These physicians are not denying the importance of 
accurate death determination methods, nor the fact that certainty is especially 
important in potential organ donors because the procedures that immediately 
follow are very different to deaths not involving organ donation. Certainty 
protects the public from malpractice and physicians from sleepless nights and 
lawsuits. Yet death itself is a process, not an event. Physicians, the professionals 
whose responsibility is to determine death, are asked to "practise the science and 
art of medicine" at every work shift (AMA, 2004). Those who doubt the rigour of 
"irreversibility" in the cardiac death of potential donors are searching for an exact 
scientific answer that does not exist. What's more, they are ignoring the context of 
the situation, as well as asking their colleagues to meet different death criteria 
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because a patient has been identified as a potential donor. This leads to death 
declaration inconsistencies between standard medical practice and organ donation 
that can only serve to increasing public misconception and fear. 
As has been discussed, physicians are acutely aware of their role 
responsibilities and priorities to their patient and the next-of-kin. They are highly 
mindful of the need to justify their actions: "not just personally, ethically ... but 
also [to] defend to your colleagues and defend to the public, if need be". Despite 
few interviewees explicitly admitting to it, a physician's awareness of liability 
was a common subtheme throughout all aspects of the donation process. Hence, 
instead of arguing the irreversibility point in declaring death in potential DeD 
donors, some interviewees supported the use of stand-down times to satisfy 
certainty. This additional measure of confidence applies after the declaration of 
circulatory death in a patient intended for DeD. The benefits and shortcomings of 
this DeD-specific measure are now addressed. 
5.4.4 Stand-down Times: A Necessary Safe-Guard? 
In a further bid to assure precision of the circulatory definition of death and 
organ donation's DDR, the NSW state government and some international 
governments (e.g. UK) introduced mandatory stand-down times following the 
circulatory death of a potential DeD donor. The few interviewees who mentioned 
stand-down times indicated their support for this additional measure of certainty 
because of its consistency with their "patient's best interest" standard. After all, 
the procedures that immediately follow the death of a potential organ donor are 
different to those not involving organ donation: 
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The five minute stand down because we're not just going to leave them in 
the bed and wash them as we normally do ... There's the very special 
thing of taking them next door and taking their organs out so having a five 
minute period stand down after they're dead before we do that, I think is a 
very good ... safeguard. 
Hence, although the stand-down times can vary from two to ten minutes 
depending on the jurisdiction, the intention is the same. The time restrictions 
appear to provide another measure of certainty, in the sometimes uncertain 
process of death. Assuring certainty of death is imperative to all parties directly 
and indirectly involved in the organ donation: distressed families, physicians and 
their colleagues, potential recipients, hospitals, the wider community, and 
especially to the general cause of organ donation. This is particularly the case if 
urban myths such as: "they won't try as hard to save me if I'm a donor" and 
others discussed in chapter two, are to ever be demystified. 
While the advantages of stand-down times were pointed out, interviewees did 
not mention their potential disadvantages, the obvious being ischaemic organ 
damage. A possible reason for this omission is that interviewees negated the 
possible ischaemic effect of stand-down times on organ vitality, which has been 
suggested in some DCD literature (e.g. Mandell et aI., 2006; Reich et al., 2009). 
Or it may be that any possible organ damage is considered insignificant compared 
to the physician's utmost duty-of-care to the patient and their family. The latter 
explanation is more persuasive given its fit with the physicians' "patient best 
interest" standard, the yardstick that was consistently referred to in all other 
donation process decisions. 
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5.5 Summary 
This chapter provides greater insight into the complex environment in which 
the organ donation "gatekeepers" currently work. Favourable donation attitudes 
aside, in practice intensivists do not feel they can allow society's organ deficit to 
proactively guide their behaviour, or that they can go as far as to recommend 
organ donation to the NOK (as some interviewees suggested happens in Spain). 
To do so was seen to jeopardise their duty-of-care by neglecting the best interests 
of the patient and the family. These intensivists work hard to maintain a 
justifiable, neutral stance, yet recently The Authority deemed that this may not be 
enough. If a conflict of interest is being perceived even by some sections of the 
community, then they propose an alternative way to deal with it by transferring 
some of the donation-specific responsibilities to another professional. 
Despite interviewees admitting how much easier their job becomes when the 
NOK initiate the prospect of organ donation, many expressed some reasonable 
concerns about relinquishing their organ donation responsibilities to another 
professional, particularly since rapport and trust with the family had typically 
been developed by the time organ donation becomes an option. What interviewees 
failed to recognize is that regardless of whether intensivists believe they have a 
conflict of interest in this specific context, the wish to avoid one is enough to let 
the potential donation opportunity pass by, and this is likely to be a significant 
issue in terms of the organ deficit. The logic for the separation of roles may allow 
for at least one intensivist per hospital to take greater ownership of dealing with 
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the donation shortage. Regardless of whose role it is to facilitate organ donation 
however, they still cannot be perceived to push the greater donation cause. 
The second section of the chapter examined the contexts under which 
interviewees did recognise their potential to cause a conflict of interest. It was 
revealed that most interviewees believed it was currently unethical for a patient 
with futile outcomes to be admitted to the reu with only the intention to realise 
that patient's potential of becoming an organ donor. This behaviour would be 
regarded as inconsistent with the patient's best interests, which is a physician's 
ultimate check-point for ethical practice. However, interviewees had no concern if 
the same patient's reu admission was for the "better management" oftheir EoLe. 
Rather, interviewees feared that if organ donation was considered too early along 
the treatment continuum, it would raise serious ethical, medical, and legal issues, 
even if the treatment was passive. This is the reason interviewees thought that 
organ donation should not be considered part of EoLe in a further bid to avoid, or 
at least minimise, the potential conflicts of interest they may pose families. 
This finding is disappointing, considering it would be much more difficult to 
actualise a patient's donation wishes if the general prospect of organ donation is 
not theoretically considered part of their EoLe. Without factoring in the 
opportunity of organ donation, potential.donors are having their therapy 
withdrawn too soon to ever become actual donors. So despite interviewees 
admitting that they "orchestrate death" frequently for the best interests of the 
patient and their family, they did not consider a patient's consent for organ 
donation enough to regard non-therapeutic ventilation to be in a patient's best 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 127 
interests, essentially this refuted the suggestion that there could be more potential 
donors if Category C patients were supported. 
While the advent of clinical triggers may indeed help to recognise potential 
donors, it may be some time before ED physicians and intensivists feel ethically 
comfortable, and legally secure, about maintaining passive treatment in potential 
donors. Many interviewees argued that treatment prolongation intended to allow 
for brain death and subsequent organ donation may hinder their patients' right to 
die a dignified death. This concern is legitimate and emphasises the need for more 
DCD programs in Australian hospitals in order to tangibly increase donation rates. 
DCD offers one way to side-step the ethical unease by reducing the duration of 
non-therapeutic intervention required before organ retrieval. For instance in 2009, 
of the seven donors that did not require inotropic support in the ICU (3% of 
Australia's 247 total donors), six were DCD donors (ANZOD, 2010). Yet 
although the period of non-therapeutic intervention in DCD should theoretically 
be less than that which is necessary in DBD, only one interviewee acknowledged 
this potential merit. A few interviewees recognised the potential benefits the re-
introduction of DCD may offer donation-keen families. 
In fact, DCD was shown to raise more ethical problems than it can currently 
solve, with antemortem interventions being particularly problematic. Almost all 
interviewees deemed it was currently unethical to perform any procedure not 
directly for the patient's benefit prior to their death. This was withstanding known 
patient or NOK donation consent, because such interventions were still not 
considered to be in the patient's best interests. Many interviewees also had legal 
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uncertainties and doubt about the community's existing level of organ donation 
education. At least until the community is better educated about DCD and the 
advancements it may offer, interviewees were more ethically comfortable if 
antemortem interventions were banned and the new potential donor pool offered 
through DCD remained restricted to Maastricht Categories three and four. 
The few interviewees who were willing to entertain the idea of giving 
antemortem interventions rejected claims that all antemortem interventions can 
hasten death, believing any threat to patient care only becomes a possibility if the 
antemortem intervention is dispensed incorrectly. Yet no interviewees pointed out 
that the same potential threats are present in most medical procedures outside of 
the context of organ donation. This was one of numerous findings to indicate that 
physicians operate under slightly different codes of practice in patients identified 
as potential organ donors. For instance, death declaration in potential donors 
requires a higher level of sophistication to ensure the DDR is upheld. For this 
reason, stand-down times may assist in the quest for certainty in the death 
declaration of potential DCD donors. Nevertheless, current interpretations of the 
"irreversible cessation" of circulation to diagnose circulatory death appear highly 
reasonable and were ethically acceptable to most interviewees. 
Overall, the current chapter allows insight in to the complex ethical standards 
that intensivists and ED physicians navigate with every conversion of a potential 
donor into an actual donor. These ethical standards were found to have permeable 
boundaries that change according to community expectations. Given that the 
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science and art of practising medicine are constantly evolving, once straight-
forward medical events are now much more complex as a resull of technological 
advancement. AU of which results in an elhicallension, as demonstrated in Figure 
5.4. 
What I am asked to do 
(role, laws, NOK, society) 
What I am personall y 
comfortable dOing 
What medical 
technology 
enables me to do 
Figure 5.4. Intcnsivists' Priorities in the Organ Donation Co nversion Process. 
The simplicity of Figure 5.4 does not do justice to the numerous ethical 
considerations intensivists must manage when converting a potential organ donor 
into an actual organ donor. However, it does illustrate how the physical and 
emotional needs of critically ill patients and families- both immediate donors and 
society's needy recipients-must be weighed up against ethically appropriate 
medical interventions, all whilst managing one's professional and personal ethical 
standards. 
Consequently, intensivists contend that the therapeutic inlent of their actions 
may be questioned when performing any procedure related to organ donation. 
And to question the therapeuLic intent guiding a physician 's behaviour was 
perceived by these interviewees as questioning their duty-of-care responsibilities 
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and their upholding of the "best interest of patient" ethical standard. Decoding the 
therapeutic intent behind each organ donation procedure allows a better 
understanding of a physician's overall motivation and confidence to actualise 
potential organ donors. It also explains why interviewees unreservedly prefer 
families to instigate the opportunity for organ donation rather than the intensivist. 
After all, if the intensivist is not the person to raise the possibility of donation, the 
therapeutic intent of their subsequent actions is less likely to be ethically 
challenged. 
The problem for organ donation programs is that they rely wholly on 
physician judgment to determine the best interest of patients who may be potential 
donors. As the current findings demonstrate, one intensivist's interpretation of the 
"best interests" standard may be quite different from another's. Furthermore, the 
more unfamiliar or "grey" the territory, the more likely physicians will err on the 
traditional, conservative take on the patient's "best interest". These 
inconsistencies in policy, opinion, and practice highlight the disjunction amongst 
the sector about what really is in the patient's best interests and whether these 
considerations should extend beyond the patient's medical wellbeing. In the next 
chapter, interviewees' application of the patient best interest standard in DBD is 
examined. 
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Chapter Six: Seeking Legal Clarity and Consistency 
6.1 Introduction 
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In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated how physicians' utilise their "best 
interest of the patient and family" compass to navigate complex ethical dilemmas 
when converting potential donors via cardiac death. It is now appropriate to 
examine how interviewees maintain this standard when converting potential brain 
dead donors. Accordingly, the first part of this chapter is devoted to issues 
pertinent to DBD. Although attracting less ethical debate than DCD, there was 
some diversity of opinion amongst interviewees about DBD and the "legally 
useful" interpretation of the neurological determination of death. While some may 
say legal interpretation inconsistencies are just a case of semantics, it will be 
shown that these differences and uncertainties ultimately affect intensivists' 
preferred method of determining brain death, as well as their level of comfort in 
explaining brain death to the NOK and the greater public. 
Interviewees' use of modem technologies in the quest for the "gold standard" 
of brain death diagnostics will also be discussed. As observed for the 
irreversibility determination of circulatory death, determining the loss of 
neurological function revealed various levels of acceptance of ambiguity amongst 
interviewees. Even intensivists who were comfortable with their practice and 
interpretation of the neurological laws were acutely aware that sector dissonance 
has the potential for bad pUblicity, litigation, and damage to public donation 
support levels. It will be shown that the consequences of these legal and practice 
uncertainties are contributing to some intensivists' lack of confidence in 
converting potential brain dead donors. 
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Interestingly, interviewees' legal and public relations apprehensions became 
most obvious in discussions about patient consent registries. The second part of 
the chapter will, therefore, explore the reasons why interviewees do not consider 
an individual's registered donation consent enough to warrant serious 
consideration, or even be within the "definition of the patient's best interest. The 
reasons for the lack of patient autonomy may be surprising to members of the 
public who signed a consent registry, believing in good faith, and in accordance 
with its marketing, that it is considered legally valid. 
In the previous chapter, it was also shown that one of the main concerns about 
DCD is not so much that some of its procedures are inherently unethical, but 
rather that performing these procedures on the uninformed public is unethicaL 
After all, physicians rely on community standards to determine and guide the 
ethics of their professional behaviour. The final section of the present chapter will 
detail interviewees' commonly-held perception that there is too much dissonance 
between the medical sector and the general public's understanding of organ 
donation procedures. The increasingly evident relationship between physicians' 
concern for poor public relations, their perception of organ donation education 
levels in the community, and their confidence in being able to actualise donors 
will conclude the analysis. 
6.2 The Acceptability of Donation after Brain Death 
Interviewees believed the demarcation between a patient's death and possible 
organ donation is clearer in potential donors declared dead according to the brain 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 133 
functionality criteria, compared to those defined dead using the circulatory 
definition necessary for DCD. To most interviewees, DBD affords a degree of 
certainty that DCD procedures are currently striving to achieve. However, some 
interviewees claimed that the reintroduction of DCD unraveled some of the 
inconsistencies that occur regularly and are well-accepted in Australian DBD 
programs. 
Figure 6.1 below displays the interviewees acceptance of DBD by depicting 
the positions broadly assumed regarding the theoretical acceptance of DBD (x 
axis) and the operational acceptance of DBD in practice (y axis). It is instantly 
apparent that compared to the "hot topic" DCD, DBD created fewer differences of 
opinion. Again permitting Clarke's (2003) reasoning, this positional map allows 
silences to be "made to speak" (p.569). For example, no interviewees rejected 
DBD outright, both in theory and in practice. Nor did anyone suggest there were 
frequent occasions where DBD can be theoretically acceptable yet operationally 
problematic. Consequently, there were only two main positions held by 
interviewees at the time of interview but again, the benefit of Clarke's 
methodology means that these positions are not necessarily static and may change 
for each interviewee, depending on the context and on the patient. Still, the 
position most commonly assumed by interviewees was being highly accepting of 
DBD both in theory and in practice (Position A). Other interviewees reported 
being highly accepting of the theory of DBD but had considerable concerns about 
its practical application in a variety of contexts (Position B). 
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Operational 
Acceptance 
of DBD 
+ 
+ 
+ 
* = Positions not 
articulated in the data 
Theoretical Acceptance of DBD 
Position A: 
Highly comfortable with 
the both theory of DBD 
and its operational 
practice 
Position B: 
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High theoretical 
acceptance of DBD but 
some operational concerns 
+++ 
Figure 6.1. Theoretical versus Operational Acceptance of DBD Positional Map. 
Interviewees who generally assumed position B did so because of legal rather 
than ethical issues. These are discussed below and displayed in Figure 6.2. Similar 
to Figure 5.3 in Chapter Five, the DBD procedure is displayed on the left side of 
the diagram. The right side demonstrates the major issues in approximate order of 
their emergence in the DBD process. The issues are also colour classified into two 
types: whether they are issues specific to DCD (purple), or they pertain to both 
DBD and DCD (blue). 
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Figure 6.2. Issues Arising rrom ODD Conversions. 
Issues found in ODD and oeD I I Issues specific to ODD 
00 = Organ Donation, DBD= Donation after Brai n Death, ICU = Intensive Care Unit. ED 
= Emergency Department, OTDA = Organ and Tissue Donation Agency, ODe = Organ 
Donation Co-ordinator, AODR = Australian Organ Donation Registry, NOK = Next of Kin 
(family), ICU MO = Intensive Care Unit Medical Officer, EoLC = End of Life Care 
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Of the three highlighted issues specific to DBD in figure 6.2 (purple-
coloured), the topic of Category C patients has already been discussed (see 
Section 5.3.1). Category C patients aside, the current findings did not suggest that 
the identification and referral of a brain dead patient as a potential donor is a 
problematic area or one that may provide any major improvements to the 
metropolitan hospitals donation rate. A senior intensivist who was practicing at 
the advent of DBD commented: 
NSW Intensivist: 
Researcher: 
NSW Intensivist: 
It always has been pretty obvious. As soon as 
someone looks like they're becoming brain dead 
then most of my colleagues - well all of my 
colleagues would be thinking donation - organ 
donation. 
And do you think that was the same 20 years ago? 
Yep. 
A person has to die from very specific causes to be pronounced brain dead. 
Recall from Section 5.1, "in society is the very uncommon set of circumstances 
that you actually reach brain death. We withdraw life support on lots of people 
who are dying, but to actually fulfil all the criteria of brain death is not that 
common". Thus, when the exceptionality of brain death arises, because of its 
intrinsic and long-association with organ donation, these physicians were 
genuinely confident that the potential brain dead donor is almost always spotted, 
and this has been the case for many years now. 
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Conversely, variance in opinion was observed for the processes that follow the 
identification and referral of a potential brain dead donor. Depicted in Figure 6.2 
by the DBD specific terms: "legally useful fiction" and "the gold standard", these 
legal and operational issues are now examined in turn. 
6.2.1 Declaring Brain Death: Challenging Cultural Notions of Death 
If protocols and guidelines are followed correctly, diagnosing brain death is 
considered a sound practice that few interviewees expressed any discomfort 
about, notwithstanding some acknowledgement of inconsistencies within and 
between ANZICS, state, and local guidelines. In fact, only through a hypothetical 
lack of adherence to current guidelines did some intensivists concede any 
potential for misdiagnosis: "god that does a lot of damage, but you can only 
imagine some dickhead' s done the organ donor testing, the brain dead testing, and 
fucked it up ... because you just can't imagine it otherwise". While their 
frustration about damage to public relations is evident, this intensivist firmly 
believed misdiagnosing brain death could only realistically happen in the hands of 
the wrong professional. 
Australian legislation requires a minimum of two medical practitioners with at 
least five years experience to conduct brain death testing, but there are additional 
jurisdiction and hospital minimum requirements. Furthermore, intensivists and 
other specialists typically perform the brain death testing procedures in hospitals 
large enough to support an organ donation program. The extract below describes 
the benefits this specialist system provides to the Australian community: 
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[W]e're very lucky in this country that we have intensive care specialists 
and that's all we do ... we're not surgeons that are operating and then 
dabbling in a bit of intensive care or some other ... we're full time 
intensive care specialists. So [regarding] brain death and organ donation, 
I think for that reason then it can be handled by real experts in terms of 
diagnosis. Because that's their job. 
By having dedicated intensivists with ongoing experience in brain death and 
organ donation, he denied possibility that brain death could be misdiagnosed in 
Australia. Rather, the suggestion was that the occasionally publicised awakenings 
of previously declared brain dead patients are confined to countries where 
different regulations permit physicians lacking specialist qualifications to conduct 
the brain death tests: 
[W]e have extremely good evidence that ifit's been done properly (and 
all this stuff you get usually elsewhere like the US where things are not 
necessarily done appropriately), but if you fulfil all the preconditions and 
you're appropriate for clinical testing and clinical testing is done right by 
the right people and is conclusive, then all of us hand on heart are 100 
per cent sure that person will never be alive again, even if we kept him 
going indefinitely. 
Like the majority of interviewees, this intensivist confidently emphasised that 
as long as designated physicians follow clinical testing guidelines, patients 
declared brain dead will never be alive again. Yet, it is this exact definition of 
alive that is problematic or indeed slippery to some. Take the following extract for 
example: "if anybody objects it's game over, pull out of the donation process and 
that person passes away". While the explicit sentiment of the statement will be 
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returned to shortly, the suggestion that the patient was not actually deceased until 
treatment was withdrawn highlights the inconsistencies inherent in the brain death 
determination process. In fact, although the reference is not unique, some 
interviewees referred to the concept of brain death as "legally useful fiction", 
created to justify the retrieval of organs in neurological patients with no chance of 
recovery: "What we're using is a useful fiction. There's a few useful fictions in 
leu about death - definitions of death, particularly a neurologic one is one of 
them. I'm not saying it's a bad thing. It's just useful stories, like tooth fairy". 
Despite stating they do not wish to label brain death as negative per se, this 
intensivist still chooses the words "useful fiction" to emphasise that the utility of 
brain death is what brought about its inception over forty years ago. 
The belief was that organ transplantation was the principle reason for the legal 
inception of brain death. For instance, an intensivist who reported no qualms 
about the current practice ofDBD commented: "other than that [transplantation 
benefits], I can't see any reason why we should be doing all these tests". Although 
many interviewees were comfortable attributing the start of this medico-legal 
determination of death to the facilitation of organ donation (rather than to the 
withdrawal of treatment in patients with futile outcomes), only two remarked on it 
being a fictional entity. In other words, interviewees were generally accepting of 
the "legally useful" description of brain death but not with the fictional 
description. After all, the use of "fiction" suggests that the concept of brain death 
is made-up or imaginary and most interviewees argued that death in a brain dead 
patient is anything but imaginary. 
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Even SO, at no time did interviewees dismiss the inherent complexities of 
declaring the death of a patient who looks "warm and pink". Many agreed that the 
appearance of brain dead patients challenges all cultural notions of what a dead 
person should look like. Without understanding the supportive technology 
responsible for the deceased patient's artificial appearance, brain death still poses 
many questions for the untrained public and even some health professionals: 
[W]e all can understand how families struggle with the concept of brain 
death. I mean even in the health field nurses and doctors - it is a bizarre 
concept to be standing at the end of the bed and watching someone's chest 
go up and down and watching the little blip, blip on the monitor and 
realise that the person has deceased. It is a difficult concept and some 
families have a fair bit of difficulty in coping with that as an idea. 
This extract provides another example of where professional and community 
understanding and ethical acceptance are not in sync with technological advances. 
The introduction of brain death meant that previous legal and ethical boundaries 
of death were reviewed. This does not happen easily: 
[T]here were a whole lot of problems with it. But in reality, brain death is 
now very widely accepted. The concept that underpins it, the loss of brain 
function, is fairly well established and reasonable, ethically and 
philosophically justifiable. In fact that argument's quite compelling I think 
and the way we do it is, I believe, legally and ethically justifiable. 
This extract represents interviewee who assumed high theoretical and 
operational acceptance of DBD at the time of interview (Position A in Figure 6.1). 
But it is the delineation of brain death based on the loss of brain function that 
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would trouble those interviewees who expressed legal and operational difficulties 
about the DBD process (Position B). Just as they had concerns about the 
inconsistencies in the legal interpretation of irreversible cessation of circulation 
death required in DCD, the same interviewees question the current DBD 
practices. And as noted in their objections to the satisfactory determination of 
circulatory death, the basis of their argument relates to inconsistencies between 
what the law demands and what is currently practiced. 
6.2.2 Function, Functions or Just Semantics? 
Current Australian brain death protocols were perceived not to strictly meet 
the legal definition of "irreversible cessation of all function of the brain" (ALRC, 
1977, para. 136). In the instance of the neurological determination of death, the 
focus of their contention is not the term "irreversible" but the criterion "all 
function of the brain". They suggest that the current testing recommendations to 
determine brain death only measure brain stem function, rather than whole brain 
function. They reject the notion that brain stem death would meet the legal 
criterion of "cessation of all function of the brain" because only some functions 
would have been specifically tested: 
One might argue that organ donation in this state has proceeded along the 
lines that the person is as good as dead. As good as dead, may as well be 
dead or as good as dead. That's not unreasonable, a person who's got no 
brain stem function is a potentially non survivor because they cannot 
function autonomously. 
Whilst acknowledging it is not all together "unreasonable" to equate brain 
stem death with brain death, he goes on to explain that the recommended 
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definition of death would be impossible to meet, effectively questioning ANZICS 
adherence to determining whole brain death according to brain stem testing: 
So the ANZICs guidelines ... specify all brain death or total brain death 
as being equivalent to brain stem death. Which intellectually is 
impossibility. I'm not saying it's not inappropriate but thus far this society 
and I mean the Victoria society, and ... other states have been practicing 
organ donation in the absence of being able to fulfil the letter of the law. 
By pointing out dissonance between organ donation procedures, 
recommended guidelines, and legal definitions of death, the insinuation is that 
Australian physicians are acting unlawfully in taking brain stem testing results as 
an indication of whole brain death. There was also a call for legal consistency by 
using the United Kingdom's definition of brains tern death to demonstrate apparent 
inconsistencies between Australian law and Australian practice: 
[S]ee [in] Australia-the definition is whole brain death, yet we only test 
the brain stem. In the UK, at least they're consistent and call it brain stem 
death, saying that if the brain doesn't work then the higher centres aren't 
going to work anyway. 
Thus, although both antagonists admit their colleagues' interpretation of brain 
death is not entirely unreasonable, they would prefer the laws to be more specific 
and, therefore, consistent with practice. Or at the very least they "would like to 
see more professionally acknowledged there is a problem, but a lot of my 
colleagues wouldn't realise there's an issue, or think too deeply about it". 
However, the current data indicates this is not the case. 
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Other interviewees conceded that there may be a lack of specificity or clarity 
in the terms used to legally define of brain death. Nonetheless, they vehemently 
rejected the suggestion that current practices mean they are acting illegally and 
say it all comes down to personal, professional, and societal legal and ethical 
interpretations of good practice. Furthermore, these interviewees contend that any 
"tougher" legal interpretation of neurological death is incorrect, one interviewee 
describing the colleague's interpretation as "just plain wrong". They argue that 
this particular colleague erroneously assumes that Australian law, like the USA's, 
requires the cessation of "all functions of the brain" rather than the singular "all 
function". To define brain death according to the plural "functions" would be 
unrealistic and unnecessary according to another interviewee: 
The brain death criteria-they're a little difficult in that ... the Australian 
definition is the whole brain death. We diagnose whole brain death by 
testing brain stem reflexes and by the presence of coma, irreversible coma, 
with a cause. We don't do any other tests of higher brain function and 
whole brain death, it's slightly difficult concept to me at times when I 
think about it. It doesn't mean that every single cell in your brain is dead. 
As you know, it's probably not. But would that be ... useful diagnostic 
criteria anyway? I don't think so. 
Accordingly, as was evidenced in the "irreversibility" definition relevant to 
DCD, most interviewees took a pragmatic approach to the brain death criteria. 
They agreed "the definition is function and ... at least it's arguable that what we 
do, does determine that all function of the brain has ceased". Thus, most opted to 
maintain the widely-agreed upon interpretation of the word "function" as they did 
not feel that terminology semantics were reason to reject or revise the current 
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legal definition of neurological death. This was primarily because "most of us just 
say well, it's whether the means justify the ends or the ends justify the needs. It's 
a hard thing because there is so much ambiguity in clinical medicine. This is one 
more area." 
A physician's interpretation of ambiguity will have a direct effect on the 
method they choose to diagnose brain death. Thus, in an attempt to fall in line 
with a preferred interpretation of whole brain death, one intensivist has recently 
modified their practice: 
The law really hasn't been able to cater for the situation of organ donation 
appropriately. I'm not saying that one's behaviour hasn't been 
inappropriate, I have organised many dozens of organ donations, but in 
recent times I have done it in a way which is likely to fulfil the legal 
requirement although I can never prove that it actually did. 
Whilst being careful not to brand their colleagues' or own previous practice as 
inappropriate, the intensivist insists there are more lawful methods of diagnosing 
brain death. Although a technical analysis of brain death testing is outside the 
scope of this dissertation, interviewees' confidence in current diagnostics is 
worthy of further exploration. 
6.2.3 The Gold Standard Method of Diagnosing Brain Death 
Australian physicians use clinical testing to determine evidence of acute brain 
pathology consistent with the irreversible loss of neurological function (ANZICS, 
2008). Where preconditions cannot be assessed, imaging of the patient's 
intracranial blood flow is recommended. Although blood flow has no statutory 
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function in death, it is used to infer that there is no brain function if there is no 
blood flow. Thus, either clinical testing or blood flow imaging is acceptable to 
make a diagnosis of brain death in Australia. 
When asked their preferred method of diagnosis, interviewees were not in 
agreement about the best or most reliable measurement. While most insisted 
clinical testing was the "gold standard", others argued that it was a test of blood 
flow. These differences of opinion are broadly demonstrated in the positional 
map, Figure 6.3 (Clarke, 2005a). Represented on the x axis are the positions 
interviewees could assume regarding the use of clinical testing to diagnose brain 
death, and represented on the y axis are the occasions when they also felt the need 
to include imaging testing. 
Imaging of 
Intracranial 
Blood Flow 
Always 
Sometimes 
Rarely 
• = Position not articulated in the data 
* 
Rarely Sometimes 
Clinical Testing 
Position A: 
Both clinical and whole brain 
perfusion tests needed to 
determine brain death legal 
criteria has been confidently met 
(unable to rely on clinical criteria 
(due to patient's injuries or age 
- e.g. children). Acting closer to 
law by illustrating lack of blood 
flow = whole brain death? 
Position B: 
Clinical testing of brain stem is 
generally sufficient to determine 
futility and brain death criteria. 
Ancillary testing is used only 
when clinical testing is not 
appropriate. 
* 
Always 
Figure 6.3. The Gold Standard - Use of Ancillary Testing Positional Map. 
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Position B outlines those situations (patients) were intensivists were confident 
using clinical examination to diagnose brain death, yet if this was not possible (for 
example, due to the patient's injuries, medication regime, or age), they were also 
comfortable to base the diagnosis on imaging results. Even so, some were of the 
OpInIOn: 
[A]s long as you have satisfied clinically to the best ability, short of those 
things you can't do, then the angiography is fine, but I don't - I'm not happy 
with it as a simple substitution ... They should be because we can't do all 
the testing, not because we haven't tried any testing. 
Consequently, some in the field refer to imaging techniques as "ancillary" 
tests, to reinforce they are not favoured enough to take the place of clinical 
examination. 
For one interviewee, wariness of the imaging techniques was not related to the 
forbidding possibility of a false negative result (no intracranial blood flow shown 
when there in fact was some). Rather, the technology can produce false positive 
results and is thus not sensitive enough to accurately detect a lack of blood flow: 
I'd find it hard for anybody to refute the fact there's no intracranial blood 
flow on a four vessel angiogram. The difficulty I have with angio[gram] is 
just only the fact that I'm not convinced that, as a test, that it's actually 
sensitive enough for brain death ... it sometimes shows intracranial flow 
and there probably isn't any. 
Furthermore, although imaging techniques were introduced to reduce clinical 
ambiguity and inconsistency in interpretation, some interviewees claimed the 
opposite often occurs: 
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[T]hat's the problem, because again it's this so-called disjunctive 
definitions of death ... we have a cardio respiratory one against 
neurologic one, and now we have different ways of saying that they're 
neurologically dead. One's clinical; one's based on imaging. Imaging and 
function don't always ... [go] together ... So which one do you believe? 
Which is the gold standard? What do you do when they don't agree? 
Because of a loss of confidence in the recommended diagnostics, some 
intensivists modify their practice to always include tests of whole brain perfusion 
(position A on Figure 6.3). If conducted in addition to clinical examination, they 
argue this practice is more consistent with legal specifications because it tests 
blood flow of the whole brain. It is furthermore claimed that medication effects 
are less problematic for whole brain perfusion studies than those tests limited to 
the brain stem: 
The typical scenario in hospital and indeed here is likely to be that a 
person has been on sedative drugs, for example, and, yet the diagnosis of 
brain stem death has been made. Sorry that is impossible. It's not possible 
to say that a person's neurological function is not influenced by drugs 
which are still present in a system. 
Interestingly, although most guidelines, (including the ANZICS 2008 
statement recommended for Australian practice) have exclusion criteria regarding 
the plasma concentrations of sedative drugs, their influence on neurological 
function was not a concern for other interviewees. Some specifically argued that 
the four vessel angiogram is done to confirm brain death when large amounts of 
sedative drugs had been administered. Yet one interviewee insists that greater 
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certainty in brain death is imperative, not only for the treating physician's 
conscience but for public approval: 
148 
Otherwise, not only is it that we may not sleep well at night, but the public 
may pick up on this discrepancy as they have done in other countries ... 
On the one hand, I want to see organ donation proceed for the benefit of 
persons who really do need the organs, but on the other hand, I don't want 
to see diverse pUblicity appearing which might damage that effort. I think 
it's time that we cleaned up our act and that we introduced another 
element of brain death diagnosis. 
This argument for increased specificity in brain death is undeniably 
compelling. Yet whilst others acknowledged the need for clarity, many continued 
to endorse current brain death practices given that "[t]here are very few gold 
standards in medicine if you really look at it. Everything is open to interpretation 
and error". In the data explored thus far, the poignancy of this statement in many 
organ donation related decisions and processes is evident. 
6.2.4 Summary 
While interviewees believed there to be less theoretical ambiguity in DBD 
compared to DCD, some were not satisfied that current DBD protocols 
successfully mitigate ambiguity as much as possible. Interviewees' were 
philosophically and ethically accepting of the diagnosis of brain death, even if the 
concept was medically created to keep up with technological possibilities. Despite 
implementation problems, this now widely-accepted determination of death offers 
many benefits to society, but without the medical, ethical, and legal endorsement 
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of brain death, a physician facilitating organ donation would otherwise be seen as 
confounding their "best interest" standard. Thus the brain death concept permits 
physicians to personally and professionally offer organ donation, it allows patients 
to have their donation wishes granted, and it provides the NOK and treating 
physicians some positive outcome from the loss of life. 
Yet, opinions varied about how to interpret the brain death legislation and how 
to subsequently diagnose brain death. Just as some interviewees expressed 
concern about the inconsistencies in the legal interpretation of the "irreversible 
cessation of circulation" required in DCD, some questioned the current DBD 
practices. The cause of this contention was the differing interpretations of the 
brain death legislative criteria: "cessation of all brain function". 
Whilst at first the debate may simply appear to be a case of semantics, even 
physicians who were comfortable with current laws and practices acknowledged 
the potential dissonance between the terminology used to define brain death and 
what is actually tested. Some interviewees went further and argued that their 
colleagues are acting outside of the law by inferring the cessation of all brain 
function from tests that measure the brain stem only. This situation highlights the 
need for amendments or ancillary imaging tests to confidently meet current legal 
criteria. One interviewee suggested a more sensible way around the issue would 
be to always include whole brain perfusion studies in the diagnosis of brain death. 
He argued this would also provide the physician with greater confidence to sleep 
at night in knowing that medications had had less of an influence on patient test 
results. Moreover, there would be no need for concern that the public might 
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discover the apparent inconsistencies between brain death legislation and practice. 
Although some interviewees specifically described this view as "extreme", the 
potential for public relations damage was at the forefront of all interviewees' 
considerations. 
Like all health professionals, physicians have different interpretations of and 
tolerance for "grey areas" and ambiguity in their practice of medicine. While 
debate is not always a bad thing, too much can translate to a lack of consensus 
and, therefore, a lack of action. Likewise, another consequence of ambiguity is its 
influence on a physician's capability to explain brain death to the NOK and the 
general public when required. This is particularly pertinent if there are doubts 
within the donation sector about imaging testing, which some interviewees do 
utilise to demonstrate brain death to the NOK to assist their comprehension of the 
complex diagnosis. 
While the brain death debate has been raging for some time and may not 
readily be resolved, the collateral damage may be more dangerous than the 
inconsistencies themselves. Physicians with good intentions are keen to shield the 
public from this debate so as not to impact Australia's low donation rate. 
Unfortunately, if detected by community members, the withholding of this 
information may have the opposite effect: 
[Y]ou can understand why the perceptive lay person out there, going 
through this process, could be awfully confused because there are 
inconsistencies, and we're not very honest about it at this particular stage. 
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So even if the public continues to be shielded from these interpretation 
ambiguities and technicalities, there is always the risk that some community 
members may perceive they are not being fully informed about the practice. This 
in turn may explain some of the public distrust described in Chapter Two, not 
only of organ donation but of physicians themselves. The impact of honesty and 
informed consent in community-directed organ donation education will now be 
discussed. 
6.3. The Value of Registered Consents to Organ Donation 
As evidenced in the brain death determination process, legal inconsistencies 
are negatively influencing some interviewees' confidence to actualise potential 
organ donors. However, for a number of reasons, a physician's indemnity interests 
were most obvious when discussing consent processes. Interviewees prioritise the 
family's adjustment to the patient's death above the patient's autonomy and 
expressed wish to donate. After all, a "happy" family means a happy doctor and 
one less likely to be sued. Associated with this concern was the fact that 
physicians doubt the legal validity of current consent registries for organ donation. 
These indemnity concerns will now be examined. 
6.3.1 "If Anybody Objects, it is Game Over": Families Adjustment Versus 
Patient Autonomy 
In most treatment decisions related to organ donation, it is fair to say that 
interviewees use their "best interest of the patient and family" standard to guide 
their own behaviour. However, once the decision to withdraw treatment has been 
made, this yardstick is not faithfully applied to procedures specific to the consent 
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of organ donation. Although interviewees did not report it happening often, 
should a patient's best interests be incongruent with their family's, physicians will 
honour the family'S best interests over the deceased's previous wishes to donate. 
In other words, there is conflict between the ethical standards of providing 
'autonomy' for the patient and 'non-maleficence' for the family. For instance, if a 
patient had documented an interest to donate but their family disagreed at the time 
of death, it was the family's decision that was unreservedly enacted: "Even if 
they'd [the patient, had previously] said ... 'oh I would really want to be a 
donor'. It's not just about them, it's about their family, it's about everybody else." 
These considerations "about everybody else" were complex and multifaceted. 
To begin with, when a patient is identified as a potential organ donor, 
interviewees will not do anything to jeopardise that family's grieving process: 
[W]hen I'm thinking about the donation of organs, I'm thinking about 
what's best for the donor family. Is it likely to have some positive benefits 
for the donor family? As well as the recipients. But I wouldn't do anything 
that was detrimental to the adjustment and the outcome for the donor 
family. 
The potential impact of an unhappy family could be detrimental to the 
reputation of both the physician and hospital, and for the general cause of 
donation for that matter: "[t]he general policy is if anybody objects it's game over, 
pull out of the donation process and that person passes away. The last thing you 
want is bad press and increasing people's distress at a difficult time." 
Interestingly, these valid concerns were less top-of-mind in other difficult 
decisions that physicians must make - such as withdrawing life support. 
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In their quest to provide patient dignity, physicians will oppose irate families 
in court, defending their decision to withdraw a patient's mechanical ventilation. 
Indeed, acting in-line with a patient's best interest has been the most influential 
contributor to a physician's behaviour in the practices examined thus far. Yet 
conversely, for patients who had taken the time to previously document their 
consent for organ donation, this standard, quite rightly, is not followed through. 
Given the need for public endorsement of organ donation, any negative organ 
donation publicity has more serious implications than those incurred to a 
physician's or hospital's reputation as a result of a contested mechanical 
ventilation withdrawal. Physicians cannot risk receiving bad press or the donation 
rate may really plummet. While the public can rest assured knowing that a 
family'S adjustment to their loved one's untimely death is of paramount 
consideration to physicians, some portions of the community may not be aware 
that this may come at a cost to individual autonomy. At the time ofa patient's 
death, not only does one's autonomy and power cease, but also, treating 
physicians yield some of their power to the NOK. Yet without thorough and 
previously digested organ donation knowledge, or at least more than is obtained 
amidst a personal tragedy, how well equipped are families to handle this power 
appropriatel y? 
In practice, interviewees observed this ultimate decision-making power was 
welcomed by some families, but greatly detested by others. Apparently parents of 
all ages struggled with the decision to donate their decedent's organs, especially if 
the patient's wishes were unknown. Perhaps it is not surprising that only 58 per 
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cent of families consent to donation (NHMRC, 2009b), even if it is to err on the 
side of caution rather than a well-considered objection, given 40 per cent of 
Australian's also do not know their loved ones wishes (DonateLife, 2010). This 
would be consistent with interviewees' assumption that organ donation can 
represent one more decision or hurdle for a family to cope with in a particularly 
harrowing time, which may not always translate to a supportive decision: 
[H]ardly anybody thinks about it [organ donation] until they're in the 
situation, and of course that's the worst day of their life. So they're not 
necessarily very receptive unless they have a great degree of resolution 
and altruism about them. 
The unfortunate reality that families are just beginning to come to terms with 
the unforseen death of a loved one, when they also must decide whether to donate 
that person's organs, was approached sensitivity and compassionately. Yet at 
times, this sensitivity was interpretable as reluctance or hesitation on the 
physician'S part, as evidenced in the following statement, where raising the 
prospect of organ donation was described as "the last thing the family needs ... 
Imagine your husband goes to work one day and next thing you're at the hospital 
and they say there's nothing we can do. And within a few hours you're in 
intensive care and the doctor's saying to you would he want to be an organ donor? 
I mean there's a fair bit to work through emotionally". 
In this context, a physician's reluctance to advocate for their patient's 
donation wishes was apparently unlike physician behaviour in European nations. 
Physicians "say they work on families for 48 hours before they give up" seeking 
NOK consent in countries whose organ donation programs are considered 
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"world's best practice". Many interviewees refuted the idea that such aggressive 
behaviour would ever be acceptable to Australian culture or helpful to the 
donation cause. This seems accurate given that, at present, just one dissenting 
family member is enough to rule out an otherwise favourable family'S donation 
intentions. Australian physicians "can't go by the concept of the senior next of kin 
says 'yes.' We need the other one [all NOK must agree]. It's a hard one. And it's 
easier to talk about it, but when in real life, I think it's extremely hard". 
While not discounting the possible injustice of the situation, interviewees' 
real-life experiences led many to summarise that "a lot of people say stuff about 
life and death without actually being there. And so, once you're in that situation 
it's quite different." Thus, when faced with incompatible donation verdicts from 
the patient and their family, or amongst the potential donor family members, 
Australian physicians have two options. They could behave as the advocate for 
the patient and/or the consenting family members, adding to the distress of 
grieving families, damaging the family unit's cohesiveness and subsequent 
community donation rates through negative pUblicity. Or, physicians could 
balance a patient's pre-determined donation "wishes against practical realities and 
other competing forces", effectively prioritising a patient's autonomy as 
secondary to the welfare of those who stand right before them. As such, "even 
though I can see it's a huge loss of opportunity", it is not difficult to see why a 
patient's ultimate decision to donate remains in the hands oftheir family and, 
furthermore, why a family's decision to proceed with donation needs to be 
unanimous. Asking a physician to forsake their respect for a distressed family 
would be a horrendous task with equally ugly consequences. 
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6.3.2 Australia's Donation Registries: "Not Even True Consent" 
It may be infrequent that families choose to ignore their dying or deceased 
family member's known donation wishes, but the mere possibility of this 
occurrence reveals inconsistencies in the "best interests of the patient and their 
family" standard that physicians use to guide their other donation-related 
behaviour. Still, other intensivists would refute this suggestion on the grounds that 
current consent registries (both the Australian Organ Donation Registry and state-
based initiatives) do not serve as informed consent by omitting many details about 
the pathways to organ donation: 
When most people tick the box they haven't got a clue what they're 
ticking. I don't think they know what they're doing when they're ticking 
'no', I don't think they know when they're ticking 'yes'. I think most 
people's knowledge of organ donation is really limited and I can 
understand that. I don't know that we're necessarily going to ever be able 
to change that but if we are going to put any store in these registers and 
things then they have to come up with a lot more education. People can't 
just tick a box and think that that means anything. 
Finding the right balance between increasing public awareness and decreasing 
confusion is an important theme to be explored in the next section. Most 
interviewees believed that Australians are presently under-educated about the 
processes of organ donation: "I don't think people actually understand the concept 
of brain death ... the education doesn't cover that. It covers the rather sanitised 
nature of organ donation". And it is the public ignorance or misrepresentation that 
understandably concerns the intensivists who facilitate donation. 
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Interviewees felt that this knowledge dissonance between the sector and the 
public effectively voids a patient's pre-determined consent, despite the fact that it 
is yet to be tested in an Australian court. This raises questions about the worth of 
these widely marketed registries. At any rate, organ donation was not considered 
in the "best interest of the patient" if it was felt that information had been kept, 
inadvertently or otherwise, from the consenting individual. Conversely, in the 
same context, physicians believe they can still maintain their best-interest-of-the-
family standard because the potential donor's family are informed of exactly 
about what is involved in the specific donation process, at the relevant time. These 
subtleties are demonstrated in the following extract, where the intensivist 
reaffirms the notion that donation consent could not yet be considered a legitimate 
extension of patient care: 
Now, it could be caring in an extended sense if that's one of the very 
expressed explicit wishes of the patient, to become an organ donor in these 
particular circumstances, maybe we can do it. But for the vast majority, I 
don't think it is; not yet, anyway. And that's a phrase again that really 
annoys me, as if to say we're not caring for a person properly if we don't 
offer them the option. Well, you don't offer the patient to be an organ 
donor; you talk to the family. The patient has no option whatsoever. 
This statement emphasises the irony of the present situation: In general, those 
who wish to make the decision to donate have the most diminished voice-in 
practice and in the law. The legal complexities of the situation are further 
evidenced when the possible patient/family positions are hypothetically reversed. 
That is, if the patient had recorded their objection to donation on the AODR, yet 
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their family believed the patient's stance had recently changed, or the family 
plainly wanted to overrule the objection, the individual's AODR refutation 
remains in place. However, this apparent inconsistency is not unusual given the 
general assumption one can lawfully refuse a procedure or treatment without 
knowledge but cannot consent to the same procedure unless they are fully 
informed of it. 
158 
Not surprisingly, due to the lack of confidence in the current consent registries 
and contrary to The Authority recommendations, some intensivists do not check if 
their patient had a recorded consent before approaching the patient's family about 
organ donation. Reasons for this are explained below: 
I've taken my name off the register. And next time when my licence 
comes up I'll take it off the licence as well because I think that the 
emphasis has changed. They've moved it now to being a consent register 
so it's signifying that on the register is a consent ... [T]hey're trying to 
make us go and look at that register before we go and talk to the families 
and for one reason-so we can coerce them ... So when they put an 
option on the register that says I am in favour of organ donation but I want 
you to ask my family, when they put that option there I'll go back on the 
register. 
Consistent with their own professional practice, and that of many others, this 
intensivist prioritises their family's adjustment before a personal wish to donate. 
Yet unlike interviewed colleagues, it is contended that the objective of the AODR 
has changed. The reasoning: The AODR is no longer seen as a means for 
individuals to register their decision to donate their own organs but rather as a 
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bureaucratic measure designed to aid physicians put donation pressure on 
vulnerable families. Like a pawn in a game of chess, the intensivist rejects the 
idea of being made to coerce families to donate, and further states that they would 
only consider resigning the registry if there was a specific option outlining a 
preference for NOK to make the decision on their behalf. 
Apart from the assumption that Australian families are as collectively-minded 
and amicable as one's own, the assumption that few individuals would want their 
family to go through additional suffering after their death was shared by other 
interviewees. But most used this family-first reasoning to justify their current 
practice rather than calling for the disbanding of AODR or indeed making 
significant changes to it. Arguing that even if an individual's consent could not be 
revoked and: 
[Y]ou did all the work of bringing in the legislation and all the community 
hoo-hah that would go with it, you might increase one extra donor in 
Australia a year. I don't think it would have a huge effect. 
In contrast, these interviewees claimed the AODR did have utility in 
broaching the difficult discussion of organ donation with the NOK. After all, 
knowing a loved one's donation wishes "takes away the guilt from what I [the 
NOK] want ... [and] focus on what would they have wanted", thereby, 
insinuating that some families may even feel guilty if they focus on their own 
needs, rather than their deceased's wishes. So in addition to potentially reducing 
the pressure suddenly placed upon a vulnerable family, the AODR may assist 
families to make a more informed decision. 
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6.3.3 The Call for More Informative Public Consent Education 
The current findings suggest that if public consent information about organ 
donation was made more explicit, some interviewees could more seriously 
consider their patient's wish to donate. They may even consider ante-mortem 
interventions to be in some patient's best interest. At the very least, if the public 
were made aware and agreeable to the two possible pathways to becoming an 
organ donor, some physician's ethical concerns about public ignorance would be 
eased. This may in turn influence physicians' motivation to actualise potential 
donors. As was evidenced when the NOK initiates the prospect of organ donation, 
the AODR can offer intensivists some distance from the therapeutic interest 
debate. 
Figure 6.4 depicts how the public level of awareness for organ donation 
procedures (positively or negatively) may impact physician organ donation 
behaviour. For instance, when it arises that a family needs to make a decision 
about whether to donate their family member's organs, any changes to the number 
of registered consents and therefore the public general awareness level, would 
presumably also impact the family's resolve for organ donation. This may 
increase the likelihood that the family will instigate the donation discussion, 
thereby creating the ideal ethical scenario for intensivists. In any case, an increase 
in public education levels would also have undeniable ramifications for 
physicians' confidence to discuss organ donation with the NOK and their overall 
conviction of AODR consents. 
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Figure 6.4. The Impact of General Public A wareness on Consent Processes 
NOK = Next of Kin 
AODR = Australian Organ Donation Registry 
Despite one ED physician 's crude word choice, the sample bad a clear 
message regarding consent issues: 
I don't think we've done enough ... we're promoting it inside the health 
field, but one big part of organ donation is the bloody public, a huge part 
of it, because that's where it comes from .... So I think we've got to be a 
little bit more proactive to get more bits. 
While it was agreed that improved public organ donation consent campaigns 
were needed, interviewees had great difficulty deciphering what level o f 
complexity these campaigns should be pi tched al. It would therefore be 
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irresponsible to infer that raising Australia's consent level would be as straight-
forward as Figure 6.4 suggests. This is particularly so considering the medical 
community is yet to find agreement on many of the ethical uncertainties plaguing 
organ donation. This internal instability is contributing to the sector's assumption 
that it is best not to let these inconsistencies slip out to the uninformed and 
untrained, which would potentially damage the public perception of organ 
donation and the subsequent donation rate. This dilemma was accurately 
described by one intensivist whose hospital was yet to implement a DCD 
program: 
I think they [the public] should hear about [DCD]. If it actually happens 
then probably it certainly shouldn't be done without the public being 
aware of it ... But on the other hand, if you tried to explain it to the 
public, that this was actually happening ... I don't know that you'd be 
able to explain it in enough detail for them to actually get that there are 
some ethical differences or there might be variability of views across the 
community that were wider than there are exist for brain death. 
While a review of current donation marketing tools is outside the scope of this 
dissertation, it is worth noting that current procedures do assume it is possible to 
educate the soon-to-be or recently bereaved about the complexities of organ 
donation in the midst of tragedy. Yet, social marketers continue to insist that only 
the most basic and superficial information about the benefits of organ donation is 
appropriate for campaigns and registration web sites. While it cannot be denied 
that the infinite numbers of organ donation scenarios are too complex to detail on 
a poster or handout for the lay person, it is interesting that social marketing 
campaigns continue to pitch public organ donation information at a relatively 
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basic level. Very little change has been noted in Australia's donation rate. In fact, 
recently released "family discussion kits" (Donate Life, 20l0a) make no mention 
of DeD at all and very limited information can be found on the remainder of their 
communications intended for the public. For example, just one of The Authority's 
fact sheets makes some mention of the cardiac option: "organ donation may also 
be possible after a person's heart has stopped beating, referred to as cardiac death, 
but this is less common" (Donate Life, 20l0b, p.l). 
If disseminated appropriately, some donation messages, such as the 
introduction of DeD to Australian hospitals, would be able to withstand media 
beat-up and be well received by receptive members of the public, particularly 
those who were interested enough to register their consent for donation. To the lay 
person, cardiac death is an easier, more familiar concept to grasp than brain death 
and yet brain death has excellent acceptance amongst the general community 
worldwide (Bell, 2003). This improved awareness may spare the family from 
making difficult decisions at such a sensitive time. Increasing public consent 
education about the major matters concerning organ donation may in tum create 
the "societal shift" interviewees say is desperately needed to improve Australia's 
flagging donation rate: 
I talked to a guy who ... said when he first started being an undertaker ... 
[and] you asked the question well burial or cremation, people got a bit 
shocked about it but he said that's no longer the case. Everyone's 
expecting that because it's normal to think about that. So if we could 
change organ donation from being something extraordinary to being 
something ordinary, something that was just part of the way we manage 
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death and dying, then doctors wouldn't find it so difficult. Patients and 
families wouldn't find it so difficult and we'd be more likely to get the 
increase in organ donation that we're after. 
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Taking on less of a neutral donation stance, this was one of few interviewees 
comfortable enough to explicitly state they would personally like to see an 
increase in donations, despite their dual capacity as a medical physician and 
facilitator of organ donation. However, the interviewee did acknowledge that 
some colleagues find organ donation "difficult". Yet they will not feel ethically 
and legally confident to change current inconsistencies in their operational 
practices of organ donation until the public receives more information than they 
do currently. 
6.3.4 Summary 
When discussing organ donation, interviewees generally appeared more 
concerned about the ethical rather than the legal ramifications of their 
involvement. However, this pattern was not observed in relation to consent issues. 
Even with a patient's known consent for organ donation, physicians believe that 
the patient's family should be responsible for the ultimate decision to donate the 
patient's organs. Interviewees believed this stance was important to ensure that 
they did not interfere with a grieving family's emotional adjustment. Such 
considerations did not factor so much into other practitioner decisions, such as the 
withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in the face of NOK opposition. It was 
revealed that much of the interviewees' reluctance to engage in patient advocacy 
was the result of their doubt of the legal validity of current registries. As a result, 
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few physicians would ever allow themselves or their hospital to be legally 
exposed by acting in-line with a patient's consent. 
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The interviewees believe that public consent registries do not equate to 
informed consent and therefore cannot be in a patient's best interest, given that the 
public do not know what they consented to at the time of registration. They were 
also aware of the unavoidable fact that the dead are far less likely to sue or 
question a physician's reputation than are unhappy families, who might one day 
claim that the patient's pre-determined consent was not informed. Although these 
circumstances are yet to be tested in an Australian court, none of this sample 
would be keen to be the first to stand trial. The fear of litigation was ubiquitous 
and had an undeniable impact on interviewees' propensity to facilitate the 
conversion of potential to actual organ donors. 
In this study, more specific public education made available on consent 
registries was wholly welcomed by the sample. The potential benefits of increased 
public understanding and support for organ donation and its two pathways are at 
least three-fold. Firstly, NOK will be more inclined to initiate the prospect of 
donating (a physician's preferred action); secondly, physicians will be more 
motivated and confident to offer organ donation to the well-receiving NOK; and 
finally, physicians may consult consent registries as recommended by The 
Taskforce, before the NOK are approached about donation. By investing in the 
multi-million dollar Authority, the Australian Government recognised that sector 
and practice change were needed, but it seems not enough of this change is yet to 
occur in the community. Without more informed community knowledge of organ 
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donation and DCD in particular, it is unlikely to ever become more than an 
optional extra in our society. 
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Chapter Seven: Theoretical Implications and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This final chapter begins by reviewing the rationale driving this study's 
extension of currently applied theories into physician attitude, identification and 
referral of potential organ donors. The current deficit of a comprehensive model 
to explain more of the elements contributing to physician conversion behaviour 
provides an ideal platform to synthesise the findings and recommendations 
offered by this unique research. It is, then, fitting to introduce this study's main 
point of difference to the existing literature: a Substantive Grounded Theory of 
Intensivists' Motivation and Confidence to Convert Potential Organ Donors. The 
core contribution to know ledge is offered as well as a key recommendation to 
broaden physicians' interpretation of the patient's best interests standard through a 
change to current consent information. This is followed by discussion of the 
present study's limitations, motivating suggestions for further research. To 
conclude, the urgent need to assist our physicians by resolving the uncertainty and 
ambiguity preventing more of Australia's potential donor pool being realised is 
emphasised. 
7.2 The Extension of Currently Applied Theories 
In Chapter Three, it was suggested that theoretical models of attitudes and 
decision-making have not been well utilised in organ donation research (Radecki, 
1997), resulting in a deficit of collective knowledge and structure within the field 
(Shanteau, 1986, as cited in Radecki). The few studies that discuss theory employ 
basic attitude-behaviour models only to explain physician support for various 
aspects of organ donation or their intention to raise the prospect of organ donation 
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with NOK. The remainder of the conversion process is overlooked or erroneously 
assumed to fall in to place, as long as the support for organ donation is there or the 
prospect to donate has been offered. These attitudinal models fail to account for a 
physician's thought schemata, instincts, motivators, knowledge, morals, 
indemnity considerations, and communication style, as well as available resources 
within the time-pressured ICU hospital environment. As a result, models such as 
the TPB (Figure 3.1) and the Hypothesized Donation after Cardiac Death Support 
Model (Figure 3.3) offer limited practical utility for explaining donor conversion 
behaviour and thus, the ability to guide policy development. 
When Gold and colleagues (2001) proposed their physician model (Figure 
3.2), they specified seven motivational and organisational factors influencing the 
detection and referral rate of potential organ donors in the hospital setting. The 
addition of factors such as the physician's workload and qualifications, and the 
hospital's culture or motivation for donation, offers an improved theoretical 
understanding of the physician's preliminary role in the conversion of potential 
donors. However, this model's practical utility is significantly limited by its 
delineation only for the detection and referral part of the conversion process. As 
the current results suggest, the detection and referral of potential donors may be 
the least problematic part of the conversion equation. In an effort to provide a 
much needed, comprehensive theory, the following model of physician 
conversion behaviour is proposed. The model is applicable to the Australian 
context, but may also assist wider policy development. 
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7.3 Overview of Substantive Grounded Theory oflntensivists' Motivation 
and Confidence to Convert Potential Organ Donors 
This study is one of the first to examine Australian intensivists' motivation 
and confidence to actualise potential organ donors using GTM and Situational 
Analysis. Following the analysis of 15 in-depth interviews carried out in six major 
metropolitan hospitals in Victoria and New South Wales, it was shown that an 
intensivist's motivation and confidence to convert potential donors is best 
understood by examining their interpretation of the therapeutic intent guiding each 
organ donation procedure. In general, when a physician believes the intention of a 
procedure is to benefit the patient (i.e. be in the patient's best interests), the 
potential for conflict of interest is minimal. But when someone other than the 
patient or their family may benefit from a procedure, this makes the same 
. 
physician uncomfortable. Given that more than one patient is involved in the 
organ donation process, physicians' acute awareness of the potential conflict of 
interest is a necessity, as is their rigorous application of the patient best interests 
standard. However, these findings revealed that one intensivist's interpretation of 
the best interest standard is quite different to another's. Furthermore, when faced 
with new or unfamiliar territory, such as DCD, intensivists' interpretation of the 
patient's best interests will err on the conservative side. This means potential 
donors are less likely to be medically supported in a way that may realise their 
potential, for instance the provision of antemortem interventions, or being 
transferred from the ED to ICU to allow possible organ donation. 
Presented over three chapters, the current research demonstrated that 
differences in opinion and practice of the best interest standard are affecting 
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intensivists' motivation and confidence to convert potential donors. These 
chapters were divided according to three secondary categories affecting 
conversion behaviour: operational obligations; determining ethics; and seeking 
legal clarity and consistency. Consistent with the literature (Chernenko et aI., 
2005; NHMRC, 2009b; Prottas & Batten, 1988; Regehr et aI., 2004; Sanner et al., 
2006), chapter four discussed how organ donation requires a significant amount of 
strategic, organisational, physical, and emotional effort from the family, and lCU 
and ED staff alike. 
When Australia's National Clinical Taskforce was commissioned to surpass 
theory and provide practical recommendations to all sectors of the organ and 
tissue donation network, one of their final recommendations was a template for 
the ideal pathway to improve potential donor conversions in the hospital setting 
(Figure 4.1). The suggested template was recommended for use by the lCU 
consultant/medical officer or Donor Coordinator. It was to be used in conjunction 
with local procedures when deciding a patient's medical suitability for donation, 
the timing of the NOK consent discussion, and referral to the AODR. However, 
the current findings reveal that this process model is too rudimentary to offer any 
practical utility in what are effectively two different and complex pathways to 
donation (DBD and DCD). Through remodeling the process (Figure 4.2), the 
present research allows further insight into the true complexity of the conversion 
process. Unlike other reference models (e.g. The Authority, 2009; The Taskforce, 
2008), this alternative flow chart provides practical utility by depicting the two 
pathways to organ donation, DBD and DCD. One of the stand-out points of this 
process model is the fact that intensivists play the crucial role at all junctions of 
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the delicate conversion process, illustrating the reason they are often dubbed the 
"gatekeepers" to organ donation. 
As obligatory gatekeepers, these intensivists are well aware of their role 
responsibilities, particularly concerning the conversion of potential organ donors. 
Yet in practice, organ donation is likely to only become an intensivist's priority if 
the NOK determines it to be one of theirs. Intensivists believe they cannot 
prioritise it or promote it to the NOK without jeopardising their duty-of-care to 
their patient and the NOK. To minimise any conflict of interest, intensivists 
therefore maintain a neutral stance towards donation by offering the NOK the 
opportunity to donate; it is never requested of them, as it is often inaccurately 
termed in much of the organ donation literature. This neutral physician approach 
is well rehearsed in comparable international societies (e.g. Canada, UK) but is 
apparently unlike the world's "best practice" organ donation programs found in 
some European nations, namely Spain. Current interviewees rejected suggestions 
that more forthright physician behaviour and organ donation endorsement would 
ever be tolerated by the Australian public, nor would it be helpful to our donation 
rate. This contradicts Swedish findings that suggest physicians who request 
donation using a neutral rather than a pro-donation approach are major obstacles 
for increased organ donation (Sanner et aI., 2006). 
If an intensivist's duty-of-care is directed to the patient and their family, this 
means donation is a secondary motivation, an optional extra for the NOK. This 
may also be interpreted as being indicative of international findings that describe 
organ donation as a secondary priority for overworked physicians (Pokormi et aI., 
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2003). Despite unanimous support for the general donation cause, interviewees 
agreed that managing a potential organ donor can be professionally and personally 
demanding. Some knew of colleagues who may not even consider initiating the 
donation process on "their lazy shifts". Still, it is promising to see that these 
interviewees did not shy away from their current responsibility to raise the 
prospect of organ donation with the NOK. This is supported by earlier Australian 
physician findings (Australians Donate, 2007). 
In fact, as found in other local findings (NHMRC, 2009b), there was very little 
support shown for an initiative to remove some of the taxing management 
involved in converting potential donors, by introducing dedicated organ donation 
hospital medical directors. Interviewees currently interpreted this responsibility 
reshuffle to potentially threaten their duty-of-care to the NOK. The initiative's 
implementation outcomes could therefore benefit from The Authority building on 
the few potential merits acknowledged within this sample, namely a reduction in 
the intensivists' conflict of interest that is apparently perceived by some sections 
of the community. Reducing the potential for conflicts of interest will be 
especially important for the successful uptake of Australian DCD programs given 
that, unlike DBD donors, the prospect of organ donation transpires prior to the 
declaration of death in the potential DCD donor. Reducing the potential for 
conflicts of interest should theoretically protect physicians, hospitals and 
governments from unnecessary litigation, as well as bolstering public support for 
Australia's organ donation program. However, if the hospital medical director 
does not gain the backing of the unit on a practical level, all the effort, money and 
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resources that The Authority has assigned to these roles could prove costly and 
redundant. 
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The potential benefits of some form of role separation have been outlined by 
local (NHMRC, 2009b) and international research (Bernat, 2008; Keenan et aI., 
2002; Mandell et aI., 2006; Simpkin et aI., 2009), but has been dismissed 
elsewhere (DOH, 2008; Meyer & Bj0rk, 2007). The current findings indicate that 
whoever is responsible for the conversion of a potential organ donor, some of the 
effort could be avoided or at least minimised by reducing the "grey" areas of the 
organ donation process. After all, it was found that a physician's confidence to 
perform the operational requirements of organ donation depends on how ethically 
and legally comfortable they are in any potential donor situation. Chapters five 
and six were dedicated to clarifying intensivists' ethical and legal acceptance of 
the conversion process. 
In keeping with their interpretation of the patientINOK best interests policy 
and akin to international findings (Mandell et aI., 2006), many interviewees were 
not comfortable considering organ donation as part of EoLC. They also did not 
support the transfer of potential donors into the ICU unless it was for active 
treatment or under the umbrella of better managing a patient's EoLC. This was 
regardless of knowing if a patient had pre-determined donation consent. Yet 
interviewees were comfortable in assuming that it is within the patient's best 
interests to have the timing of their ICU death orchestrated to assist their NOK' s 
adjustment and grieving processes. Hence, while the logic of clinical triggers and 
acronyms is appealing, the current findings suggest that the identification of 
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potential donors, particularly brain dead donors, is less problematic than what 
happens after-asking physicians to maintain futile therapy just to support 
potential donor opportunities. 
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As found in international research (Bell, 2003), the current interviewees raised 
some reasonable concerns about denying severely neurologically damaged 
patients a dignified death. This may be a possible result of providing non-
therapeutic interventions, such as continuing ventilation for extended periods. It 
therefore seems the current research findings are in line with the fairly stable 
median times recorded for donor maintenance over the past six years, shown in 
Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 
Donor Management Times According to Year 
By Time from Time from Ventilation 
Year Admission to Brain to Brain Death 
Death (median hours) 
(median hours) 
2004 33.3 29.7 
2005 36.7 31.4 
2006 33.0 28.8 
2007 36.0 32.9 
2008 42.9 36.9 
2009 37.6 32.6 
Note: Adapted version of the Australian donor "Tenninal Management" statistics according to year, 
ANZOD, 2010, p.46. 
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Amongst other contributing factors, these relatively stable median times seem 
indicative of the ethical boundaries for donor maintenance within which our 
physicians are willing to operate. And although some donor maintenance fears 
may be mitigated by the reintroduction of DCD, which theoretically requires less 
non-therapeutic intervention before death, DCD was actually seen to create more 
ethical dilemmas than it solves. This finding is also consistent with previous 
Australian physician research that described DCD as a "difficult area", despite it 
receiving a general "philosophy of support" (NHMRC, 2009b, p. 32). 
The reintroduction of DCD in some Australian hospitals makes avoiding a 
conflict of interest increasingly difficult for physicians. Recall that in DCD, the 
prospect of organ donation must be raised with the NOK of a potential donor 
before the patient has been declared dead. Upholding strict ethical boundaries will 
be imperative to the success of the DCD program. In keeping with Canadian and 
UK protocols, these interviewees thought it is more justifiable and therefore easier 
to limit the new potential donor pool to Maastricht Categories three (and 
occasionally four), and to ban antemortem interventions outright. However, not all 
interviewees agreed with this latter stance. Instead, some argued that antemortem 
interventions only realistically threaten patient care when medications are 
dispensed incorrectly. Still, no interviewee pointed out that the same potential 
threat is present in all medical contexts, not related to organ donation. 
By increasing the medical and general community's education and support 
level for DCD, intensivists may be comfortable enough to administer small doses 
of antemortem heparin in the future. Consistent with some international 
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commentators (Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010), this significant finding suggests that 
some concerns for DCD were not so much that its procedures are inherently 
unethical, but rather that performing these procedures on an unknowledgeable 
member of the public is unethical due to the lack of truly informed consent. After 
all, physicians rely on community standards to determine and guide the ethics of 
their professional behaviour. And like most of these interviewees, one could 
deduce that the majority of Australian physicians would not want the 
responsibility of law-making added to their already complex job descriptions. 
Therefore, while this study largely supports the current death determination laws, 
it would appear more definitive legislation regarding antemortem interventions is 
warranted to ease physician ethical and indemnity concern. 
This could be done through more appropriate national human tissue acts rather 
than state-by-state Guardianship Acts, which were not specifically designed to 
cater for organ donation situations (Naffine et aI., 2009). The state-based 
Guardianship Acts are also widely open to interpretation. When determining 
patient best interests, the ambiguity is well illustrated in the Victorian 
Government legislation (1986, s 38) where, for example, Tibballs (2009) asserts 
that the lower ranking criterion (f): "treatment to be carried out is only to promote 
and maintain the health and well-being of the patient", outranks the consideration 
of criterion (a); "the wishes of the patient, so far as can be ascertained". 
Interviewees were outwardly concerned that any perceived pushing of the 
ethical boundaries of DCD might paradoxically lead to damaging community 
support levels and the new potential donor pool. This concern is well-documented 
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in the DCD literature (Keenan et aI., 2002; Mandell et aI, 2006; Tibballs, 2008). 
In contrast, it has been suggested that public confidence may actually increase 
with the understanding that procedures designed to hasten an inevitable death 
could assist physicians "assure freedom from awareness, and any suffering" in the 
dying patient (Bell, 2003). Still, due to the intrinsic link between DCD and current 
physician unease for antemortem interventions, any uncertainty and 
misinformation about their need or use may be unnecessarily contributing to the 
delayed uptake of DCD in many Australian hospitals. Akin to American 
qualitative physician research, the current study also found that there are concerns 
about the transplantable quality of DCD organs (Mandell et aI., 2006). Keeping 
the medical sector abreast of recent, more favourable DCD organ vitality research 
will also be imperative to the uptake and success of Australian DCD programs. In 
the first year following an American DCD communication initiative to hospital 
staff alone (print, multimedia and personal communication), there was a 93 per 
cent increase in the number of DCD donors and 179 per cent by 2008 
(D' Alessandro et aI., 2008). 
In the current study, opinion differences and practice inconsistencies were 
most pronounced when the discussion turned to death determination procedures in 
the DCD donor. Predicting the time and irreversibility of death following life-
supporting treatment withdrawal creates additional ethical considerations in the 
DCD donor, not to mention logistical consequences. Most interviewees believed 
current DCD procedures satisfied the "irreversible cessation of circulation" law, 
but their confidence was not shared by all. Disconcerting claims were made about 
some physicians not acting in line with their patient's best interests through failing 
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to prove irreversibility of cardiac function in potential DCD donors. These claims 
can be dismissed for failing to take into account the appropriate context of the 
proposed treatment withdrawal (Bernat, 2008; Snell & Levvey, 2009), and 
demanding a higher level of certainty than medical science can currently provide: 
"From a purist perspective, the complete and irreversible cessation of all cell life 
has become increasingly indefinable" (Shemie, 2007, para. 7). 
The legal definition of death is not that there must be irreversible cessation of 
the heart but irreversible cessation of circulation (Snell & Levvey, 2009). Thus in 
a bid to reduce the ambiguity, it has been suggested that DCD be renamed to 
donation after cardiocirculatoty death (Snell & Levvey, 2009). This re-title may 
also allow scope for the future and ethical use of heart transplantation in DCD. As 
was concluded in overseas DCD qualitative research (D'Alessandro et aI., 2008; 
Mandell et aI., 2006), at the very least, it is vital for public and physician 
confidence that there is national consistency on the eligibility and management of 
the DCD donor. Current uncertainties are reflected in the fact that the National 
DCD draft guidelines specify that death must occur 90 minutes post-active 
treatment withdrawal, NSW guidelines stipulate 60 minutes, and independent 
hospital DCD policies vary widely. 
Although stand-down times were not recently recommended in the National 
DCD draft protocol, the incorporation of stand-down times in DCD programs 
provides a more effective measure of certainty in circulatory death than does 
arguing about what is currently unknown (the time to circulation irreversibility). 
Again, national consistency is desperately needed because in some states a DCD 
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donor may be considered dead enough for organ retrieval to begin two minutes 
prior to the same patient dying in a NSW ICU. 
Providing certainty in death was also the focus of current DBD findings. 
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Despite an overall theoretical and ethical acceptance of the brain death criteria, 
and physicians' confidence in their ability to explain it to NOK, there was 
evidence of doubt about the fulfillment of the neurological criteria to determine 
death. This primarily came from interviewees who had also questioned the lawful 
interpretation of the cardiac criteria. Consistent with medical ethicists, Truog and 
Miller (2008), some suggested that the emergence of DCD had reinstalled sector 
uncertainties about the validity and ethics of brain death and the DDR. No 
interviewee doubted that a patient declared brain dead in Australia would ever 
recover consciousness. Nor did anyone call for the disbanding of the DDR. But 
there were some differences in the interpretations of the brain death determination 
law and even larger inconsistencies in the preferred method of diagnosing brain 
death, the latter being consistent with earlier qualitative findings (Sadala et aI., 
2006). These results are also in line with the limited but highly vocal observers 
who argue that asking physicians to meet our "flawed" definitions of death may 
be preventing more successful donor conversions (e.g. Tibballs, 2008; Truog & 
Miller, 2008). 
As was concluded in the chapter on DCD, a certain level of ambiguity in 
medicine is unavoidable, but the medical practice and legal delineation of being 
alive versus being dead should be clear (Shemie, 2007). Brain blood flow tests 
have been described as the most reliable ancillary test for brain death (Shemie et 
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al., 2006; Shemie, 2007; Tibballs, 2008) yet these findings suggest not all 
intensivists would agree. So while there were fewer inconsistencies evidenced in 
the opinion, practice, and policy of DBD compared to DCD, there is still work to 
be done particularly with respect to Australia's diagnostic practice of brain death 
but possibly also our legal definition of it. This will be imperative as technology, 
organ donation and transplantation continues to evolve at such a rapid pace. 
International commentators have similarly concluded that the law, health policy, 
and bioethical arenas have not kept up with our ever-advancing insight into the 
complex spectrum that is life and death (Shemie, 2007). 
To benefit the public's understanding of brain death, there was some support 
shown in the current study for the introduction of brainstem death terminology, as 
it is called in the UK This is an important finding as it seems the public detection 
of within sector and international inconsistencies may be having a greater impact 
on intensivists' conversion behaviour than the actual inconsistencies themselves. 
This is because no matter where interviewees sat on a potential issue or how 
comfortable they were with their own management of it, all demonstrated definite 
unease about the public detecting practice inconsistencies. So whilst these 
interviewees were comfortable with their own brain death knowledge, some were 
distinctly uncomfortable about how little the public knew about the complicated 
concept. Physicians with good intentions were therefore keen to shield the public 
from the debate in order not to negatively impact Australia's low donation rate. 
Even those who stood by their more reasonable interpretations of contentious 
issues appeared concerned about how they would be perceived by colleagues, 
media, and the uninformed public. No physicians wanted to be misinterpreted as 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 
prioritising organ donation over patient care or, even worse, to be seen as organ 
chasers. Hence, the physicians' overwhelming preference was for the NOK to 
initiate the prospect of organ donation, so their own duty-of-care could not be 
called into question. 
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Legal uncertainties, ambiguity, and different interpretations of state-based 
guardianship acts further confounded the issue of consent. Like these informants, 
I now strongly endorse the view that the patient's family should be responsible for 
the ultimate decision to donate the patient's organs, even if this contradicts the 
patient's known consent. To prioritise it any other way is too damaging to the 
family, the staff, and the greater donation cause. Interviewees also rejected 
Australia's supposedly legally valid and informed consent registries, claiming 
only the NOK could currently give legally binding, informed consent at the 
relevant time. This is a noted theme in the literature (Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010; 
Tibballs, 2008). Accordingly, some suspicion and resistance was noted for The 
Authority's recommendation that intensivists consult the AODR before broaching 
the topic of organ donation with patient's NOK. This resistance is in line with 
popular thinking thata physician's ignorance of their dying patient's registered 
donation status can reduce the potential for conflicts of interest (Naffine et aI., 
2009). 
Consent registries are costly programs to run, even more so if they are to 
provide a better informed understanding of what it means to consent to organ 
donation. If intensivists continue to hold little faith in the value of consent 
registers, they are depriving themselves of a useful tool when broaching the 
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prospect of organ donation with NOK. More importantly, they are depriving 
themselves and NOK the closest opportunity to act in line with the patient's true 
best interests (i.e. greater than their physical best interests). It is for these reasons 
that our national consent registry, the AODR, should continue to be funded, 
marketed and expanded to include information that reflects legally informed 
consent. Respected international commentators have also provided positive 
recommendations for the potential to increase consent rates through public 
registries (Sheehy et aI., 2003). 
These collective findings are represented in Table 7.2, which is a theoretical 
attempt to explain the key sequential process currently involved in the 
intensivist's conversion of a potential donor into an actual donor. So that the 
potential for conflict of interest can be minimised, the therapeutic intent of each 
step of the process is in line with the physician's interpretation of the patient's 
best interests. Some procedures may overlap or recur. Note the italicised font is 
used to emphasise contentious procedures and points of difference between the 
two pathways to donation. For instance, Step Seven illustrates the substantial 
difference in the way death occurs via the two modes of donation. 
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Table 7.2 
Substantive Grounded Theory of Intensivists' Motivation and Confulence to 
Convert Organ Potential Donors according to Pathway 
DBD: Challenging Cultural Notions DCD: Navigating the Grey Zone 
1. Upholding patient best interests 1. Upholding patient best interests 
a. Decision to withdraw a. Decision to withdraw 
therapy therapy 
2. Supporting the donation potential 2. Supporting the donation potential 
but resisting organ donation as but resisting organ donation as 
part of EoLC part of EoLC 
3. Enforcing the Dead Donor Rule 3. Offer, receive, but never request 
and seeking certainty in death: organ donation 
a. Determining brain 
function( s) 
b. Seeking The Gold 
Standard Method of 
Diagnosis 
4. Offer, receive, but never request 4. Obtaining informed NOK 
organ donation donation consent 
5. Obtaining informed NOK 5. Respecting NOK best interests 
donation consent (no longer the patient's) 
6. Respecting NOK best interests 6. A voiding the Slippery Slope of 
(no longer the patient's) Antemortem Interventions 
7. Maintaining therapy 7. Withdrawing therapy 
8. Enforcing the Dead Donor Rule: 
a. Determining 
irreversibility 
9. Satisfying certainty in death 
a. Stand down times 
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Overall, the current findings were consistent with suggestions that physicians 
have a limited, namely medical or physiological, interpretation of patient's best 
interests (Richards & Rogers, 2005). Unfortunately, due to the perception of a 
deficit in legal protection and public consent education, any significant change to 
this interpretation seems unlikely. Like their overseas counterparts (D'Alessandro 
et aI., 2008; Gardiner & Sparrow, 2010; Keenan et aI., 2002; Mandell et aI., 
2006), some interviewees made a good argument for the need for more detailed 
public consent education (including DCD) than has been provided to date. This 
was not to specifically increase the number of registered consents but to improve 
general awareness and support levels so that consent may become truly informed 
and organ donation becomes the norm, not an optional extra for the NOK. 
Commentator Bell (2003), agrees that improved community consent "for all 
components" of donation would advantageously "reflect the informed will of the 
public rather than legalise or sanction the tactics of the transplant service" (p. 
180). 
Public organ donation belief and attitude research continues to highlight the 
need for improved dialogue and education (Cantarovich et aI., 2007; Siminoff et 
al., 2004). One of the present study'S interviewee descriptions of brain death as 
being "as good as dead" was a view also shared by 43 per cent of an American 
public sample, where only 40 per cent of respondents actually considered declared 
brain dead patients as deceased (Siminoff et aI., 2004). However, nearly 67 per 
cent of respondents who classified brain dead patients as alive were still willing to 
donate. A further 46 and 34 per cent of respective respondents were comfortable 
donating from severely brain injured and persistent vegetative state (PVS) 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 185 
patients, despite also classifying these patients as being alive. These figures rose 
sharply to 96 and 94 per cent, respectively if the respondent instead classified the 
severely brain injured and PVS patient as dead. 
While similar brain death enquires with Australian samples are yet to be 
released (Naffine et aI., 2009), these American findings do suggest that unlike 
some interviewees and critics insistence (e.g. Shewmon, 1998a, 1998b, 2001, 
2004; Tibballs, 2008), the public are not going to reject organ donation outright if 
they are provided with more specific information about the intricacies and 
complexity of the death and donation process. Recall, it is generally found that 
increased knowledge about donation and transplantation correlates to a more 
positive attitude toward donation (Ingram et al., 2002). Many people may use 
more detailed death and organ donation information to guide their own decision 
making. This may even extend current ethical and societal boundaries so that 
patients with a poor prognosis, such as PVS or a high spinal cord injury, may one 
day be able to donate following their withdrawal of life-support (Keenan et aI., 
2002; Truog & Miller, 2008). At the very least, the current findings and others 
(Keenan et aI., 2002; Siminoff et aI., 2004) indicate that some sections of the 
public, and health professionals, are ready to accept organ donation from a wider 
pool of patient types. Even if brain death does not equate to death in a traditional 
sense, it appears that some individuals do not believe it equates to conscious 
living, that is, to a life worth living. As is also prophesised by medical ethicist, 
Veatch (2008), who estimates nearly a third ofthe American population show 
support for a consciousness-based death definition on religious and philosophical 
grounds. 
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However, the great difficulty for social marketers, is balancing how much 
additional information would be useful to improve general understanding and how 
much could potentially damage the public's support for organ donation. The 
current findings suggest more specific information should now be made available 
on the national consent registry by The Authority and, at the very least, this 
should include some basic details about the DCD option. 
Finally, the current research revealed a number of situations where physicians 
appear to operate under a somewhat different, more conservative code of practice 
in patients identified as potential organ donors. At least one of the current 
interviewees and some published authors explain this repeated finding by pointing 
out that compared to non-donation patients (whose burial or cremation is 
generally days after the death declaration), the course of events immediately 
following a potential organ donor's death is vastly different (Shemie, 2007; 
Shewmon, 2004). Thus, because the organ donation process poses an increased 
potential for conflicts of interest, physicians will continue to seek out a higher 
degree of certainty in all matters related to a potential organ donor. This additional 
need for certainty is understandable and important for the greater donation cause. 
Still, one's desire to donate should not be ruled-out by impossible medico-legal 
demands and bureaucratic red-tape. 
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7.4 Contribution to Knowledge and Key Recommendation 
In an attempt to develop policy, change practice, and add to the knowledge-
base of the profession, the substantive theory proposed in Table 7.2 offers more 
than just an Australian model of when and why physicians convert some potential 
organ donors into actual donors, but not others. Through the logical collaboration 
of the GTM and Situational Analysis, this research provides valuable insight into 
the variance inherent in physicians' practice of donor conversion, rather than just 
a few of the collective mechanisms often supplied via quantitative research. The 
highly-flexible methodology allowed unprecedented access into a small sample of 
Australian gatekeepers' experiences, where it was revealed that at present some 
physicians do not, or cannot, accept organ donation to be within the definition of a 
patient's best interests. This is primarily because the current interpretation of a 
patient's best interests is largely physiologically determined, rendering it 
disappointingly narrow at times. As is my opinion, this interpretation of one's best 
interests may be surprising to the majority of the Australian public who show 
great endorsement for the practice of organ donation. 
A number of recommendations for improvement to our donation practices 
have been put forward in this paper and by organisations like The Authority. 
However, it is hereby predicted that the only tangible change to current donation 
rates will come when Australian physicians in ICU, emergency, and neurosurgical 
departments feel ethically and legally confident to philosophically consider organ 
donation a valid part of a patient's EoLC and be supported by nationally 
consistent operational protocols to permit such confidence. This would represent a 
significant deviation from the current resistance depicted in Step Two of the 
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Substantive Grounded Theory of Intensivists' Motivation and Confidence to 
Convert Organ Potential Donors according to Pathway (Table 7.2). Delays in the 
uptake of DCD programs in Australian hospitals highlight the active resistance to 
accepting organ donation as part of EoLC, because the mere practice of DCD 
forces physicians to consider the option of organ donation prior to the declaration 
of a patient's death. 
The current findings suggest that more education is needed for both health 
professionals and the public, particularly about DCD and its mechanisms. This is 
likely to produce nationally consistent and up-to-date legal and ethical guidelines 
that are desperately needed to promote physician and public confidence. If more 
informed consent education was readily available on the national registry, 
including DCD information, Australian physicians could then seriously consider 
organ donation as part of their patient's EoLC, because their ethical concern about 
public ignorance would be eased. This would unlock physicians' narrow 
interpretation of the patients' best interest standard and, consequently, provide the 
key to unlock Australia's potential donor pool. 
Due to the complexities inherent in the organ donation process, it would be 
naIve to suggest that sweeping changes to physician conversion behaviour could 
result from yet another public general awareness advertising campaign. Previous 
attempts have not produced long-lasting change, and this is certainly not what is 
being recommended here. Instead, as part of the donation registration process, 
more detailed information should be targeted to those individuals who have 
accessed the registry with the intent to record their wishes. To meet more 
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informed consent standards, this should include information about the two 
pathways to donation and basic education about some of the mechanisms 
involved. To increase physician confidence, it seems the level of information 
provided would not need to be nearly as detailed as that given to the distressed 
NOK when an actual donation opportunity eventuates. These information sheets 
should be available on the AODR and Authority web sites (and upon request), and 
could be similar in presentation, but not in content, to the fact sheets already 
released and available on The Authority'S website. 
7.5 Study Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research 
This study relied on interview data, which may not accurately represent 
interviewees' true opinions given the human tendency to present oneself in a 
favourable light. For example, despite assurance of personal and hospital 
confidentiality, it is possible some interviewees felt uncomfortable about 
admitting how truly taxing they find managing a potential organ donor. The social 
desirability bias should have at least been minimized; however, through 
interviews being conducted in an individual rather than in a group setting. It 
certainly did not prevent one interviewee admitting that they sometimes seriously 
question the allocation of organs due to dissatisfaction with outcomes in certain 
recipient groups, such as cystic fibrosis sufferers or cigarette smokers who do not 
cease smoking despite receiving life-saving organs. This would be a contentious 
topic of interest for future research nonetheless. It is also not possible to predict 
whether having a researcher with no experience in the donation sector exerted a 
positive or negative influence on responses. 
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The strength of this rich, real-world research also comes at a cost to statistical 
generalis ability. Using larger samples and quantitative methods should allow 
future researchers to test the current study's themes with the aim of broadening 
the generalis ability of findings beyond theory. Comparing high versus low 
donating hospital units on the basis of the influencing factors identified by this 
research, for example, may facilitate a re-evaluation of current donation 
procedures within Australian hospitals. For instance, a study of hospitals in our 
nation's consistently highest donating state, South Australia (20 DPMP in 2009), 
would offer valuable points of comparison for the remaining states and territories. 
Future research could also examine reasons for the interstate variability of donor 
maintenance times, as noted in Table 7.3. 
Table 7.3. 
Donor Management Times According to State 
State 
ACT 
TAS 
NT 
VIC 
SA 
QLD 
NSW 
WA 
Time from Admission to Brain Death 
(median hours) 
81.2 
64.1 
45.0 
40.5 
37.8 
36.9 
36.7 
33.7 
Note: Adapted version of the 2009 Australian donor "Terminal Management" 
statistics according to state, ANZOD, 2010, p.46. 
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Amongst other factors, the substantial variability in median times from patient 
admission to brain death across our different states and territories may be 
indicative of the different ethical donor maintenance boundaries within which 
Australian physicians are willing to operate. Using the substantive theory to guide 
the development of a quantitative survey instrument, designed to test whether the 
factors outlined in the interviews and the empirical literature, may help 
differentiate and explain different hospital and state donation rates. This survey 
could also be distributed to overseas units. 
Intensivists' wariness of the legally valid and informed consent registries 
highlights promising research opportunities. After all, the need to improve general 
public organ donation education was one of few issues where all interviewees 
showed consensus. Australian public and physician focus groups could be useful 
in ascertaining the degree of specificity needed in public DBD and DCD 
information and consent registration packs, before our donation gatekeepers will 
deem a patient's consent information worthy of their consideration. Using a pre, 
post, and follow-up education dissemination design, these results may have 
significant ramifications for current marketing directives but also policy 
development. Larger, quantitative samples could also assess whether an 
improvement in the public's DCD education and the potentiallegalisation of 
antemortem interventions could translate to intensivists' acceptance for 
antemortem interventions. 
The key to creating the societal shift that physicians say is needed to make 
organ donation ordinary rather than extraordinary is likely to come through long-
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term education directives. For example, the demonstration of positive attitude, 
knowledge, and even behavioural impacts following school-based environmental 
education interventions (Skamp, 2009), has lead to the Australian Government's 
recent addition of environmental sustainability to the school curriculum 
(Australian Government, 201Ob). Future research should investigate whether the 
application of culturally-sensitive organ donation education to existing secondary 
school health and wellbeing curriculum programs has any long-term effects on 
donation rates. This could be done by building on successful school, family, and 
mobile learning centre initiatives, such as Life Education Australia but limited to 
senior secondary pupils due to the sophisticated subject matter. 
The current research indicates that The Authority's recent implementation of 
clinical triggers and dedicated hospital organ donation specialists should 
theoretically benefit the overall donor conversion rate, particularly DCD donation. 
However, it will be particularly relevant for future research to establish whether 
having dedicated donation specialists may, in effect, just reposition one set of 
issues from one professional to another. At what point in the conversion process 
the hand-over occurs will also have interesting conversion-rate research 
implications, given that this sample deemed it unethical to transfer terminal 
patients to the lCU just to support their potential to become organ donors. Still, it 
will be important for the dedicated specialist is not introduced too late in the 
process to really capitalise on Australia's potential donor pool. As observed in this 
and other local research (NHMRC, 2009b), physicians may especially benefit 
from gaining a better understanding as to why NOK refuse organ donation and 
whether they regret this decision once their initial shock and grief has subsided. 
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Analysing these sensitive themes amongst parents and pediatric physicians could 
offer promising insights into Australia's even-lower donation rate in children. 
The Australian advent of DCD processes and the release of draft national 
guidelines also provide abundant means for further local inquiry. For example, 
adding to international research that contrasts the quality and transplantation 
success of organs procured from circulatory dead donors compared to brain dead 
donors (Devey & Wigmore, 2009; de Vries et aI., 2010; Snell & Levvey, 2009; 
Suntharalingam, et al., 2009). Due to the rapid time in which DCD must occur, 
comparing how local DCD protocols handle the time and place of treatment 
withdrawal in the potential circulatory donor is also worthy of investigation. 
Within this small sample alone there was concern about the indignity of 
withdrawing treatment and asking NOK to wait out the observation period in an 
anesthetic bay or operating theatre, only to have to return to the ward if death did 
not occur in the specific time frame. Such a scenario also highlights the 
contentious issue of observation time and stand-down periods: how long is long 
enough to declare death and irreversibility at that? The future success of DCD in 
Australia depends on medical and general community acceptance of the national 
protocol and its roll-out. It will also be important for researchers to explore 
whether an extension of DCD categories to include high spinal patients and heart 
transplantation may one day be considered ethically and socially acceptable to 
physicians and society alike. Finally, the ethical retrieval and transplantation of 
hearts from DCD donors is also in dire need of international agreement in policy 
and protocol (Reich et al 2009). 
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Despite one interviewee's suggestion that asking physicians about DBD 
procedures is only likely to produce "standard answers", the current study 
revealed there is a definite need for wider research into physicians' perceptions of 
brain death practices. The most immediate question for larger samples is whether 
current Australian brain death protocols do, in fact, strictly meet the lawful 
definition of brain death, or whether the legal wording or diagnosis practices need 
to be tightened. For instance, in the legal determination of brain death, does the 
definition of the word "function" need to be further clarified by the medical 
community? The current findings suggest some physicians would even support 
the introduction of legislation so that an ethical basis for pronouncing death could 
be the permanent loss of brain functionality related to consciousness, sometimes 
referred to as the "higher-brain definition" (Veatch, 2008, p. 673). It would also 
be highly relevant to assess how much medical ambiguity intensivists are 
comfortable with when diagnosing brain death via clinical and/or technological 
means. A questionnaire using themes that have emerged from this and detailing 
alternate legal definitions of brain death, case studies, or hypothetical scenarios 
(including certain medication plasma levels), may assist policy makers lessen the 
gap between our brain death policy and practice. 
Although the theme was not strongly evidenced in the current sample, the 
impact of public distrust of physicians, their profession, and authority figures on 
organ donation rates was raised by one interviewee. Employed at a hospital 
servicing a highly multicultural, low socioeconomic area, this interviewee 
outlined that "people who are disgruntled about their lot in life ... may lack the 
intrinsic desire to consent to donation to help others, unknown to them, when 
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asked by an untrustworthy figure". This supports local (NHMRC, 2009b) and 
international findings that physicians are sensitive to the potential impact of 
religion and culture on consent to donation (Chernenko et al., 2005; Guadagnoli et 
aI., 1999; Regehr et al., 2004). Future research should examine if this lack of trust 
from some community groups is something Australian physicians face daily, or 
simply a misguided attempt to explain low NOK consent or potential donor 
referral rates in low S.E.S. hospitals. Such research is imperative given our 
multicultural population and the consistent finding that depending where they 
live; indigenous Australians are 3-17 times more likely than the general 
Australian population to require kidney transplantation (Preston-Thomas, Cass, & 
O'Rourke, 2007.). The impact of culture on consent rates in the reverse scenario 
may also be worthy of further inquiry. One overseas-born interviewee commented 
on the increasing number of newly-trained Australia lCU physicians originally 
from the Indian sub-continent. Cultural differences will have some positive or 
negative influences on physician training and NOK communication styles for 
example. 
Finally, future research may need to overcome the hospital access difficulties 
that were experienced in the current study. Despite university and state ethics 
approval, individual and hospital confidentiality assurances, and willing 
participants, conducting on-site hospital interviews was particularly difficult in 
one Australian region due to state governance issues. 
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7.6 Conclusion 
The Taskforce and The Authority have proposed that potential donor 
opportunities are not being recognised in the Australian hospital setting. This is 
consistent with the current research that suggests uncertainties and inconsistencies 
in opinion, policy, and practice are significantly impacting the motivation, 
confidence, and ultimately, the donor conversion behaviours of physicians and, 
subsequently, the families they are treating. An Australian model was needed to 
provide new explanations and guide practice and policy development. A 
Constructionist Grounded Theory and Situational Analysis approach was thereby 
chosen to ascertain the Gatekeepers' perspective into what differentiates the 
potential organ donor from being considered a real donor opportunity. The 
findings delineated the two sides of a physician's facilitation of organ donation: 
the rewarding, fulfilling, positive-out-of-tragedy component and the strenuous, 
emotionally draining and unnecessarily ambiguous component. 
As a society in desperate need of more organ transplantation, we owe it to 
ourselves and our over-burdened physicians to make their jobs easier by lessening 
conflict of interest concerns. Measures to reduce the ambiguity and uncertainty 
currently plaguing physicians' interpretation of a patient's best interests standard 
should therefore be directed at three key areas: 
• establishing agreeable operational roles and responsibilities for physicians 
involved in the practice of organ donation 
• implementing nationally consistent ethical practice guidelines 
• clarifying inconsistent organ donation legislation, including the 
supposedly legally informed public consent registries. 
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The increasingly evident relationship between physicians' concern for poor 
public relations, their perception of an uninformed public, and their confidence to 
convert donors calls for the immediate expansion of public consent registration 
information to include more explicit information about the two pathways to 
becoming an organ donor. If physicians' ethical concern about public ignorance is 
eased, this in tum may influence physicians to act in line with a broader 
interpretation of a patient's best interests thereby accepting organ donation as part 
ofEoLC and subsequently influencing the physician's motivation and support for 
operational practices that will actualise potential donors. 
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Autopsy: an examination of the body after death to determine the cause of death and/or to 
discover and describe pathological processes present in the body at the time of death 
(NHMRC, 2007). 
Antemortem (premortem) intervention: intervention that is carried out before death with 
the aim of maintaining organ viability following irreversibility of circulation (NHMRC, 
2007). 
A potential donor: a patient who demonstrates the clinical signs of impending death by 
irreversible loss of all brain function or irreversible cessations of circulation, is 
haemodynamically supported in an intensive care unit or emergency department and 
meets the general medical criteria for organ and tissue donation in Australia (adapted 
from DonateLife, 201Oc). 
An actual donor: a deceased patient where organ retrieval occurred. 
An unidentified or missed referral: a realistic medically suitable donor who failed to 
become an actual donor because of lack of medical intervention. (Hibberd et aI., 1992) 
Brain death: a term for death determined by the irreversible loss of all function of the 
brain. It must be distinguished from severely brain damaged states such as permanent or 
persistent coma or unconsciousness, post-coma unresponsiveness (vegetative state) or 
minimally conscious state (NHMRC, 2007). 
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Cardiac death or non-beating heart death: are terms for death determined upon 
irreversible cessation of circulation. Criteria for diagnosing cardiac death clearly 
differentiate this from other states such as irreversible cardiac disease in which circulation 
is failing or is maintained artificially, or where cessation of circulation is predicted but 
has not yet occurred (NHMRC, 2007). 
Category C patient: patients with the potential to progress to brain death within 24 hours 
if supportive treatment were continued (Opdam & Silvester, 2006). 
Constant comparative methods: grounded theory method of comparing data with data, 
data with category, category with category, and category with concept, to find similarities 
and differences, assisting the analyst move from the level of description to one of 
abstraction (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
Death: is the final cessation of the integrated functioning of the body. Integrated 
functioning is a characteristic of living beings. Death is observed to have occurred when 
there is irreversible loss of brain function or irreversible cessation of circulation 
(NHMRC, 2007). 
Health professional: A physician, registrar, nurse, or hospital administrator. 
Intensivist: A physician who specialises in the care of critically ill patients, usually in an 
intensive care unit (lCU), (MedicineNet.com, 2003). 
Maastricht Categories: An international meeting on organ donation after cessation of the 
circulation held in Maastricht in 1995 identified four categories of potential donors 
(Kootstra et ai., 1995), to which a fifth category was added in 2003. These are described 
as either uncontrolled (Categories I/II and V) or controlled (Categories III/IV) donors. 
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Category I: dead on arrival 
Category II: unsuccessful resuscitation 
Category III: awaiting cardiac arrest 
Category N: cardiac arrest in a brainstem dead cadaver 
Category V: unexpected cardiac arrest in a critically ill patient. 
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Organ: a part of the body that performs vital function(s) to maintain life. These include 
the kidney, heart, lung, liver and pancreas (NHMRC, 2007). 
Organ recovery: The process of procuring a donor's organs or tissues for the purpose of 
transplantation (NHMRC, 2007). 
Recipient: a person who receives organs and/or tissues from another person (the donor) 
(NHMRC, 2007). 
Tissue: a group of specialised cells (e.g. cornea, heart valves, bone, skin) that perform 
defined functions (NHMRC, 2007). 
Warm ischaemic time: The time from irreversible cessation of circulation (and non-
perfusion of organs in situ) until the COmmencement of preservation solution for organ 
procurement (NHMRC, 2007). 
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Appendix C 
Human Research Ethics Committee Approvals 
Research Services 
Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research) (Melbourne Campus) 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Dr Greg Tooley cc: Emily Tunks 
School of Psychology, Burwood 
FROM: AlExecutive Officer, Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (DU-HREC) 
DATE: 25 January 2008 
SUBJECT: Project EC 304-2007 (Please quote this project number in future communication. ) 
Increasing Australian organ donation rates: a study of personal and 
organisational barriers to donation, as perceived by health professionals 
This application was considered at the DU-HREC meeting held on 12 December 2007. 
Approval has been given for Emily Tunks, under the supervision of Dr Greg Tooley, 
School of Psychology, to undertake this project for a period of three years from 2S 
January 2008. 
The approval given by the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee is given only 
for the project and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to contact the 
Executive Officer immediately should any of the following occur: 
Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time. 
Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project. 
The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion. 
Modifications are requested by other HREC's. 
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every year 
and at the conclusion of the project. Failure to report as required will result in suspension of 
your approval to proceed with the project. 
DU-HREC may need to audit this project as part of the requirements for monitoring set out in 
the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving Humans (1999). 
Jeremy Chin 
On behalf of DU-HREC 
(03) 92517123 
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+ 
• \11 St Vincent's Hospital 
8 July 2008 
Dr Greg Tooley 
School of Psychology 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Hwy 
Burwood VIC 3125 
Dear Greg 
SVH File Number: 081103 
A facility of 
SI. Vincents & Mater HeaIIII Sydney 
St, Vincent's Hospital Sydney Ltd 
ABN n 054 038 872 
390 V'lCtoria Street 
Darlinghursl NSW 2010 Australia 
T +612 83821111 
F +61 293324142 
www.stvincents.com.au 
Project Title: Increasing Australian Organ Donation Rates: A study of personal and 
organisational barriers to donation, as perceived by Health Professionals 
(HREC Ref: 08lSVHl97) 
Thank you for submitting the above project for ethical and scientific review. The project was 
first considered by the St Vincent's Hospital HREC Executive at its meeting held on 16 June 
2008. This lead HREC has been accredited by NSW Department of Health as a lead HREC 
under the model for single ethical and scientific review. 
This lead HREC is constituted and operates in accordance with the National Health and 
Medical Research Council's National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Research Involving 
Humans and the CPMPIICH Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice. 
I am pleased to advise that the Committee at an Executive meeting on 7 July 2008 has 
granted ethical approval of the above multi-centre project to be conducted at the following 
NSW Public Health site(s): 
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital; 
• Liverpool Hospital; 
• Westrnead Hospital; 
• St Vincent's Hospital; 
• Royal North Shore Hospital; 
• The Children's Hospital Westmead; 
• St George Hospital; , 
• Wollongong Hospital; and 
• Nepean Hospital 
If a new site(s) is to be added please inform the HREC in writing and submit a Site Specific 
Assessment Form (SSA) to the Research Governance Officer at the new site, 
The following documentation has been reviewed and approved by the HREC: 
NEAF (AB/5214/1) 
Protocol Version 2 dated 2 July 2008; 
Participant Information Statement and Consent Form Version dated 1 
November 2008; and 
Letter to Doctors at sites. 
Please note the following conditions of approval: 
Continuing the Mission of the 
Sisters of Charity 
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1. This approval is valid for five years, and the Committee requires that you furnish it 
with aMual reportS on the study's progress beginning in July 2009. 
2. The Co-ordinating Investigator wiI immediately report anything ....t.idl might warranl 
review of ethical approval of the project in the spedfIed fonnat. including unforeseen 
events thai mIght affect continued ethical acceptability of the pro1ect and any 
complaints made by study participants regarding the condUCI of the study. 
3. Proposed changes to the research protocol, conduct of the research, or length of 
HREC approval will be provided to the HREC for review, in the specified format. 
4. The HREC will be notified, giving reasons, K the project Is discontinued before the 
expected date of completion. 
5. The Co-ordinating Investigator wiJl provide a progress report, In the specified format. 
annually 10 the HREC as Yo'eJl as at the completion of the study. 
HREC approval is valId for 5 years from the date of this leiter. 
You are reminded that this letter constitutes ethIcal Ipproval only. You must not 
commenct this research project at a site untllaeparata authorisation from the Chief 
Executive or delegate of that site has been obtained. 
A copy of thjs leiter must be forwarded to aR sile inves!ioalors for sl,lbmission to the relevant 
Research Governance Officer· 
ShoIJd you have any queries about your project please contact the Executive DffICef -
Research Office, Tel: 8382-2075, email research@stvincenls.com.au. The HREC Terms of 
Reference, Standard Operating Procedures, membership and standard forms are available 
from the SI Vrncent's Hospital website: 
hltp:JlwNwsvh.slvincenis.com.aulresearchoffice/ReschOfficeI 
Please quote 081103 in all corresponclence. 
The HREC wishes you every success in your research. 
Yours sincerely 
5~~ 
Sarah Chartton 
Executive Officer 
Research Office 
levelS delacy BuIdi1g 
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AppendixD 
Plain Language Statement, Consent and Revocation Form 
DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
TO: Participants 
Plain Language Statement 
Date: 1 November 2007 
Full Project Title: Increasing Australian Organ Donation Rates: A Study of Personal 
and Organisational Barriers to Donation, as Perceived by Health Professionals 
Principal Researcher: Dr Greg Tooley 
Student Researcher: Emily Tunks 
Associate Researcher(s): Dr Tess Knight 
This Plain Language Statement and Consent Form is 5 pages long. Please make sure 
you have all the pages. 
1. Your Consent 
You are invited to take part in this research project. 
This Plain Language Statement contains detailed information about the research project. 
Its purpose is to explain to you as openly and clearly as possible all the procedures 
involved in this project so that you can make a fully informed decision whether you are 
going to participate. 
Please read this Plain Language Statement carefully. Feel free to ask questions about 
any information in the document. You may also wish to discuss the project with a relative 
or friend or your local health worker. Feel free to do this. 
Once you understand what the project is about and if you agree to take part in it, you will 
be asked to sign the Consent Form. By signing the Consent Form, you indicate that you 
understand the information and that you give your consent to participate in the research 
project. 
You will be given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep as 
a record. 
2. Purpose and Background 
The purpose of this project is to better understand the impact of attitudes, and behaviours 
of senior medical staff, and management; the policies, procedures and culture of the work 
unit, and the nature and infrastructure of the department, on subsequent organ donation 
rates. 
A total of 20 people will participate in this project. 
Previous experience has shown that organ donation is a medical, economic and socially 
critical issue. Despite this, donation rates continue to plateau at suboptimal levels well 
below what they should and could be. Previous research suggests the worldwide crisis in 
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organ shortage may not only be due to a lack of potential donors, but rather a failure to 
convert many potential into actual donors. 
You are invited to participate in this research project because physicians and ICU 
managers have been identified as a crucial link to the organ donation process. 
The results of this research may be used to help researcher Emily Tunks'to obtain a 
Doctorate of Psychology (Health) degree. 
3. Funding 
This research is totally funded by Deakin University. 
4. Procedures 
Participation in this project will involve: 
A one hour, face-to-face interview will be carried out on site at your hospital by 
investigator, Emily Tunks. Interviews will recorded via audio tapes and note-taking. 
5. Possible Benefits 
Possible benefits include: 
As well as providing a platform for larger quantitative enquiries, this research may 
facilitate the re-evaluation of organ donation procedures within hospitals and offer a 
conceptual framework upon which hospital administrators could structure organ retrievals 
within relevant units (e.g. ICU). Thereby, reaping the medical, economic and social 
benefits that even the smallest increase to our organ donation rate would bestow. 
We cannot guarantee or promise that you will receive any benefits from this project other 
than an opportunity to express your opinion and experiences for the attainment of greater 
knowledge. 
6. Possible Risks 
Possible risks, side effects and discomforts include a potential for discomfort when 
recalling negative previous experiences with organ donation. The interview can cease 
immediately if you are uncomfortable at any time. Please phone LifeGI FT (VIC: 1300 133 
050 or NSW: 02 92294461) if you feel you need follow-up debriefing with trained 
counsellors at no charge. 
There are no unforseen risks if you decide to withdraw from the study. 
7. Privacy, Confidentiality and Disclosure of Information 
All data will be de-identified, stored at Deakin in a locked filing cabinet and accessed only 
by the principal researchers. The data will be stored for the minimum requirement of six 
years after the final publication and it will be destroyed at the end of the storage period. 
Any information obtained in connection with this project and that can identify you will 
remain confidential. It will only be disclosed with your permission, subject to legal 
requirements. If you give us your permission by signing the Consent Form, we plan to 
discuss and/or publish the results with LifeGIFT and a peer-reviewed journal. 
In any discussion or publication, information will be provided in such a way that you 
cannot be identified. 
8. Results of Project 
Results of the project will be shared with participants and LifeGIFT following acceptance 
of the thesis. It is hoped that a publication in a peer-reviewed journal will result from the 
project. 
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9. Participation is Voluntary 
Participation in any research project is voluntary. If you do not wish to take part you 
are not obliged to. If you decide to take part and later change your mind, you are free to 
withdraw from the project at any stage. Any information obtained from you to date will not 
be used and will be destroyed. 
Your decision whether to take part or not to take part, or to take part and then withdraw, 
will not affect your relationship your employer, Deakin University or LifeGIFT. 
Before you make your decision, a member of the research team will be available to 
answer any questions you have about the research project. You can ask for any 
information you want. Sign the Consent Form only after you have had a chance to ask 
your questions and have received satisfactory answers. 
If you decide to withdraw from this project, please notify a member of the research team 
or complete and return the Revocation of Consent Form attached. This notice will allow 
the research team to inform you if there are any health risks or special requirements 
linked to withdrawing. 
10. Ethical Guidelines 
This project will be carried out according to the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007) produced by the National Health and Medical Research Council 
of Australia. This statement has been developed to protect the interests of people who 
agree to participate in human research studies. 
The ethics aspects of this research project have been approved by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee of Deakin University. 
11. Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted 
or any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact either: 
The Executive Officer, St Vincent's Hospital Research Office, Level 6 deLacy Building, 
Darlinghurst NSW 2010, Telephone: 0283822075, research@stvincents.com.au. Please 
quote project number 08/SVH/97. 
The Executive Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Deakin University, 221 
Burwood Highway, Burwood VIC 3125, Telephone: 03 9251 7123, Facsimile: 03 9244 
6581; research-ethics@deakin.edu.au. Please quote project number EC 304 -2007. 
12. Reimbursement for your costs 
You will not be paid for your participation in this project. 
13. Further Information, Queries or Any Problems 
If you require further information, wish to withdraw your participation or if you have any 
problems concerning this project (for example, any side effects), you can contact the 
researchers responsible for this project: 
Emily Tunks 
DPsych (Health) 
School of Psychology 
Deakin University 
Email: ebtun@deakin.edu.au 
Dr Greg Tooley 
Associate Head of School of Psychology 
Deakin University 
Email: tooley@deakin.edu.au 
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
TO: Participants 
Consent Form 
Date: 1 November 2007 
Full Project Title: Increasing Australian Organ Donation Rates: A Study of Personal 
and Organisational Barriers to Donation, as Perceived by Health Professionals 
I have read and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain 
Language Statement. 
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep. 
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where 
information about this project is published, or presented in any public form. 
Participant's Name (printed) ............................................................................. . 
Signature... ...... ... . ... .. ... ... . . . ... ... . . .... . .. . .. ...... ... ... ...... Date 
Emily Tunks 
DPsych (Health) 
School of Psychology 
Deakin University 
Email: ebtun@deakin.edu.au 
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DEAKIN UNIVERSITY 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
TO: Participants 
Revocation of Consent Form 
Date: 1 November 2007 
Full Project Title: Increasing Australian Organ Donation Rates: A Study of Personal 
and Organisational Barriers to Donation, as Perceived by Health Professionals 
I hereby wish to WITHDRAW my consent to participate in the above research 
project and understand that such withdrawal WILL NOT jeopardise my relationship 
with Deakin University, LifeGIFT or my employer. 
Participant's Name (printed) ............................................................ . 
Signature......................................................................... Date 
Please mail or fax this form to: 
Emily Tunks 
DPsych (Health) 
School of Psychology 
Deakin University 
221 Burwood Hwy 
Burwood, VIC 3125 
Fax: (03) 9244 6858 
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AppendixE 
Initial Interview Guide 
Semi-structured, in-depth interview question list: 
Introduction 
Welcome. Some of Today's interview questions are deliberately broad, whilst 
others more specific but won't take any longer than an hour to complete. 
My background 
237 
No previous experience with organ donation except during my time as the Exec. 
Officer for transplant board at RACS. Also, have hospital experience as medical 
secretary and ward clark but not in the ICU. 
For the development of this project, I have consulted LifeGIFT VIC and NSW, 
who have informed me of the procedures on their behalf as state donor 
coordinators. 
Title of my research 
Increasing Australian Organ Donation Rates: A Study Of Personal And 
Organisational Barriers To Donation, As Perceived By Health Professionals. 
Purpose of the interview 
The information that you provide will be used to develop a theoretical model for 
the ways in which physicians practice organ donation within Australian hospitals. 
Looking to clues as to whether we can even increase the donation rate beyond 
what is currently reported? 
PLS and consent form 
Highlight the issue of confidentiality. 
You to keep the PLS. 
Demographic information: 
1. Age 
2. Gender 
3. Years of experience as physician 
4. Years of experience as ICU/ED physician 
5. Locations/Countries of training 
6. Number of hospital beds in your unit 
Questions: Prompts: 
1. What does the practice of organ Has your personal experience with 
donation mean to you? the organ donation process 
influenced your personal 
commitment to organ donation? 
i.e. Would you donate your family 
member's or~ans? 
2. Do you believe organ donation Donation after Cardiac Death 
should nullify one's preference (DCD)? 
for end-of-life care? Donor management? 
How to prioritise 
Ethical concerns? 
3. In your opinion, what are the Donor management? 
Converting Organ Donors: A Situational Analysis of Australian Physicians 238 
factors that most contribute to Missed donors? 
the successful retrieval of donor Family consent? 
organs at your hospital? Confidence in legislationlbrain death 
criteria? 
Time to discuss with family? 
4. Specifically, what are/are there Recognitionlldentity/Referral 
any other organisational process? 
characteristics and influences Staff cooperation (between nurse, 
that support or impede optimal drs, donation and transplant staff)? 
organ donation rates within Resources for donation and 
hospitals? transplant? Cost versus benefit? 
5. What procedures are mandated Requesting/communication? 
by your unit/organisation with 
respect to the procurement of 
consent for organ donation? 
6. Do these organisational policies, Is education of ICU staff 
procedures and practices continuous? 
resonate with what you feel Would you be interested in receiving 
about donation and greater training? If so, in which 
transplantation? area specifically? 
Brain deathlDCD criteria? 
Requesting/communication training? 
End-of-life care cirricula? 
Medical students? 
7. What do you believe are the Best part of being involved? 
roles and responsibilities of Worst part of being involved? 
physicians like yourself in Fear of perceived or actual conflicts 
improving organ donation rates of interest? 
within Australia? Reluctance to approach? 
Who is accountable for achieving 
standards? 
Should and how could we recognize 
staff accordingly? 
8. What advice do you have for Medical students? 
new intensivists who will be 
involved in the donation or 
transplantation process? 
9. Do you have any other • Thank you again for your 
comments? What questions do time. 
you think I may have missed? • If you have any other 
comments or afterthoughts, 
please feel free to email them 
directly to me at the email 
address at the bottom of the 
PLS. 
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AppendixF 
Ordered Situational Map: Personal and Professional Barriers to Organ 
Donation as Perceived by leU Physicians 
Table Fl. Ordered Situational Map: Personal and Professional Barriers to Organ Donation 
as Perceived by leu Physicians. 
Individual human elements/actors 
Collective human elements/actors 
Nonhuman elements/actants 
Implicated/silent actors/actants 
Key events in situation 
Discursive constructions individual and/or 
collective human actors 
ICU Physicians 
Organ Donation Co-ordinators 
Designated OD officers 
ED doctors 
Pharma and medical supply companies 
Regulatory bodies 
Organ Donation Registries 
Professional Colleges and Societies 
LifeGIFT (VIC and NSW) 
General Society (consent) 
Religious groups 
Clinical and Ethical Guidelines and Standards 
Medical equipment 
Medications 
Brain death diagnostics 
Guidelines 
Legal definitions of death 
Org Don Computer Registries 
PatientslDonors 
Social workers 
Religious staff 
PatientslDonors families and friends 
Recipients and their families 
Nurses 
Certain cultural groups 
National Taskforce 
State Government hospital funding difficulties 
DCD implementation 
Nurses as better for the emotional work 
Physician Conflict of Interest concerns 
Ethical Boundaries 
Deceased known consent 
Physician's own decision to donate 
Physicians power 
Physician uncomfortable about requesting don; 
"Families have been through enough already" I 
Donors "Positive out of tragedy" 
Drs duty of care (full disclosure) 
Doctors guilt about the lost the patient? 
Ethnic cultures as less willing stereotypes 
Families Distrust of Doctors 
Clinical Triggers (e.g. GIVE) 
ADAPT 
Opportunities for donors, families and recipien 
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Table Fl. Ordered Situational Map: Personal and Professional Barriers to Organ Donation 
as Perceived by ICU Physicians. 
Discursive constructions of nonhuman actants Medical technologies as lifesaving or undignif: 
PoliticallEconomiclLegal elements 
SocioculturaVsymbolic elements 
Temporal elements: Australian National 
Historical Frame 
Spatial elements 
Brain death testing as invasive 
Pre-mortem interventions as invasive and unne 
Confusing legal definitions of death 
Taskforce costs 
Cost of dialysis 
Cost of transplantation/anti rejection meds 
Cost to retrieval hospitals 
Costs to transplantation hospital 
Cost of health professionaIJofficer to fill role 0 
Legal definitions of death 
Medical imdemnity concerns 
NOK overules AODR consent 
Ethically lawful practice 
Lack of circulation equates to death 
Different expected and actual consent rates for 
Ord donation seen as the ultimate" altruistic gil 
Organ donation discussion takes time 
Time away from other ICUIED patients 
Time of night when retrieval usually occurs 
Stand-down times 
Aust OD rates (and past unsuccessful reports) 
Donor management and work up time 
ICU bed resources 
Operating room and staff availability 
ED bed resources 
Donor hospital staff resources 
Transplant hospital staff resources 
Major issues/debates (usually contested) DCD 
Related discourses (historical, narrative, 
and/or visual) 
Other key elements 
Legal useful fiction - Brain Death and it's testil 
Categories of donor pool - esp C 
Two legal definitions of death 
Conflict of Interest (caring for patient and don( 
Pre/ante-mortem interventions 
NHMRC Guidelines 
ANZICS guideline 
NSW DCD guidelines 
Individual hospital guidelines and policies 
Families adjustment 
Worldwide comparisons of DPMP (particularl: 
Males dominant in role of ICU physician 
Caucasian dominant in role of ICU physician? 
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Table Fl. Ordered Situational Map: Personal and Professional Barriers to Organ Donation 
as Perceived by ICU Physicians. 
Negotiations ED to Neurosurgeons (DBD) 
ED doctors to ICU physicians 
Neurosurgeons to leu physicians 
leu physicians to nurses 
leu physicians to NOKJFamily 
leu physicians to state-based agencies 
leu physicians to OD co-ordinators 
leu physicians to dedicated hospital OD officI 
leu physicians to transplant surgeons 
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APPENDlXG 
Relational Analysis Situational Map: Focus on ICU Physicians' Application 0/ 
DCD Procedures 
Recipient Pre·mortem Social I Hospnal Policy I I Khown consent I Duty of considernions interventions wor1<ers Dis guik care ~ I legal definnions of death I NDKlfamiiy I Qevelof 
"Posnive out 
comms oftragedy" 
detail) NSW ~ Request I funding discourses Deceased's Indemnity allocations discourses 
, wishes 
Cost Specialist Brain death discourses Potential donor Doctors 
i ICU diagnostic conversion r'3:es emotion/care grving 
I Potential donor 
Nurses kiticipation Be DBD ADAPT NHMRC Drs categories· C assumptions 
I l'IhiCS I guidelines moralny Distrust of 
. about Overcomplication 
NSW dnvers , INOK I Society I discourses 
drs licence patients 
Doctors 00 State 
.. guidelines 8ld of life care Cubural !\JoIZICS Donor consider.Jtions 
'"0 I Donors I identifiction cuniculum 
guidelines 
resources and referral Hospnal I Patients Communication Intellectualisation resources Time 
I \IIC hospnals I Drs personal 
Unn discourses dependant 
procedures National 
Taskforce values ED Colleague Society's Drs own decision environment Drs understanding ethical 
acceptance Drs sl<ill to donate forwnhdrawal and interpretation discourses 
Neurosurgeons li1esatling medical Drs of care ofthe At Transplant centre 
equipment commnment 
I Govemment Clinical Lobby 01\1 Don Death 
triggers I Donor pool groups ADDR Co·ordinators 
Madia ED Religious I Drs atlnudes I 
lifesaving Spanish Conflid of 
staff medications Consent r.Jtes comparisons Interest 
Figure G I. Relational Analysis Situational Map: Focus on ICU Physicians 
Application or DCD Procedures. 
